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ABSTRACT
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, PARENTAL EFFORT AND SCHOOLING
by
Andrew J. Houtenville 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1997
When evaluating public education programs that are aimed at improving student 
achievement, it is often assumed that a child's family background is an exogenous 
factor, albeit an important factor. However, parental decisions may be influenced by 
such programs. It is the assertion of Becker and Tomes (1976) that distortions in 
parental behavior (time allocation) may be one of the reasons that compensatory 
education fails to improve student achievement. In short, parents reduce their own 
effort when school services (schooling) is increased. However, theoretically parental 
responses are ambiguous; parental effort can increase or decrease in response to 
increased schooling. This dissertation investigates the response of parents to changes 
in schooling and the opportunity cost of schooling.
Empirically investigating parental behavior, the National Education 
Longitudinal Study (NELS) is utilized. NELS contains parent, student and school 
administrator surveys along with standardized student examinations. It is the 
comprehensive nature of NELS that allows for the estimation of the model implied by 
Becker and Tomes (1976) for the first time. When schooling is assumed to be 
exogenous, parental effort equations are estimated the results of which are used in the
xiii
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estimation of the household's achievement production function. When schooling is 
assumed to be endogenous, parental effort and schooling equations are estimated, and 
again the results are used to estimate the production function. In addition, tests are 
performed to determining the exogeneity of schooling.
The empirical results suggest that parental effort is influenced by changes in 
schooling and the opportunity cost of schooling. Unfortunately, the results are 
conflicting. Depending on the measure of effort and schooling, some estimated 
coefficients reveal a complementary relationship between schooling and effort, while 
others suggest that schooling and effort are substitutes. With regard to the role of 
schooling, exogeneity tests lend support for the non-exogeneity of schooling. In the 
end, it is concluded that parental effort is influenced by school variables, and the key 
to policy is ensuring that parental responses help rather than hinder policy.
xiv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Few issues receive more attention from the public, politicians, government and 
scholars than child development. First of all, every member of the public was, is or 
acts like a child and therefore has something to say about child development. 
Presidential politicians even debate the locus of child development: the "village" 
versus the "family". In the United States, government programs from Head Start to 
public primary and secondary education to student loans are in part aimed at boosting 
the attainment of the nation's youth. Government spending on primary and secondary 
education alone is roughly 6.6 percent of the United States' gross national product in 
1991, as reported by Haverman and Wolfe (1995). Scholars are not short on words. 
Numerous studies have evaluated the determinants of child attainment as measured by 
cognitive ability, high school graduating rates and labor market wages, to name a few.
One of the most pivotal moments in the child development research was the 
issuing of the 1966 Coleman Report. It offered evidence of the importance of the 
household environment in determining a child's attainment (as measured by cognitive 
ability). In other words, the achievement of primary and secondary students depends 
not only on the school and teachers but on the child and parents. The Coleman Report 
focused the attention of some economists and others away from schools and toward the 
home.
1
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2Rather than viewing the household environment as a static or exogenous factor 
in the determination of a child's academic achievement, this dissertation looks at how 
the constrained choices made by parents influence their child's academic achievement. 
Of particular interest is what happens to the efforts of parents when attempts are made 
by federal, state and local governments to boost student achievement. In theoretical 
models below, it is shown that parental effort may increase or decrease in response to 
such government programs.1 Becker and Tomes (1976) assert that such distortions in 
household behavior may explain the failure of government programs. However, the 
response is ambiguous which means that it is an empirical issue. As a consequence, 
this dissertation provides an empirical analysis of parental effort and achievement and 
shows that parental effort does respond to changes in the school environment but in 
conflicting ways.
General Framework and Central Issues 
The general framework employed in this dissertation to explore parental effort 
and achievement begins with the assumption that all cultures teach their children the 
skills necessary for survival as adults and for the maintenance of the culture. As 
institutions, the family and community ("village") are responsible for the development 
of these skills. However, due to complexity, the family and community depend on 
another institution, the school, to provide services that are too difficult and costly to
1 Briefly, the source of this ambiguity is revealed in the following story. Professor 
Chamberlin is disappointed with the grades of her students, so she improves her lectures.
This action provides her students with two conflicting incentives. On one hand, her students 
can study less while keeping their grade the same. On the other hand, each hour of studying 
(effort) is now more effective and thus reduces the opportunity cost of an additional letter 
grade. In response, her students may study more to obtain higher grades.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3provide in the home and community. In order to produce these skills, the services of
0
the school are combined with other inputs. The observed level of skills and the 
corresponding level of school services are chosen within complex interactions between 
the family, community and the school. In the following discussion, the level of skill is 
called achievement, and the services obtained from the school are called schooling. In 
short, achievement is the performance of a child, while schooling is the exposure a 
child gets to educational material.
The family determines the level of achievement, while the community and 
school influence the decisions of the family via taxes, subsidies and regulations. First 
of all, within the family, parents' preferences for achievement often supersede a 
child's ill-informed preferences. Parents' preferences are realized by providing the 
inputs used to produce achievement, such as schooling, parental effort (assistance with 
homework), books, home computers, etc. and by overseeing the production process. 
The community's preference for achievement is realized by subsidizing the family's 
purchase of inputs (such as schooling, nutrition, and a safe environment) and the 
creation and enforcement of regulations regarding schooling. The school's preferences 
for achievement are realized via their productive efficiency in producing schooling, 
i.e ., their efficiency influences the cost of achievement borne by the family. It is 
important to note that the community and schools can influence achievement by 
influencing schooling; but in order to do so, they must go through the family.
This generai framework facilitates the investigation of the family's response to 
the actions of the community which is the central issue of the analysis presented
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4below; however, the behaviors of the community and school are not explicitly 
modeled. Of particular interest are (1) how parental effort and student achievement 
may change in response to the actions of the community and (2) whether schooling is 
chosen by families or exogenously determined.
Advancements
In the process of investigating parental effort, schooling and achievement, three 
theoretical models are developed within the context of household production and time 
allocation. In general, these models formalize a household's demand for and supply 
of inputs that go into the production of achievement and then describe that household's 
production function for achievement. In essence, the household satisfies its demand 
for achievement via the supply of parental effort and purchasing of schooling. The 
three theoretical models differ in the ability of families to choose schooling; however, 
the aforementioned ambiguity in parental behavior shows up in all three models.
Empirically, following the implications of these theoretical models, reduced 
form effort supply and schooling factor demand equations are estimated, and then 
these results are used to estimate the household production function for achievement. 
(Of course, the schooling equation is dropped if schooling is exogenous. This 
assumption is empirically tested.) The effort supply and schooling demand equations 
address the ambiguities in parental behavior. In particular, the Becker and Tomes' 
(1976) assertion is empirically modeled for the first time with regard to primary and 
secondary education.
The estimates of effort supply and schooling demand are used to consistently
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5estimate the production function, something that has been neglected in the past due to 
data limitations. They lacked either adequate effort data or adequate achievement 
data. In addition, linking effort supply and schooling demand with the production of 
achievement merges the time allocation and household production function literatures 
for the first time with regard to achievement. This is in accordance with a 
recommendation made by Mincer (1977).
None of these advancements would be possible if not for the Restricted-Use 
National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS). This rich data set has been largely 
ignored by the economics literature. It provides individual level data for children, 
their parents and their schools, in addition to other family and household 
characteristics. In particular, along with a child's standardized test score, NELS 
provides measures of his or her parents' effort and characteristics of his or her school. 
With these variables, effort, schooling and achievement equations are estimated.
Jointly investigating time allocation and household production behavior could not be 
performed without such a broad yet detailed data set.
Structure of Following Chapters 
In order to explore parental effort and achievement, this dissertation utilizes the 
family economics, education economics, and public finance literatures. These 
literatures are reviewed in Chapter II. As mentioned above, theoretical and empirical 
models of parental behavior are developed to investigate the determinants of parental 
effort and to explore how these determinants influence the academic achievement of 
children. Schooling as an input into the production of achievement is assumed to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6outside the influence of the family in Chapter m , while schooling is assumed to be 
chosen by the family in Chapter IV. In the last section of Chapter IV, whether 
families choose schooling is tested. A synthesis of results and concluding remarks are 
provided in Chapter V. A list of references plus appendices that include tables, 
mathematical derivations and a description of the data follow Chapter V.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to explain the observed level of achievement and schooling, 
economists focus on the constrained choices of families, communities, and schools and 
the ability of these institutions to influence achievement and schooling. Various fields 
of economics analyze observed achievement and schooling in different ways. First, 
the family economics literature frames the determination of achievement and schooling 
in terms of a family's demand for and production of child quality, where achievement 
is a characteristic of child quality and schooling is an input into the production of child 
quality. Second, the education economics literature evaluates the ability of schools to 
produce achievement and schooling. Third, the public finance literature focuses on the 
community's demand for and supply of achievement and subsequent subsidization of 
schooling. Overall, family economics looks at the constraints and choices of the 
family, while education economics and public finance evaluate the constraints and 
choices of the school and community, respectively.
Family Economics
How families choose achievement and schooling and how families respond to 
the actions of the community and school are investigated in the family economics 
literature. The study of family economics begins with Harvey Leibenstein (1957) and 
Becker (1960) who use consumer theory to model the determinants of fertility
7
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8behavior. Becker (1960) suggests that if parents receive direct utility from children, 
then children are analogous to consumer durables. He also suggests that there is a 
tradeoff between child quantity and child quality, since parents may choose to 
consume many low quality children or a couple of high quality children. One o f the 
characteristics o f child quality that may satisfy a fam ily's demand is a certain level o f 
achievement. In the 1960's, a theory of fertility was developed that posits that the 
demand for children (quantity and quality) depends on family characteristics such as 
income and the value of the parents' time.
Parallel to the fertility theory, Becker (1965) introduces a new element into 
consumer theory - a theory of household production and time allocation. According to 
Becker (1965), the family produces utility generating commodities (like achievement) 
by employing inputs purchased from the market (like schooling) and household inputs 
(like parental effort) in the household's production process. Ignoring intra-family 
interactions, the family's problem is to maximize utility,
(1)
defined over commodities subject to production functions,
ci =fi(xP t,) (i « 1,...,»), (2)
a budget constraint,
(3)
and a time constraint,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9T = H + Ef(, (4)
where U(») is the utility function;
Cj is the i* commodity produced by the family;
fi(«) is the household production function for the i* commodity;
Xj is a vector of Iq market goods used to produce the i* commodity;
Pi is a price vector for the k; market goods used to produce the i* commodity; 
t; is the family time used to produce the i* commodity; 
w is the market wage;
H is the number of hours worked in the labor force;
N is non-labor income;
T is the total time available to the family.2
Substituting the time constraint into the budget constraint creates the "full income"
budget constraint
There are two approaches to solve the family’s problem: the commodity price 
approach and the input approach. In the commodity price approach, the "full income" 
budget constraint is transformed into the commodity price budget constraint,
by using the production functions to substitute for It, and x;, where Jtj(*) is the 
shadow price of the i* commodity. The parameters of the shadow price reflect 
household technology and preferences. The family's problem is to maximize utility 
subject to the commodity price budget constraint. The solution is a set of commodity
2 Assuming there is only one wage earner or that the parents receive the same wage 
simplifies matters greatly.
(5)
wT + N = E*t(pv p * ..., pH, w)c,, (6)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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demand functions,
c, -  CjOtiCpj,..., p„, w),..., n^Cpp..., p„ w), IV, T, w) (i = 1,..., n). (7)
The properties of these commodity demand functions are consistent with the properties 
of traditional demand functions.3 The input demands and time supply equations fo* 
and O  are found residually by entering the optimal commodity into conditional input 
demands and time supply equations.
In the input approach, the production functions are substituted into the utility 
function; therefore, the family's problem is to maximize utility,
WiC*i, *i).... /,(■*„. 0). <8>
subject to the household "full income" budget constraint. The solution is thus the 
family's input demand functions,
V* = ^ (P p - .. P„, w, N, 7) (i = 1,..., n), (9>
and time supply functions,
= tjCPp—.P ,. w», Nt T) (/ = 1,..., n). (10>
The family’s production functions for the desired commodity,
<T O  = 1 «). (11)
are found residually by entering the input demand and time supply functions into the
3 Strong assumptions must be made about the household production function in order to 
derive the commodity demand as a function of the shadow prices. Poliak and Wachter (1975) 
show that constant returns to scale and no joint production of commodities must be assumed, 
otherwise the shadow prices change with the amount of commodities demanded.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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production functions. Note that these production functions for the desired commodity 
are not commodity demand functions, since there is no explicit representation of 
commodity price.4
As a result, the influence of the commodity's shadow price on its demand (dc’’/dT )^ 
cannot be constructed. However, all of the other comparative statics of c ”  and Cj* are 
identical, since they are derived from the same first-order conditions.
National Bureau of Economic Research's (NBER) work on fertility decisions 
(notably, Willis 1973, Becker and Lewis 1973, and De Tray 1973) incorporated the 
new fertility theory and the new theory of household production and time allocation. 
Not surprisingly, family economics views children, in terms of quantity and quality, as 
one of the commodities produced and demanded by the family. These studies 
theoretically and empirically evaluate various aspects of the trade-off between child 
quality and quantity. Another important advancement made in the NBER series is the 
use of educational achievement as an element of child quality. De Tray (1973) uses 
expected county public school per pupil expenditures as a measure of child quality. 
Household Production Function Studies
With achievement as a form of household output, studies estimating 
household production functions of achievement proliferated: Leibowitz (1974a, 1977), 
Fleisher (1977), Mumane, Maynard and Ohls (1981), Behrman and Taubman (1986), 
Stafford (1987), Krein and Beller (1988), and Hanushek (1992). In these studies, the
4 Constant returns to scale and no joint production of commodities do not have to be 
assumed, because the input approach is not trying to derive the commodity demand as a 
function of the shadow price.
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household produces a certain characteristic of child quality, for example, earnings, 
market wage rate, or academic achievement as measured by test scores or grade level 
completed. In general, these characteristics are regressed on household inputs and 
characteristics, such as schooling, proxies for parental effort, the availability of 
reading material, encyclopedias, a television, mother's education, father's education, 
mother's work habits, father's work habits, birth order, number of siblings, gender of 
child, family income, food expenditures, house size, whether the family lives in public 
housing, and whether the parents are divorced.
For example, Leibowitz (1974a) and Fleisher (1977) use a recursive system of 
production functions for I.Q., achievement, and wage/eamings to model the influence 
of household inputs on these three measures of child quality. The I.Q. production 
function,
I.Q. = / ( household inputs),
is imbedded in the achievement (measured by years of education completed) 
production function,
achievement = g(household inputs, I.Q), (13)
which is imbedded in the wage/eamings production function,
wagefeamings = f{household inputs, achievement). (H)
The direction of this recursive system is based on the age when these measures are 
most important and most influenced by household inputs. The endogeneity of 
achievement in the production of earnings/wages follows the human capital production
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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function literature that started with Ben-Porath (1967).5
Coming from a different direction and a static approach, Mumane et al. (1981) 
and Hanushek (1992) include school quality in the achievement production function, 
where achievement is measured by standardized test scores. The family produces 
achievement by mixing exogenously determined schooling with other household inputs 
which are also exogenously determined. In their empirical models, the schooling is 
not chosen by the family, although the authors provide no justification for this 
assumption. However, in a separate section of his paper, Hanushek (1992) estimates 
an equation that suggests a strong relationship between teacher quality and household 
characteristics, but he does not include the insights from this equation in his household 
production model where teacher quality is exogenous. Mumane et al. (1981) discuss 
the ability of families to choose inputs, but do not follow through with this discussion 
in their empirical specifications.
These studies estimate the household production function in order to examine 
the influence of household technology on the determination of achievement. However, 
these household production studies fall short of the theoretical underpinnings of Becker 
(1965) and the NBER work. Recall in the input approach, the solution of Becker's 
(1965) model is a series of household input demand functions (x;**), time supply
1 The human capital approach is complementary to the approach taken in the family 
economics literature, for it simply modifies the family's objective function. Achievement 
becomes a form of human capital which is a means to consumption rather that a consumable 
item. The demand for achievement is a factor demand in the production of wealth and 
depends on the rate of return on achievement. The motivations of the family are placed in 
terms of altruism and inter-generational wealth transfers.
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functions ( O ,  anti residually found production functions for desired achievement 
(C ;* * ). The aforementioned household production studies attempt to estimate the 
household production function for achievement (Cj) but are actually inconsistently 
estimating the production function for desired achievement (c " ).6 With few 
exceptions, the inputs into the production function are considered exogenous to the 
choices made by the household.7 For example, when included, parental effort (or a 
proxy) is exogenous and not explored as a matter of choice.8 Without first estimating 
the input demand and time supply functions, the estimation of a production function is 
not only inconsistent but cannot disentangle household technology from household 
preferences.
Time Supply Studies
In order to produce achievement, the family mixes schooling with other inputs 
such as parental time. Becker's (1965) theory of household production and time 
allocation set the groundwork for numerous time supply studies such as Leibowitz 
(1974b), Gronau (1977), Stafford and Hill (1974, 1977, 1980), Kooreman and
6 Inconsistency exists because of the likely correlation between the error term in the 
production function and error terms of the underlying household's factor demand and time 
supply equations. In other words, inputs are choice variables (endogenous)
7 Leibowitz (1974a) and Fleisher (1977) consider I.Q. as endogenous in the production of 
achievement and then achievement as endogenous in wages/earnings.
8 The shortcomings of all of these studies, except Stafford (1987), are due to a lack of the 
data set that contains detailed information on both household output and inputs. Data sets with 
student achievement are not often collected with specific household input data. For example, 
marital status is sometimes used to proxy parental effort, because presumably married couples 
spend more time with their children. In defense of these household production studies, very 
few microeconomic data surveys contain information on achievement, household inputs, and 
school inputs.
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Kapteyn (1987), and Solberg and Wong (1991). Recall one solution of Becker's
(1965) model is a system of input demand and time supply equations (X;** and tj” ). 
These studies focus on the inputs into household production. They address such issues 
as time allocation among household members, housework, and female labor supply.
In these studies, the household supplies a certain amount of time to a particular task, 
for example, child care time by mother, washing dishes, doing laundry, aggregate 
housework by homemaker, leisure, market work, personal care, and interacting with 
their children (teaching, reading, playing). In general, the amount of time supplied is 
regressed on family characteristics, such as wife's education, husband's education, 
wife's age, husband's age, husband's occupation, wife's work experience, husband's 
wage, wife's wage, predicted housewife's wage, number of children, children's 
gender, children's age, number of children in school, family income, family non-labor 
income, house size, race, and religion.
However, these time supply studies do not follow through with the estimation 
of the production function for desired child quality (Cj**), nor do they look at schooling 
as an input. For example, Gronau (1977) examines the allocation of married women's 
time between work at home, work in the market, and leisure, but he lacks a measure 
of household output which is needed to estimate the commodity demand function. 
Leibowitz (1974b) examines the supply of child care by mothers and focuses on the 
role of the mother's education on time allocation decisions, but she also lacks output 
data. By failing to estimate the production function and other input demand functions 
(such as a factor demand for schooling), the time supply studies can say little about
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the influence of household choices on the determination of the level of output, like 
achievement and the mix of inputs, like schooling.
Merging the Two Lines of Research
From Becker's theory of time allocation and household production, family 
economics splits into two lines of research that differ in their focus on inputs and 
outputs. However, the Hill and Stafford team and Leibowitz participate in both lines 
of research.9 Commenting on Hill and Stafford (1977 - time allocation), Mincer 
(1977) suggests merging time supply and household production function studies. Hill 
and Stafford (1977) do not estimate the household production function for desired 
achievement using their own data. Instead, they cite Leibowitz's (1974a) household 
production function results in order to show a positive correlation between 
achievement and parental time inputs. Mincer (1977, p. 554) states, "[a]ctually, Hill 
and Stafford show no direct relationship between parental time inputs and measures [of 
a] child's development or achievement." In essence, Mincer (1977) wants Hill and 
Stafford (1977) to address the commodity (achievement) that actually motivates the 
supply of time. Stafford (1987) does not attempt such a merger, even though he uses 
a data set with seemingly adequate household output data (standardized student test 
scores). Stafford (1987) does not address Mincer's (1977) criticisms by 
simultaneously estimating household production function and time supply equations. 
Addressing Mincer's (1977) suggestion, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) merge
9 These studies are Leibowitz (1974a, 1977 - household production, 1974b - time 
allocation) Stafford (1987 - household production), Hill and Stafford (1974, 1977, 1980 - time 
allocation)).
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the two branches of the literature by simultaneously estimating household input 
demand equations (X ;**) and the household production function.10 Specifically, 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) estimate the demand for health related inputs and the 
infant health production function. They use the predicted values of the household 
inputs to consistently estimate the production function. In doing so, Rosenzweig and 
Schultz (1983) translate the household production function from a constraint into a 
behavioral relationship; in other words, they translate the production function into the 
production function for desired infant health (c: into Cj**). Recall that this production 
function is not like the standard formulation of a demand equation, because there is no 
explicit commodity price or shadow price. The main emphasis of Rosenzweig and 
Schultz (1983) is on obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters. They do not 
attempt to isolate preferences. Returning to achievement, Rosenzweig and Schultz's 
(1983) empirical model suggests that the input demands for schooling, parental effort, 
and other household inputs must be estimated and the results used to estimate the 
household's production function for desired achievement.
The Family's Response tQ ihg Community and the School
Given Becker's (1965) model of household consumption and production, the 
response of the family to the actions of the community and school may be addressed. 
As previously mentioned, the community influences the family's decisions through the 
taxation, subsidization and regulation of schooling, while school employees influence 
achievement via their efficiency in providing schooling. In family economics, Becker
10 Time use data was not available for the estimation of time supply equations.
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and Tomes (1976) discuss the influence of the community and the school by allowing 
these institutions to influence a child's initial quality endowment. According to Becker 
and Tomes (1976), parents respond to an exogenous increase in a child's quality 
endowment in two ways. On one hand, the increased endowment increases the 
production/consumption possibilities of the parents for all commodities. In response, 
parents shift household resources devoted to child quality away from that child and 
toward other household activities. As a result, the child's quality increases by less 
than the exogenous increase in the child's quality endowment. On the other hand, the 
increased endowment may increase the productivity of the other inputs in the 
production of that child's quality, thereby reducing the shadow price for that child's 
achievement. In response, parents shift household resources toward that child and 
away from other household activities.11 As a result, the child's quality increases by 
more than the exogenous increase in the child's quality endowment. Concerning 
parental effort, schooling, and achievement, this suggests that when the community 
subsidizes schooling, parents may actually reduce the amount of direct effort they 
expend in the production and consumption of achievement, if the first effect dominates 
the second. The amount of achievement may stay the same or increase depending on 
the degree of to which parental effort is reduced.
Compensatory education programs (such as Head Start) are a way for the 
community to subsidize the purchase of schooling by certain families. Becker and
11 Johnson (1978) and Ross (1991) add that all in-kind transfer programs may suffer from 
this adverse redistribution of household resources.
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Tomes (1976) use this result in a discussion of the "failure" of the community to 
influence achievement through compensatory education programs. Such programs 
essentially give parents additional child quality, but parents may use this in-kind 
transfer to redistribute household resources to other activities. Depending on the size 
of the two effects above, compensatory education programs may be ineffective. In the 
extreme, such programs would have no effect on child quality (educational 
achievement). According to Becker (1993, p.274), "[rjedistributions of expenditures 
within families induced by government subsidies can explain why many programs 
appear to have weak effects on participants." Empirically, Peltzman (1973) found 
some evidence that tuition subsidies to higher education reduce the family expenditures 
on higher education. Whether parental effort decreases in response to community 
actions has yet to be explored empirically.
If parents substitute away from the commodity that is targeted by community 
programs (like compensatory education), then communities must take this into 
consideration when designing such programs. Likewise, an economist evaluating the 
effectiveness of such programs must also consider the distortionary effect the programs 
have on household resource allocation and consumption.
Education Economics 
To this point, family behavior and the influence of community actions on 
family behavior are discussed. In this section, the discussion revolves around the 
actions of the school and the impact of these actions on family decisions. The 
education economics literature provides insight into the actions of the school.
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School Production Function Studies
The ability of schools to produce achievement is the focus of numerous school 
production function studies. Similar to the household production function, the school 
produces achievement by mixing certain school inputs such as per pupil expenditures, 
student-teacher ratios, teacher qualifications, etc. These school inputs are chosen 
according to some unspecified school objective function. However, similar to the 
shortcoming of household production studies, family characteristics are assumed to be 
exogenous. In other words, family characteristics are entered into the school 
production function but are not considered to be influenced by the actions of the 
school.
The school production function literature is rooted in the "Coleman Report"
(1966). This controversial and highly cited report finds that school inputs do not 
influence student achievement, while family background is extremely influential. The 
"Coleman Report" led to the proliferation of studies estimating public school 
production functions. Lending support to the "Coleman Report" (1966), Hanushek 
(1979, 1981, 1986) surveys these studies and concludes that school inputs do not 
influence student achievement, while the family background is very influential. These 
conclusions support the approach taken in family economics where the focus is on the 
constraints and choices of the family and not the ability of the school to produce 
achievement.
Impact of the School on Family Decisions
Hanushek's (1986) conclusions do not mean that actions of the school or school
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employees should be ignored. There is important insight to be gained from 
Hanushek's conclusions. Hanushek (1986, pp. 1166) asserts, ”[i]f we think of schools 
as maximizing student achievement, the [inability of school inputs to influence 
achievement] indicates that [public] schools are economically inefficient, because they 
pay for attributes that are not systematically related to achievement." This suggests 
that schools are following an alternative objective function, and that the allocation of 
school resources runs counter to the objectives of the family and community who 
desire school inputs that maximize generation achievement for the minimum costs.
Although, without controlling for the endogeneity of household variables, such 
a conclusion cannot be reached. It may be the case that the objective function of 
schools is to maximize achievement, but the objectives of families dampen the ability 
of schools to boost achievement. For example, suppose that a school increases its 
productive efficiency (increase schooling) in the hopes of boosting student 
achievement. According to Becker and Tomes (1976), families respond to this in-kind 
transfer of schooling and achievement. Some families may respond by reducing their 
efforts holding achievement constant, while other families increase their efforts and 
increase achievement. A production function for student achievement that does not 
consider the endogeneity of family inputs would show school inputs being ineffective 
and family characteristics being influential.
The problem with the school production function approach is that schools 
produce schooling not achievement. The interaction of school and families is best 
understood in family economics where the actions of the school increases or decreases
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the cost of achievement faced by the family. If the school is maximizing achievement, 
then it must go through the family to satisfy its objective function.12
Public Finance and Schooling Regulations 
To this point, three broad assumptions are made. First, the family maximizes 
utility subject to household constraints. In order to do so, the family mixes inputs 
such as schooling and time to produce utility generating child achievement. 
Importantly, schooling is assumed to be a matter o f choice. Second, subsidies from 
the community alleviate the influence of household constraints by giving the family 
additional resources to be used in the production of achievement. Third, the behavior 
of schools also influences the household constraints via the cost of schooling.13 
However, the community also imposes regulations on schooling that introduce an 
additional constraint on the ability of the family to choose schooling and achievement. 
The degree to which schooling should be treated as endogenous to the family depends 
on the degree to which these schooling regulations are binding.
In the United States, there are two important ways in which the community 
regulates the family with regard to schooling. First, families are required to provide 
children a minimum level of schooling. Although varying across states, this minimum 
level of schooling often takes the form of minimum years, days and hours of 
schooling. If  parents choose to provide schooling in the home and forgo public and
12 Mumane et al. (1981) and Hanushek (1992) looked at the influence of schooling on the 
household production of achievement, but they lack an adequate measure of household inputs 
to explore the influence of schooling or its cost on the household's choice of inputs.
13 If schooling is exogenous to the family's decisions, the school and community can 
influence the level of schooling directly. This option is explored below.
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private institutions, these parents must meet certain minimum standards. The second 
and more important schooling regulation is the mandatory public provision of 
schooling and accompanying taxation which forces the family to pay for public 
schooling regardless of whether they utilize it.
How these regulations are chosen and the degree to which they constrain a 
family's decisions is addressed in the public finance literature. Numerous approaches 
are taken to explain the provision of public schooling, such as the Tiebout model, the 
median voter model, and the competing Leviathans model. In some of these models, 
schooling is exogenous to the choices of the family, while in other models schooling is 
endogenous. A major issue addressed in the sections to follow is whether schooling is 
an input demand for households or an exogenous factor.
Tiebout Model and Endogenous Schooling
The Tiebout model of publicly provided goods allows the family to choose the 
level of public schooling. Tiebout (1965) advances a Pure Theory o f Local 
Expenditures in response to work by Richard A. Musgrave and Paul A. Samuelson in 
public finance theory that modeled federally provided public goods. Given federal 
provision, the only recourse of the "consumer-voter" was to satisfy their preference 
through political mechanisms. Tiebout (1956) points out that many governmental 
services are locally provided, such as public schooling. Given local provision,
Tiebout (1965, p. 418) asserts that "consumer-voters" may satisfy their preferences by 
"picking the community that best satisfies his preferences for public goods." 
Metaphorically, the "consumer-voters" shop or vote with their feet. Musgrave and
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Samuelson's implicit assumption of federal provision did not give "consumer-voters" a 
choice. Assuming perfect mobility of households and the absence of institutional 
inefficiencies, the family moves to the jurisdiction that provided its utility maximizing 
bundle of publicly provided goods.
In essence, the Tiebout model equates the family and the community by placing 
the family as the central decision-maker. The objective function and constraints of the 
family explain the observed level of publicly provided schooling.14 A family moves to 
the school district with their optimal level of schooling. Given perfect mobility and 
the absence of institutional inefficiencies, the observed public schooling in a school 
district is consistent with the preferences of every family within this school district. 
Given the homogeneity of the community, the family mirrors the community. This 
result also allows conclusions to be drawn about family preferences by using school 
district level data.
Returning to family economics, if the family behaves according to the Tiebout 
hypothesis, the observed level of schooling should be treated as endogenous.15 
Achievement will differ within a school district depending on the other inputs provided 
by the family.
Median Voter Model and Exogenous Schooling
To the contrary, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) place the community (the 
electorate) in the role of the decision maker. By assuming a majority rules voting
14 This holds regardless of whether schooling is a "public" good or a "private" good.
15 The cost of mobility would be a part of the cost a family incurs to obtain and adjust 
schooling (transactions costs).
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scheme, the preferences and constraints of the median voter determine the level of 
public schooling. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) derive and then estimate the 
median voter's and thus the community's demand function for local public schooling 
(as measure by per pupil expenditures). This means that public schooling is 
exogenous to non-median families. In order to obtain optimal achievement, such 
families must compensate for the inappropriate level of public schooling by adjusting 
other inputs or by opting for private schooling.
Competing Leviathans Model
Placing the preferences of the public producer in the forefront, the Leviathan 
model approaches the determination of public schooling from the supply side.16 
Leviathan (the public provider) maximizes its own utility or wealth by providing the 
cost minimizing level of public schooling with a revenue maximizing tax structure.
The level of public schooling is provided with the minimum of its resources. In this 
fashion Leviathan maximizes the transformation of tax dollars into its own private 
consumption.
In a simple Leviathan model, the choice of schooling is exogenous to the 
family. However, if the family behaves according to the Tiebout hypothesis, the 
Leviathan Model provides a supply side to the Tiebout hypothesis. Like the 
monopolist, the ability of Leviathan to extract surplus from consumer-citizens is 
constrained by the degree of competition from Leviathans in other locations, which
16 Recall that schooling is defined as the level of services received at the school, therefore 
the Leviathan Model only describes who determines schooling not achievement.
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depends on the degree to which the consumer-citizens are mobile. The ability of 
Leviathan to impose its objectives on consumer-citizens decreases with the mobility 
(elasticity of demand) of the consumer-citizen and the responsiveness of other 
Leviathans. Schmidt and Schmidt (1995) explore the degree to which public providers 
compete. In contrast, an immobile median voter is subjected to both the tax structure 
and level of public schooling mandated by Leviathan. Also, Leviathan does not 
compete with private schools, because the consumer-citizen must still pay taxes. 
Leviathan would rather see children go to private schools which removes the expense 
of schooling such children.
Incorporation of Private Schooling Alternatives
The existence of private schools cannot be ignored in a discussion of the ability 
of the family to choose schooling. The public finance literature takes various 
approaches to including the existence of private schooling alternatives. In these 
approaches, the family is constrained by schooling regulations and the choices of the 
median voter, but the existence of private schools partially lifts the constraint of these 
regulations.
Sonstelie (1982) adapts the median voter model. Private schools exist because 
some families demand a level of schooling that is higher than that demanded by the 
median voter. Sonstelie (1982) derives and estimates the median voter's schooling 
demand function and the reservation level of schooling of a representative family.17 If
17 An often overlooked difficulty with such studies is that the median voter theorem may 
fail because the existence of private schools may lead to multi-peaked preferences.
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the median voter prefers a level of public schooling below the reservation level of 
schooling, then the representative family with children sends its children to private 
schools.
In contrast, Schmidt (1992) derives the demand for private schooling by 
combining the median voter model and Tiebout model with imperfectly mobile 
households. Imperfect mobility necessitates an alternative method of determining the 
level of public schooling. Hence, Schmidt (1992) assumes the level of public 
schooling in a district is determined by the median voter. However, she allows non­
median voter families to maximize their utility by choosing among a discrete 
distribution of public and private schooling alternatives. This model is much different 
from the Tiebout model, for in the Tiebout model there is no need for private schools, 
because individual families maximize utility by moving. Tiebout (19S6) uses the 
family's decision making process to explain public provision. In this model, the 
voting mechanism determines the level of public schooling produced, but the 
individual families determine the level of schooling they ultimately consume. In 
essence, Schmidt (1992) places the family in control of schooling, but the family can 
only choose between a public school and private alternative.
Conclusions of Ihg Literature Review 
The general framework presented in the Introduction assumes that the family 
chooses the level c f achievement and the corresponding level of parental effort and 
perhaps schooling subject to household constraints and the behavior of the community. 
This general framework facilitates the investigation of the family's response to the
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actions of the community, which is the central issue of the analysis presented below. 
Of particular interest are whether families can choose the level of schooling and how 
parental effort changes in response to the actions of the community.
The literature presented above supports this general framework. Family 
economics, which is best represented by Becker (1965) and Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1983), provides a model of household choice. Education economics lends insights 
into school behavior. And public finance provides different ways to view the 
household's ability to choose schooling in the context of mandatory public provision of 
schooling and the existence of private school alternatives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER m
ENDOGENOUS EFFORT AND EXOGENOUS SCHOOLING MODEL
Altogether, three theoretical models are presented in this chapter and chapter 4. 
They are designed to embody the general framework and facilitate the investigation of 
the central issues described in the Introduction (page 2). These models follow 
Becker's (1965) theory of household production and time allocation and draw upon the 
insights of Becker and Tomes (1976). The basic assumption of these three models is 
that parents desire child academic achievement and oversee the production of this 
achievement. Parents produce academic achievement by mixing the effort they expend 
(parental effort) with schooling. This implies that the parents have a parental effort 
supply equation, a schooling factor demand equation and an achievement demand 
equation.
These models vary according to the ability of the family to choose schooling.
In the first model, schooling is exogenous to the choices of the family. The family 
cannot move to another school district and does not have private school alternatives.
In this case, the family may be subject to the preferences of the median voter or a 
Leviathan-like public provider. The second model is similar but allows the family to 
choose the amount of schooling used in the production of achievement. Schooling is 
measured in uniform units and is available at a constant price. There is no distinction 
between public and private providers of schooling.
29
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A very simplified version of the parents' problem shows the differences among 
these two models. Suppose that the family consumes two things, schooling (S) and all 
other goods (C). In Figure 1, the family's indifference curve and budget constraint 
depict how the family maximizes utility. If schooling is exogenously determined (as in 
the model presented in this chapter) then the family may be stuck with a sub-optimal 
bundle, point W in Figure 1. If the family can choose the level of schooling at some 
constant price (as in the simple model of Chapter IV), then the family will adjust 
schooling and the composite commodity accordingly, point X in Figure 1.
In a third, more realistic model, schooling is endogenous and the family 
chooses the level of schooling from a choice set of private and public schools. When 
choosing a school from their choice set, the family faces a fee schedule associated 
with their choice set. This fee may vary in a non-constant way with the level of 
schooling provided by school. In short, the price is the change in the fee due to a 
change in the level of schooling.
This more realistic model does not easily fit into Figure 1. Instead, Figure 2 
depicts the fee/schooling (total outlay) schedule for two families, k,F(S) and k2F(S). 
(The public and private decision is ignored for simplicity.) Each point on a 
fee/schooling schedule represents the fee and schooling of a particular school in a 
family’s choice set.18 When a family chooses a school, it is choosing the fee it pays 
and the level of schooling the school provides. In Figure 2, the two families face 
different schedules because they face different choice sets. Choice sets may vary
18 The marginal price of schooling is the slope of the fee/schooling schedule.
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according to the easy of switching schools and the degree of competition. There may 
be transactions costs present in one choice set that are not present in another. And/or 
competition may drive down the cost of schooling and drive up the quality of the 
schools in the choice set. In Figure 2, all levels of schooling are available for both 
families to purchase, but the fee paid varies because of costs associated with their 
different choice sets. This difference is captured in the proportional shifters (k, and 
<2), which plays an important role in the empirical section of Chapter IV.
In short, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the differences among the theoretical models 
presented below. The constraints on the family become much more complex with the 
inclusion of the production function for achievement and the ability of the family to 
adjust household inputs.
Theoretical Model of Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling 
To begin with the case of exogenous schooling, simplifying Becker's (1965) 
model outlined in equations (1) through (4), parents are assumed to derive utility from 
their child's achievement (A), a composite good (C) and leisure (L). Like the 
commodities (Cj) in equation (2), achievement is produced by mixing certain inputs. It 
is assumed that parents mix their effort (E) and schooling (S) to produce achievement 
according to some production function.
In the model explored in this chapter, schooling is assumed to be exogenous; 
the family has no influence over the level of schooling received by its children.
Perhaps there are no private schools, and the level of schooling may be determined by 
the median voter, a pure Leviathan with no competition, or some other mechanism
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over which the family has no influence. In Becker's (1965) model this assumption is 
analogous to holding an input purchased in the market (xj constant. The exogeneity 
of schooling forces the family to adjust other household and market inputs in order to 
produce the utility maximizing level of achievement. Analogous to Becker's (1965) 
time inputs (tj), parents may adjust the amount of effort they expend on the child. If 
the exogenous level of schooling (S°) changes, perhaps due to changes in public 
policy, then the amount of parental effort may change.
To formalize this simplification of Becker's (1965) model, the parents' problem 
is to maximize utility,
W.  £). <15>
which is a function of a composite good (C), leisure (L), and the academic 
achievement of their children (A). This maximization process is subject to a budget 
constraint,
p sS° + p cC = wH + N (budget constraint), ^
a time constraint and the household production function for achievement,
T = H + L + E (itime constraint), (1?)
A = /(£ , S°) (household production Junction), WO
where U(«) is the utility function;
A is the academic Achievement of their children; 
f(«) is the household production function;
E is time (Effort) devoted to their children's education;
S° is the exogenous level of Schooling;
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C is a Composite of all other goods;
L is Leisure time; 
ps is the price of S°; 
p c is the price of C; 
w is the market wage;
H is labor market time;
N is non-labor income;
T is the maximum Time available to the parents.19
It is assumed that U(«) is separable, differentiable, and strictly quasi-concave, and 
f(«) is differentiable and strictly concave.20 The sign of fSE is ambiguous but assumed 
non-negative.21 By normalizing p c to one and substituting the constraints and the 
production function into the utility function, the parents' problem is
m ax^ u <f(E> s °)> wT + N - wE - wL - p JS°, L), (19)
The first-order conditions are
UJE - wUc = 0, (20)
UL -w U c = 0. (21)
The second-order conditions are
19 The amount the family pays for schooling may be a nonlinear function of the level of 
schooling. However, it is assumed in this model that the price of schooling is a constant.
20 Removing the separability assumption does not substantively change the result 
presented below, but is assumed in order to simplify the discussion. In addition, 
assuming a single wage rate for the family greatly simplifies matters.
21 This means that additional parental effort doesn't decrease the productivity of 
schooling and vice versa.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
10,1 ■  V M e  ♦  VJa  *  < 0.  * * * >
|0 2l -  * VJcJlU LL * w'UcJ  * w % cVLL > 0. C»)
The parents maximize their utility by choosing effort and leisure,
E = E (w ,T ,N ,p s,S°) ,
L = L{w, Tt N, p \  S°). (2S)
The production function for desired achievement is residually found as
A = f(E(wt T ,N ,p s,S°) ,S°) .  <26>
In the time allocation framework, the wage is the opportunity cost of time as
can be seen in the budget constraint. The response of the parental effort to a change 
in wage is a function of negative substitution effect and a positive income effect,
£w * GUcUll * [T-L-E\En >«< 0. (27)
The negative substitution effect follows from the fact that an increase in wage 
increases the opportunity cost of effort (and therefore the opportunity cost of 
achievement), which in turn, causes parents to reduce effort and switch to leisure 
and/or the composite commodity. However, the positive income effect arises because 
an increase in wage increases income and therefore causes parents to provide more
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effort; i.e., obtain more achievement.22 Note, there is no substitution among the 
inputs in the household production process because of the exogeneity o f schooling; i.e. 
one of two inputs is fixed. In the next chapter, this form of substitution is important 
when schooling is assumed to be endogenous. (The comparative statics of the parental 
effort equation are derived in the Mathematical Appendix.)
More interesting is the change in effort with in response to a change in 
exogenous schooling. The community and school influence the family's decisions by 
changing the level of schooling and/or the price of schooling. For example, the level 
of schooling (S) increases in minimum standards, while an alternative is to reduce the 
price of schooling (ps) with a matching grant. The relationship between parental effort 
and schooling is shown by the response of parental effort (E) to changes in schooling 
(S),
* -Vs * -GHtu/MK v ' Ucc * v i i  * w*vcc * Vtl) , <M)
where G is the reciprocal of | G21, and En is the change in parental effort due to a 
change in non-labor income.23 Similar to Becker and Tomes' (1976) discussion on 
compensatory education, parents respond to a change in schooling in three ways. E$ 
is comprised of a negative income effect, a negative achievement effect, and a positive
22 Effort (and therefore achievement) is a normal good, En > 0 . This follows 
from the assumption of a separable utility function; i.e., the utility derived from one 
good does not effect the utility derived from another.
23 Separability makes achievement a normal good, En > 0. Assuming a non- 
separable utility function makes the income effect En ambiguous and the three effects 
more complex and ambiguous, as well. However, the general interpretation of the 
three effects still holds.
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productivity effect. First, the negative income effect (-EnPs) stems from the fact that a 
change in schooling changes the household's disposable full income (wT +  N - psS), 
assuming that parents must pay for the change in schooling.24 This reduction in 
disposable full income reduces the level of achievement attainable by the parents and 
therefore the level of parental effort diminishes. In other words, in order to pay for 
the additional schooling, the parents must forgo other activities, one of which might be 
achievement/parental effort.
The achievement and productivity effects follow from changes in the 
production relationship between parental effort and schooling. The negative 
achievement effect (-G [ U ^ ^ f J  [w2Ucc +  U jJ  < 0) reflects the fact that an increase 
in schooling allows parents to lower their efforts while maintaining the chosen level of 
academic achievement.25 In contrast, the positive productivity effect (-GfUAfsaKVUcc 
+  UlJ  > 0, given fSE >  0) reflects the fact that an increase in schooling raises the 
marginal productivity of parental effort (fg), thereby reducing the per unit opportunity 
cost of achievement.26 In short, an increase in schooling reduces the shadow price of 
achievement and therefore increases the quantity of achievement demanded. In order 
to produce this higher level of achievement, the parents must increase their effort.
24 Different methods of funding the increase in schooling will have different 
impacts on parental full disposable income.
25 The [w2Ucc +  UgJ term appears in both production related effects. This term 
basically scales the achievement and productivity effect by the parents' preferences for 
alternative uses of their time.
26 This can be shown by manipulating the first-order conditions.
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The sign of Es is ambiguous and depends on the strengths of the income, 
achievement, and productivity effects. Parents may respond to an increase in 
schooling by increasing or decreasing the level of effort they expend on their child's 
education. Recall that Becker and Tomes (1976) linked the failure of compensatory 
education to a decrease in the household inputs. However, it may be the case that 
household inputs (like parental effort) increase in response to community efforts, 
especially if the family does not pay for the additional schooling (i.e., no negative 
income effect on parental efforts).
Instead of increasing schooling, suppose in an attempt to increase achievement, 
the community lowers the price of schooling.27 The response of parental effort (E) to 
changes in the price of schooling (ps) is
Ef  = -EnS° < 0. (29)
When the price of schooling is lowered, parental effort increases and therefore 
achievement increases. This result follows from an increase in the family's feasible 
production/consumption set and lends support for the public subsidization of schooling. 
Since schooling is exogenously determined, cross-price substitution effects do not 
exist, because the family cannot substitute schooling for parental effort. Rather, Ep» 
only contains an income effect, because a change in the price of schooling does not 
influence household production relationships. By decreasing the price of schooling the
27 The price of schooling may be reduced improving the efficiency of the school 
system or by shifting the property tax burden more toward non-residential property or 
by increasing state aid that is funded through broad based taxes, etc.
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community can increase achievement, but if the community increases the level of 
schooling, parental effort may decrease and achievement may remain the same. 
Reducing parental effort is likely not what the community intended to accomplish.
Empirical Model of Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling 
In the theoretical model presented above, the response of parents to changes in 
schooling is ambiguous. How parents respond to the actions of the community and 
school is therefore an empirical question. Based on their theoretical work, Becker and 
Tomes (1976) assert that the reallocation of household resources may cause 
compensatory education programs to be ineffective. This dissertation provides the 
first empirical exploration of this assertion. The foundations of this advancement are 
found in Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) and Hanushek (1986). Rosenzweig and 
Schultz (1983) estimate the demand for health related inputs and the infant health 
production function, while Hanushek (1986) provides insight into estimating an 
achievement production function.
Following P.osenzweig and Schultz (1983), given the exogeneity of schooling, 
the Erst step is to estimate a reduced form parental effort supply equation,
E, = y'X{ + e,, (30)
where the vector X contains schooling and family characteristics like the parents' 
wages and non-labor income. The coefficient on schooling represents the 
substitutability or complementarity between parental effort and schooling. The next 
step is to estimate the production function for desired achievement using the expected 
value of parental effort derived from the first step,
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A, = * & % ]  + a'x, + vr (31)
The coefficient on expected parental effort is a E. Estimating equation (31) provides a 
consistent estimate of the family's production function for achievement, i.e., the 
measurement of parental effort is purged of the correlation between e; and v;. The x 
vector is a subset of the X vector. It includes schooling and family characteristics but 
excludes the wages of the parents. Wages represent the opportunity cost of parental 
effort and only influence the achievement through parental effort. Before explicitly 
describing the variables that represent effort, schooling and family characteristics, a 
description of the data set that supplies these variables is provided.
Description of the Data Set
In order tc estimate the model above, a comprehensive data set that reports a 
child's achievement, his or her parents' effort, his or her schooling and other 
characteristics is needed. The United States Department of Education's Restricted Use 
National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) is such a data set. In fact it is the 
scale and scope of the NELS data set that eliminates that constraints faced by previous 
studies.
NELS is a comprehensive three wave (1988, 1990, 1992), national survey of 
24,599 students and their parents, teachers, and school administrators. The students 
(from 815 public schools and 237 private schools) were in the eighth grade in 1988. 
Along with the survey, each student took standardized tests in reading, mathematics, 
science, and social studies. NELS follows and re-tests the same students from 8lh
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grade to 10* grade to 12th grade.28
Using the 8* grade surveys is preferred, because parental effort is more 
relevant in 8* grade than in 10* grade. Unfortunately, in order to control for prior 
achievement, which is stressed throughout the achievement production function 
literature, the 10* grade surveys (1990) need to be used, because the 8* grade surveys 
do not contain a measure of prior achievement.
In preparing the NELS data set for the estimation of the effort equation and 
production function, five basic cuts were made. First, 10,361 observations (42 
percent of the 24,599 observations in NELS) are dropped. These observations are 
missing the student survey, parent survey or student examination for 1988 (8* grade) 
or the student survey and student exam for 1990 (10* grade).29 Second, 17 
observations (0.001 percent of the remaining 14,238) are dropped, because the parents 
are the same gender which makes it difficult to code mother and father variables.30 
Third, 8,307 observations (58 percent of the remaining 14,221) are dropped. These 
observations lack one or more of the relevant variables. Fourth, 946 observations (16 
percent of the remaining 5,914) are dropped because the family is headed by a single 
parent. Including single parent families in the same equation as two parent families
28 The use is restricted due to confidentiality issues. The Public Release NELS 
does not contain continuous measures of schooling, for fear that someone will be able 
to identify a specific school and thus a specific school administrator.
29 One of the major shortcomings of NELS is that it does not contain parents 
surveys for 1990, therefore some of the family information (wages and income) are 
1988 figures. See the Data Appendix for more detail.
30 "Mother" and "father" represent a parent, step-parent or individuals similar to a 
step-parent.
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creates problems with father and mother variables. Entering zero for the missing 
parent's education makes it difficult to interpret the estimated coefficient on mother's 
and father's education.31 The last cut is to drop 809 observations (16 percent of the 
remaining 4968) because these families send their eighth grade child to private school. 
These private school families are dropped, because schooling is clearly endogenous for 
these families.32 However, these families are utilized below when schooling is 
explored as a matter of choice. In the end, 4519 two parent families (18.4 percent of 
the 24,599 families in NELS) remain. These two parent families send their eighth 
graders to public school (public school families) and have complete information on the 
relevant variables.
Econometrics Techniques and Issues
NELS provides the relevant variables needed to estimate the parental effort 
supply and the achievement production function. These variables are described below 
and briefly in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Means and 
standard deviations are reported for continuous variables, while frequencies and 
relative frequencies are reported for dummy variables (denotes by superscript cross).
However, the two step procedures and the nature of the data create problems in 
the estimation of the coefficients and standard errors and in the interpretation of the
31 Separate equations for single parent equations are not estimated for simplicity 
and left for future research.
32 Only using public school families could lead to sample selection bias. This 
possibility is explored in the next chapter when parents are assumed to be able to 
choose schooling.
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coefficients. Starting with the effort equation, actual parental effort (E) is not 
observed. Instead, three variables are used to represent actual parental effort. They 
are the responses of a child to three questions on the 10th grade survey. Check is how 
frequently his or her parents "check on" his or her homework: never, rarely, 
sometimes, often. Discuss is how frequently his or her parents "discuss things" 
studied in school: never, sometimes, often.33 Event is whether the parent attends 
"school events" in which the child participates. Separate equations are estimated for 
these three representations of actual parental effort (E).
The categorical and qualitative nature of these measures of parental effort 
necessitates the use of qualitative-variable econometric models to estimate the 
relationship between parental effort and the independent variables like schooling. The 
way children categorize their parents is assumed to reflect the underlying actual 
parental effort (E).34 For example,
If Discuss =  never = 0, then E <  E,;
If Discuss =  sometimes = 1, then E, <  E <
If Discuss =  often =  2, then E > Ej,
where E, and E2 are threshold values that separate the categories. The ordered probit 
model is used for Check and Discuss, because they have more than two categories 
and the ordering is meaningful; i.e., less to more parental effort. This econometric 
model estimates the threshold values (MU's in the tables) that put parents into a
33 The question that Discuss is based upon does not have a "rarely" category.
34 Of course, a child’s perception may differ from his or her parents' and may 
depend of the child's gender. Such issue are left for future research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
particular category.35 Tne probit model is used for Events, because it has only two 
categories and thus no threshold values need to be estimated.36 Ordered probit simply 
uses the information revealed by the ordering. In short, these econometric models 
estimate the relationship between actual parental effort and the independent variables 
by looking at the probabilities of falling into a particular category.37 The LIMDEP 
statistical package is used to estimate these models via maximum-likelihood estimation.
In the second step, following much of the education production function 
literature, the dependent variable in the achievement equation (Achieve) is a student's 
score on part of the 10th grade standardized test. This partial score is based on a 
subset of reading and mathematics questions. Importantly, this subset of questions is 
defined by the creators of NELS and described as being "consistent" across the 1988 
(8* grade) examination and 1990 (10th grade) examination. The importance of the 
1988 examination is discussed shortly.
This partial test score (Achieve) is a continuous variable so ordinary least 
squares regression model (OLS) is used. However, while the coefficients of the 
production functions are valid, the standard errors obtained from OLS are biased.
35 During the estimation of the ordered probit equation one of these E, is 
normalized to zero.
36 An option for future research is to join these three measures into one variable 
with 24 possible categories and then estimate a pan-parental effort using multi-nominal 
logit or nested logit.
37 The probit models assume that the underlying actual level of effort is normally 
distributed and the probability of being in a category is drawn from the standard 
normal distribution. Gujarati (1988) provides a readable and basic explanation of 
these models, while Maddala (1982) is a more comprehensive and sophisticated 
exposition.
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Recall parental effort is a matter of choice; using the expected value of the parental 
effort measures rather than the actual value purges 8; of its correlation with v;. More 
explicitly, the estimated parameters of the Check, Discuss and Event equations are 
used to compute the expected values of parental effort, x(Check), x(Discuss) and 
x(Event). The probability of the parent being in the highest category, 
p(Check=often) and p(Discuss=often), could be entered into the achievement 
equation. Their estimated coefficients would be easy to interpret. But information 
about the probabilities of the other categories would not be not utilized. In order to 
minimize the loss of information the expected values, x(Check) and x(Discuss), are 
entered into achievement equations. The expected values of a multiple-response 
categorical variable is a weighted sum of the probabilities: x(Check) equals 
0*p(Check=never) +  l*p(Check=rarely) +  2 *p(Check= sometimes) + 
3*p(Check=often). Similarly, x(Discuss) equals 0*p(Discuss=never) +
1 *p(Discuss= sometimes) +  2*p(Discuss=often). From the Event equation xfEvent) 
is calculated in the same fashion, l*p(Event=go).
Unfortunately, the statistical package used to run OLS does not distinguish 
between expected values and actual values. As a result, the estimated standard errors, 
which enter into the calculation of the t-ratios, are biased. Typically, the correct 
standard errors are calculated in an additional step by using actual effort (E), but here, 
this secondary calculation is not possible because actual effort (E) is not observed.
Only the categorical responses are available. There are methods of calculating the 
correct covariance matrix when the first stage is a single probit equation and the
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second stage is ordinary least squares.38 However, when the first stage is more than 
one endogenous categorical variable, the calculation of the correct covariance matrix 
becomes more complex. Deriving the correct covariance matrix is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. Instead, to resolve this problem, a bootstrap procedure is used to 
get estimates of the standard errors.
Following Efron and Gong (1983), this bootstrap procedure treats the data set 
(4,159 observations) like the universal population. One thousand random samples of 
4,159 observations are drawn with replacement from the data set. These 1,000 
samples are used to estimate 1,000 achievement equations. For each variable, the 
standard deviation of the 1,000 estimated coefficients is an estimate of the coefficient's 
standard error.
Regarding the interpretation of the coefficients, the results of the effort and 
achievement equations are presented in Tables 4 and 6, respectively. For the effort 
equations, the reported estimated coefficients of the probit or ordered probit models 
are not the marginal effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable as in 
OLS. The reported coefficients represent f  of equation (31), which is the influence 
of independent variables on the actual effort (E).39 Of course, the actual effort is not 
observed given the discrete nature of the data. Recall these econometric models 
estimate the relationship between actual parental effort and the independent variables
38 See Maddala (1983), page 167.
39 More specifically, it represents the relationship between the actual effort and the 
independent variables that are scaled by the actual error term.
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by looking at the probabilities of falling into a particular category.
In order to aid the discussion of the influences of the independent variables on 
parental effort, Table 5 reports the change in the probability (at the sample means) of 
the parents being in the highest category (p(Check=often), p(Discuss=often), 
p(Event=go)) due to a standard deviation change in continuous variables. For 
dummy variables, the difference between the probability of the parents being in the 
highest category with and without the dummy variable (except the regional dummies) 
are calculated. These calculations use the coefficients reported in Table 4.
For a different reason, the OLS estimated coefficients of the achievement 
equations are also difficult to interpret. In order to obtain "consistent" test scores 
across the 1988 (8th grade) examination and 1990 (10* grade) examination, the 
creators of NELS transformed the test score into an almost uninterpretable index. As 
a result, the marginal influence (magnitude) of an independent variable is difficult to 
interpret, and the discussion below focuses on the signs and statistical significance of 
the estimated coefficients.
For brevity, a statistically significant variable is termed as "influencing" the 
dependent variable or being "statistically significant" rather than stating, "according to 
this subsample of NELS this variable has a statistically significant influence on the 
dependent variable because the null hypothesis that, in the population, this variable has 
no influence on the dependent variable is rejected with a degree of confidence of 90 
percent or greater." Similarly, statistically /^significant variables are interpreted as 
"not influencing" the dependent or being "statistically insignificant" rather than stating,
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"according to this subsample of NELS this variable has a statistically insignificant 
influence on the dependent variable because the null hypothesis that, in the population, 
this variable has no influence on the dependent variable fails to be rejected with a 
confidence level of 90 percent or greater."
There is another difficulty involved in the interpretation of the coefficients in 
both the effort and achievement equations. During the estimation of the three effort 
equations, the log-likelihood function would not converge in LIMDEP. This problem 
is common, so much so that possible solutions are presented in the LIMDEP manual 
on page vii, between the Preface and the [Table of] Contents. In order to assist 
LIMDEP, some of the independent variables are scaled down. For example, the 
family's income needed to be multiplied by 0.00001. The scaling factors are reported 
in Table 1. The coefficients o f all the effort and achievement equations are fo r the 
scaled down independent variables. Re-adjusting the coefficients would have 
necessitated the use of scientific notation.40 Note, the means and standard deviations 
in Table 2 are not scaled down. The numbers reported in Table 5 are not influenced 
by the scaling down of the independent variables.
Dependent Variables
Estimation issues aside, there are three measures of parental effort (E). They 
are based on the response of the child to three questions: (Check) how frequently his 
or her parents "check on" his or her homework, (Discuss) how frequently his or her
40 For example, the coefficient on family income in the Discuss in Table 4 is 
0.4628. Re-adjusted for the scaling causes this coefficient to be 4.63E-07.
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parents "discuss things” studied in school and (Events) whether the parent attends 
"school events” in which the child participates. Again, Table 1 contains definitions of 
these and other variables.
Check is a problematic measure of parental effort, because it is ambiguously 
related to the production of achievement. The causality between achievement and the 
act of "checking on" homework is in doubt, especially for 10th graders who are well 
into their education. For some families, "checking on" homework may indicate more 
effort and thus more achievement, while for other families, it may indicate the child 
needs help because they are not achieving. This problem makes it difficult to interpret 
results and may make the coefficients indistinguishable from zero.
As a measure of parental effort, Event is also problematic. Whether parents 
go to events the child participates in is relative to the number of events in the school. 
Unfortunately, Event is not adjusted for the number of school events because this 
number is not available. As a result, it will not be surprising to see a positive 
relationship between parental effort and the amount of school resources.
Perhaps the purest measure of parental effort is how often parents discuss 
things learned in school with their child (Discuss). This measure reflects the overall 
interest and involvement of the parents. However, discussing things is probably the 
least time consuming of the three measures (especially Event); therefore, the parents' 
wages may not accurately reflect the opportunity costs of the effort they expend. 
Independent Variables and Hypothesis Signs
In accordance with the general framework of Chapter I and the theoretical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
model explored in this chapter, parental effort (E) and a child's achievement (A) are 
influenced by the school and household environments. A set of independent variables 
is used to represent these environments. These variables are broken down into five 
groups which are schooling, child, parent, family and demographic. As a guide, their 
hypothesized influences on the parental effort (E) and achievement (A) are outlined in 
Figure 3.
To begin, the schooling (services received at school) received by the child is 
represented by a set of school characteristics. Of these school characteristics, three 
represent the school's teachers: the teacher student ratio (Tea/Stu), lowest salary 
received by a teacher (LowSal), and the percentage of teachers with a Master's or a 
doctoral degree (%Degree). A higher teacher student ratio (Tea/Stu) provides a child 
with better instruction and thus represents more schooling. The higher the lowest 
salary (LowSal) the better paid faculty and thus better schooling, assuming better paid 
faculty are better instructors. The greater the percentage of teachers with advanced 
degrees (%Degree), the better the instruction is at the school; i.e., more schooling.
A child's school experience is greatly influenced by the students with which he 
or she associates. There are also two measures of the child’s peers: the percentage of 
the student body net in the school's subsidized lunch program (%NonLun) and the 
percentage of non-minority students in the student body (%NonMin). A student in a 
subsidized lunch program is likely to come from an income constrained family that 
provides fewer educational opportunities. Associating with such constrained children 
may diminish the schooling of other children. Thus, an increase in the percentage of
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the student body not in the school's subsidized lunch program (%NonLun) represents 
an increase in schooling. Similarly, given past discrimination, minority students may 
have had fewer educational opportunities. Therefore, an increase in the percentage of 
non-minority students in the student body (%NonMin) also represents an increase in 
schooling.
The last variable to represent schooling is whether a child is in a non-urban 
environment. Schools in urban areas are more likely to face a whole host of 
problems, such as aging infrastructure, inadequate educational material and under- 
funding. Thus, being in a non-urban environment (NonUrb) represents an increase in 
schooling.
Note that an increase in each of the schooling variables represents an increase 
in schooling, hence, the use of the teacher-student ratio instead of the more commonly 
used student-teacher ratio. The influence of an increase in schooling on parental effort 
is ambiguous according to the theoretical model above; thus, there are no expectations 
regarding the influence of the schooling variables on parental effort (Check, Discuss, 
Event). However, in the production of achievement, an increase in schooling is 
expected to increase the level of achievement (Achieve). If a child receives more 
services, then he or she will achieve more.
Turning to the characteristics of the child, in accordance with the education 
production function literature, the 8th grade score (Prior_A) is entered as an 
independent variable in the achievement equation in order to reduce the influence of 
inherent intelligence. Including Prior_A transforms the achievement equation such
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that the family is producing "value-added" to the test score.41 An increase in Prior_A 
is expected to increase a child's current achievement (Achieve), because a child who 
does well in 8th grade should do well in 10th grade.
The level of prior achievement (Prior_A) is also included in the effort 
equation. A child that has did well in the past may reflect past parental effort or 
reflect that such a child doesn't need parental effort in the current period, which 
suggests a negative relationship between prior achievement and current parental effort. 
However, such a child's parents may be likely to supply the same high level of effort, 
which suggests a positive relationship between prior achievement and current parental 
effort. As a result, there is no firm expectation with respect to the influence of prior 
achievement Prior A on parental effort.
Whether a child is considered a problem child (by the parents) (BadChild) may 
attract or repel parental effort. Parents may be trying to rectify the problem with 
increased effort, or they may not wish to invest effort in a problem child because the 
effort may be in vain.42 Or perhaps the causality is reversed: the child is a problem 
due to the lack of parental effort. In the end, no conjectures are made about the 
influence of a problem child on parental effort. In production, a problem child 
(BadChild) should diminish the level of achievement produced (Achieve). If the 
opposite holds true, then perhaps the parents' view of the child is not entirely valid.
41 Of course, the "value added" may be a function of inherent ability.
42 Parental effort may be negatively related to a problem child because a problem 
child reports effort differently than a none problem child.
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The last o f the child's variables to enter into the supply of effort and 
production of achievement is whether the child is female (Girl). Similar to the 
reported lack of attention received from teachers, female children may attract less 
attention from their parents as compared to male children. However, it may be the 
case that parents compensate for the lack of attention at school by providing more 
effort. Thus, the expected influence of a daughter (Girl) on parental effort is 
ambiguous. Likewise, in production, the gender of the child may have a positive or 
negative influence on achievement. The coordination of a girl's education may be 
easier than a boy's if they tend to be better behaved, but the inclusion of prior 
achievement and whether the child is a problem child should account for difficult boys 
(or girls).
Turning to the characteristics of the parents, parental education (M_Ed and 
F_Ed) ambiguously influences parental effort. On one hand, more educated parents 
may recognize the benefits of academic achievement and therefore provide more 
effort. On the other hand, less educated parents may better recognize the 
disadvantages of inadequate academic achievement and also provide more effort. In 
production, a positive relationship between parental education and achievement 
(Achieve) is expected since more educated parents may be better able to coordinate 
production and provide higher quality effort.
Due to past racial discrimination in the allocation of educational resources, the 
schooling of non-white parents may be lower in quality than their white counterparts. 
Thus the influence of a parent's race (NonWhite) may have a confounding effect on
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parental education. In essence the non-white variable controls may include some 
negative effects of past discrimination.
The religious affiliation is included in both equations and reports whether the 
parent that answered the questionnaire is Catholic (Catholic). No conjectures are 
made regarding its sign.43
Whether the father is the parent most involved in the child's education 
(F_Invol) is another characteristic included in both the effort and achievement 
equations. No expectation is held regarding the influence of whether the father is the 
most involved parent.
Theoretically, wage (w) is the opportunity cost of an additional unit of 
parental time. The influence of wage on parental effort is ambiguous due to classic 
income and substitution effects. (See equation A20 in the Mathematical Appendix the 
derivation of the E*.) An increase in the wage increases income and therefore the 
ability of the household to consume all goods. However, increasing wages raises the 
marginal cost of a unit of achievement by increasing the foregone earnings from 
parental effort; this leads to a decrease in achievement and thus effort expended. 
Empirically, the mother's and father's hourly wage enter into the parental effort 
equation (M_Wage and F_Wage) with no expectations regarding their influence.44
43 This variable plays an important role later in the endogenous schooling model.
44 The wage measures were created by using a NELS occupation question and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics median weekly earnings by occupation, by gender. Home­
makers received the wage for his or her gender's overall market wage as a measure of 
their foregone market wage. This may overstate a home-maker's wage, because he or 
she is staying home forgoing his or her market wage, because he or she has a low
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Wages influence achievement indirectly through parental effort, but wages do 
not directly influence coordination and production abilities of parents, especially since 
parents' education is included to capture the abilities of parents. Wages do not enter 
the achievement equation and are the identifying variables for the production 
parameters.
One of the most interesting family characteristics is the number of siblings 
(Sibs). The number of children should have a negative influence on effort.45 One 
might expect the number of siblings to reduce time available (T) to spend on the 
surveyed child thereby reducing the amount of effort. However, this direction of 
influence may exist because sibling effort is substituting for parental effort. In the 
production function, there may be significant jointness and economies of scale in the 
number of children that affect positively the level of achievement produced.
With the inclusion of wages, family income (Income) should to some degree 
represent non-labor income (N). Assuming achievement is a normal good, families 
with more non-labor income should expend more effort in order to realize additional 
achievement, for they can afford to forgo earnings. Of course, this assumes 
achievement is a normal good. With regard to production of achievement, family 
income represents the presence of other household inputs not taken into consideration 
and thus has a positive effect on the production of achievement.
earning potential.
45 In family economics, the number of children is often consider a choice variable 
and much is made of the tradeoff between child quality (achievement) and the quantity 
of children.
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The impact of household capital on the provision of effort and production of 
achievement is represented by the availability of study aids and household appliances. 
The availability of a computer, encyclopedia and study room (Aid) (like schooling) 
may complement or substitute for parental effort; therefore, no conjecture is possible 
with regard to their influence on parental effort. However, in the production of 
achievement, study aids should increase the productivity of the household and the 
child's achievement. Along the same lines, the lack of access to time saving 
household appliances, such as a washer, dryer and dishwasher (LimCap), should 
reduce parental effort since it reduces the time a parent can spend with his or her child 
on educational activities. Regarding achievement, limited access to such appliances 
reduces the ability of parents to coordinate household production.
Controlling for other exogenous forces, regional dummy variables (NorthCen, 
South, West) are included in the effort and achievement equations. No expectations 
of their influence on effort or achievement are held.
Interpretations of Results
In the first step, three effort equations (Check, Discuss, Event) are estimated; 
the results are in Table 4. In the second step, a linear production function is estimated 
via ordinary least squares (OLS) and with parental effort represented by the expected 
value of parental effort obtained from the first stage. The production functions are 
presented in Table 6. Recall the standard errors are estimated using a bootstrap 
procedure.
To recap, the. characteristics of schools, parents, children, and household effect
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achievement in two ways: (1) indirectly, by influencing the effort that parents supply, 
and (2) directly (except wages), by influencing the production of achievement. The 
expected value of effort captures the indirect impact.
Exogenous Effort and Schooling Model - Before looking at the results o f the 
two step estimation procedure, a replication of the aforementioned household 
production function literature is explored by estimating the achievement production 
equation with exogenously determined parental effort and schooling; i.e., eliminating 
the estimation of the effort equations. This replication allows for the verification of 
previous studies and also provides the assurance that the data used in this dissertation 
is not behaving in an unanticipated fashion.
Using the variables discussed above, except wages, three separate household 
achievement production functions are estimated for each measure of parental effort 
(Check, Discuss, Event). A fourth achievement equation, titled All, is estimated; it 
includes all three measures of parental effort at once. The parental effort variables are 
coded as dummy variables. The lowest effort categories are omitted (Check =  never, 
Discuss =  never, Event =  don't go). Check is broken into three dummy variables 
(rarely, sometimes and often), while Discuss is broken into two dummy variables 
(sometimes or often). The Event dummy variable represents the parents going to 
school events. The ordinary least squares results of these production functions are 
presented in Table 3.
Looking across the columns of Table 3, the signs of the coefficients remain the 
same, whether they are statistically significant or not. In addition, statistical
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significance is consistent across all four equations. Thus, including all three measures 
in one household achievement production function (All) does not lead to appreciable 
multi-collinearity. Given the similarity across the four equations, only the results of 
fourth equation (All) are interpreted below.
Starting with parental effort, Discuss and Event are statistically significant, 
while Check is not. So, parents discussing things learned in school with their child 
positively influences the child's achievement, and this effect increases the more 
frequently discussion takes place, since the coefficient on Discuss=often is larger than 
the coefficient on Discuss= some. Similarly, the children of parents who go to school 
events achieve more than the children of parents who do not go to school events. 
Checking on a child's homework does not influence the child's achievement; this may 
be the result of a reversal of causality for parents with low achieving children. Low 
achievement leads to more frequent checking, while more frequent checking leads to 
high achievement.46
This supports the results of Stafford (1987). He estimates an achievement 
investment equation rather than a household production function. The difference is in 
the theoretical underpinnings which leads to the inclusion of the mother's predicted 
wage. In his regressions, F-tests reveal that a number of variables measuring 
mother's time jointly influence the cognitive skills of the child. Similarly, Leibowitz 
(1977) shows that a child's vocabulary increases when parents spend time reading with
46 Interpreting the numerical value of the coefficient in achievement equations is 
difficult, because the test score provided in NELS is a complex calculation designed to 
obtain consistency across the 8th and 10th grade examinations.
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a child.
Regarding the other important input into a child's education, the schooling 
variables do not influence the level of achievement produced by the family with two 
exceptions.47 The percentage of teachers with advanced degrees (%Degree) positively 
influences the level of achievement produced by a family. This one result is consistent 
with expectations - an increase in schooling increases achievement. However, against 
expectations families in non-urban areas (NonUrb) produce less achievement then 
their urban counterparts; i.e., an increase in schooling does not increase achievement. 
This result may be due to noise in this measure which lumps together suburban with 
rural schools and aging central cities with all other cities. Some rural schools face the 
same resource problems as aging central cities. Nevertheless, contrary to 
expectations, urban families still produce more achievement.
The studies of achievement with explicit measures of parental effort, Leibowitz 
(1977) and Stafford (1987), do not possess measures of schooling, because these 
studies are based on household surveys and have no information of the child's school. 
Comparison to Hanushek (1992) and Mumane et al. (1981) is difficult, for they use 
dummy variables to represent the impact of a particular school. This method is used 
because their data is drawn from 13 public schools in Gary, Indiana. In both studies, 
F-tests on the school dummies suggest that "the school" is influential, but the direction 
of their results are not discussed by the authors.
47 There is severe multi-collinearity in this model, but it is discussed in the next 
chapter.
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As for the characteristics of the child, the child's prior achievement (Prior A) 
positively influenced the level of current achievement. This unsurprising result is 
consistent with the findings of Murnane et al. (1981) and Hanushek (1992).48 In 
contrast to prior achievement, a problem child (BadChild) makes it more difficult to 
produce achievement as compared to his or her less troublesome counterpart. There is 
no difference between the achievement produced by families with female 10th graders 
than families with male 10th graders; the other two studies mentioned above find 
similar results. However, Hanushek (1992) finds that female children outperform 
male children when achievement is measured with a reading test. In addition to 
parental effort, the education of the parents (Ed_M and Ed_F) also positively 
influences in a child's achievement, which suggests better educated parents are better 
at coordinating a child's education and perhaps they may provide better quality 
parental effort. Leibowitz (1977) and Murnane et al. (1981) find evidence that 
achievement increases with mother's education, but father's education has no such 
influence.
Regarding the other parent characteristics, neither the race of the parents 
(NonWhite), the religious affiliation of the parents (Catholic), nor whether the father 
is the most involved parent (F_Invol) are statically significant. Leibowitz (1977) also 
finds that race does not play a role in achievement when parental time inputs are taken
48 The null hypothesis that the population coefficient on Prior_A is equal to one 
is rejected in all four equations. As a result, it would be improper to use the 
difference of the 1990 and 1988 test scores as a measure of achievement. Such a 
measure implicitly assumes a one to one relationship between the current and prior test 
scores.
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into consideration.
Turning to the family variables, like the other two studies, the number of 
siblings (Sibs) is found to negatively influence the level of achievement produced by 
the household. As the number of children in the household increases, it appears that 
resources are being spread thin and/or there are problems coordinating education.49 
The negative influence of siblings is present in Leibowitz (1977), Murnane et al.
(1981) and Hanushek (1992). Contrary to Murnane et al. (1981) and Stafford (1987), 
family income (Income) does not influence the level of achievement produced. Their 
studies reveal a positive relationship between income and achievement.
Similar to Leibowitz (1977) the availability of study aids (Aid) like 
encyclopedias or a computer positively impacts the level of achievement.
Families in the western region of the United States produce more achievement 
than contemporaries in the other regions of the United States. No intuition exists 
about why this is the case, and the demographic variables are not discussed below.
Replicating the household production function studies provides perspective on 
the advancements offered below; i.e., the consistent estimation of the household 
production function for achievement. It also suggests the subset of NELS used in this 
dissertation is roughly in line with the data sets used in other studies.
Effort Equations - Estimating the household production function treating 
parental effort as exogenous leads to inconsistent estimates. Effort is a choice
49 In a different framework, this result may suggest the tradeoff between child 
quality and child quantity. Of course, achievement is measured by the performance of 
only die child in 10th grade.
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variable. Parents supply effort in order to obtain their desired level of achievement.
In order to purge the household production function of the endogenous household 
behavior (the correlation between e; and Vj), the effort supply equation is estimated in 
the first step and the expected value of effort entered into the production function.
The results of estimating the reduced form effort supply equation are in Table 4.
Recall the estimated coefficients that result from probit and ordered probit are difficult 
to interpret. In order to facilitate interpretation, the change in the probability (at the 
sample means) of the parents being in the highest category (p(Check=often), 
p(Discuss=often), p(Event=go)) due to a standard deviation change in a variable is 
calculated for each continuous variable. For dummy variables, the difference between 
the probability of the parents being in the highest category with and without the 
dummy variable (except the regional dummies) are calculated. These calculations are 
presented in Table 5.
Looking across the three effort equations in Table 4, each of the independent 
variables influences Check, Discuss and Event in the same fashion; i.e., the signs are 
the same with a few exceptions. This reveals that these three measures are capturing 
the same type of behavior, because the parents are reacting to the constraints and 
characteristics of the household in the same manner. For example, the coefficients 
are positive for wages, family income, study aids and parents’ education and wage, 
while the coefficients are negative for limited household capital and the number of 
siblings.
Looking at specific variables, an increase in each of the school variables
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represents an increase in schooling, and recall that the influence of schooling on 
parental effort is ambiguous in the theoretical model. The estimates of the three effort 
equations suggest a mixed relationship between schooling and parental effort, and this 
relationship differs over the three measures of parental effort. In the Discuss 
equation, 5 of the 6 schooling coefficients are negative. This suggests that parents 
supply less effort when the child receives more schooling; however, none are 
statistically significant.
In the Check equation, the signs on the schooling coefficients are more mixed; 
4 o f 6 are negative. Again, this hints that parents reduce effort when the child 
receives more schooling. However, only the percentage of students not in subsidized 
lunch programs (%NonLun) influences the frequency of checking. For example, an 
increase in %NonLun by one standard deviation (17.4 percent) decreases the 
probability that parents "often check" on their child's homework by 0.01, whereas the 
probability of parents checking on homework often at the sample mean is 0.25. Thus 
an increase in this one measure of schooling reduces the level of parental effort as 
measured by checking on homework.
The results of the Event equation suggest a stronger relationship between 
parental effort and schooling. All of the schooling measured are statistically 
significant, except the percentage of non-minority students. However, some suggest a 
negative relationship, while others represent a positive relationship. Similar to Check, 
an increase in %NonLun by one standard deviation (17.4 percent) decreases the 
probability that parents go to school events by 0.02, where the probability of parents
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go to school events is 0.62 at the sample mean.
Similarly, an increase in the percentage of teachers with advanced degrees 
(%Degree) by one standard deviation (0.2 percent) reduces the probability that parents 
go to school events by 0.03. The probability that parents go to school events 
decreases by 0.02 when the lowest salary (LowSal) increases by one standard 
deviation ($2,900). These results suggest an increase in schooling substitutes for 
parental effort.
To the contrary, the estimated coefficients on the teacher student ratio 
(Tea/Stu) and the non-urban dummy variable (NonUrb) suggest a complementary 
relationship between schooling and parental effort. An increase in the teacher student 
ratio by one standard deviation (0.016 teachers) increases the probability that parents 
go to school events by 0.03. A school with more teachers per pupil can put on more 
events, and these events are avenues for parental effort. Along the same lines, the 
probability of going to events is higher by 0.02 for parents in non-urban area 
(NonUrb). Non-urban areas are hypothesized to have more resources and thus may 
provide more events for children to participate in.
So what conclusions can be made about the influence of exogenous schooling 
on parental effort? The signs in the Check and Event equations hint at substitution 
between schooling and parental effort. However, only whether parents go to school 
events is influenced consistently by schooling. Likelihood ratio tests of the joint 
significance of the schooling variables confirm these findings. The hypothesis that the 
schooling coefficients simultaneously have no influence is rejected in only the Event
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equation, but the signs of these coefficients send mixed signals. On one hand, 
increases in %NonLun, % Degree and LowSal (increases in schooling) reduce 
parental effort. On the other hand, NonUrb and an increase in Tea/Stu (increases in 
schooling) foster parental effort.
However, a slight pattern arises in the results of the Event equation. The 
substitutes for parental effort, %Degree and LowSal, reflect the quality of the 
teaching staff. The other substitute, %NonLun, reflects the quality of the student 
body. Now, the complement, Tea/Stu, represents the volume of teachers. (Being in 
a non-urban area straddles both quality and quantity.) Holding quantity constant, the 
quality of school resources is a substitute for parental effort. Perhaps parents 
withdraw effort when they believe their children are in good hands. In contrast, 
holding quality constant, the quantity of school resources complements parental effort. 
Perhaps the quantity of school resources facilitates parental effort.
Unfortunately, the time allocation literature does not offer any insight or 
support for these results. This literature looks at things like the availability of reading 
material but (due to a lack of data) does not explore schooling as an input into the 
household production/time allocation process. This omission also reflects the tendency 
for this literature to be rooted in "housework" and female labor supply decisions, 
while this study is rooted in the education literature.
The time allocation literature addresses many of the parents' and household 
characteristics included in the three effort equations. In particular, it focuses on the 
education of the mother. Leibowitz (1974b) and Hill and Stafford (1977, 1980) show
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that more educated mothers spend more time on child care activities. Their findings 
are supported by the results of this study. Parental effort as measured by Discuss and 
Event is positively influenced by mother's education (M_Ed). The same influence is 
found in the Check equation, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. A 
standard deviation rise in mother's education (2.7 years) increases the probability that 
she and her husband discuss things by 0.03 and go to school events by 0.02. This 
suggests that more educated parents provide more effort in order to obtain a higher 
level of achievement.
Although positive in all three equations, the education of the father is only 
statistically significant in the Discuss equation. When the father's education (F_Ed) 
increases by one standard deviation (4 years), the probability that parents discuss 
school with their child increases by 0.01. So more educated parents are more likely to 
provide more effort, as measured by how often they discuss things learned in school 
with their child. Leibowitz (1974b) finds similar behavior.
Earlier it is hypothesized that the race of the parents may represent past 
discrimination in allocation of educational resources and thus have the opposite 
influence of parents' education. In the Check equation non-white parents are more 
likely to provide more effort as measured by checking on homework. The probability 
that Non-white parents often check on homework is 0.03 more than white parents.
This contradicts expectations spelled out above, and this coefficient is statistically 
significant.
Twenty percent of the sample reveals that the father is the most involved parent
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(F Invol). In the Discuss and Check equations, the coefficients on this variable are 
positive yet statistically insignificant. It is positive and statistically significant in the 
Event equation. When the father is the most involved parent, parents are less likely 
to go to events; the probability is reduced by 0.04. This may reveal constraints on the 
mother's time that reduces the ability of parents to provide certain types of effort like 
going to school events.
In the Event equation, as compared to their non-Catholic peers, Catholic 
parents are more likely to go to school events; the probability is increased by 0.33 
(from 0.60 to 0.93).50 Perhaps the Catholic focus on church and community, rather 
than on an individual relationship with a deity, leads to more outgoing parents.
(Recall these are public school families; private school families are dropped in this 
chapter.)
Turning to the child's characteristics, parental effort as measured by Event 
increases with prior achievement; this suggests that the parents of high achieving 
children supply the same high level of effort they did in prior years. However, this 
could be due to children with higher Prior_A participate in more school events; thus, 
their parents are more likely to go to these events. As mentioned earlier, as a 
dependent variable, Event needs to be adjusted for how many events in which the 
child can participate.
Similarly, but without such problems, a positive relationship between parental 
effort and prior achievement is revealed in the Discuss equation; this coefficient is
50 The calculation of this figure has been double checked.
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positive and close to being statistically significant. This hints that Discussion of school 
occurs more frequently in households with high achieving children as represented by 
prior achievement.
In contrast, in the Check equation parents of a high achieving child are less 
likely to check often on their child's homework. This suggests that checking on 
homework is punitive or an act of trying to correct past problems. It may reflect past 
parental effort or that such a child may not need parental effort in the current period, 
which suggests a negative relationship between prior achievement and current parental 
effort.51
In a similar characterization of the child, problem children (BadChild) have 
parents that are less likely to often check on homework; their probability is lower by 
0.06. The probability that such parents go to school events is 0.09 lower than their 
counter-parts with a non-problem child. These results are supported by the negative 
coefficient on BadChild in the Discuss equations. These findings may reflect that 
problem children do not bring home homework or participate in school events. Or 
perhaps there is a reversal of causality where uninterested parents lead to problem children.52
51 As a lagged endogenous variable, Prior_A may be correlated with the error 
term of the effort equation and thus lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
coefficients; perhaps, effort supply takes a while to adjust. However, dropping 
Prior_A from the effort equations does not change any of the coefficients' signs or 
statistical significance.
52 The first interpretation suggests that parental effort is relative to what is 
happening in schoc1 and the dependent variable needs to be adjusted accordingly. The 
second interpretation suggests that the problem child is a measure of child quality like 
achievement and thus endogenous. Exploring these complications is left to future 
research.
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It is sometimes suggested that boys crowd out girls for the attention of a 
teacher. Could the same thing be happening in the home? The results of the Discuss 
and Event equations say no; the opposite holds true. Female children receive more 
parental effort; perhaps, parents are compensating for the lack of attention received 
from teachers. Parents of girls are more likely to often discuss things she learned in 
school and more likely to go to school events in which she participates.53 For girls, 
the probability of discussing often increases by 0.06, and the probability of going to 
events increases by 0.03. The difference between girls and boys or perhaps the 
preferences and habits of the parents may be the source of this differential treatment. 
Hill and Stafford's (1977) results regarding the influence of a child's gender are 
mixed; in some instances, more time is devoted to sons, while in others more time is 
devoted to daughters depending on parents' education.
The existence of siblings in the household reduces parental effort as represented 
measured by all three measures. An increase in the number of siblings by one 
standard deviation (2.2 siblings) decreased the probability of (a) checking often by 
0.02, (b) discussing often by 0.02 and (c) going to events by 0.03. This supports the 
notion that these parents are more constrained and/or the effort of siblings substitutes 
for the effort of parents. Similarly, Hill and Stafford (1977) find that the presence of 
older children reduces the housework of mothers in lower socioeconomic households.
Aid, Income and LimCap reflect the resources of the family. Across the
53 In a future study devoted to child gender, the existence of a male sibling will be 
entered and interacted with the girl variable.
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board, the signs of the coefficients of these variables reveal that a lack of resources 
constrains the supply of parental effort. The signs of these coefficients suggest that 
family income (Income) and the availability of study aids (Aid) are positively related 
to parental effort, and limited access to household capital is negatively related to 
parental effort. Looking at the statistically significant variables, wealthier families 
may have more time available for time consuming parental duties, like going to school 
events. Limited access to household capital (washer, dryer or dishwasher), as 
expected, reduces parental effort, suggesting such parents are more constrained by the 
other household duties. Limited households are less likely to often discuss school and 
less likely to go to school events (probabilities decrease by 0.02 and 0.08, 
respectively).
Lastly, in all three equations, the mother's wage positively influences parental 
effort, while the father's wage is statistically insignificant, although all are positive. 
Recall that wage reflects the opportunity cost of time; however, its influence is 
ambiguous because of traditional income and substitution effects.34 The results show 
that an increase in the mother's wage by one standard deviation ($3.20) leads to the 
probabilities of (a) checking often increases by 0.01, (b) discussing often increases by 
0.01, and (c) going to events by 0.02. This result suggests that the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect; in other words, the ability to consume more
34 As mentioned earlier, it is assumed in this study that parents do not receive 
utility from effort other than the through the achievement it produces. In part, the 
validity of this assumption determines the validity of representing the opportunity cost 
of effort with market wages.
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achievement due to higher full income dominates the effect of the increase in the 
opportunity costs of effort/achievement. (See equation A20 in the Mathematical 
Appendix the derivation of the E*.)
Going through the results coefficient by coefficient sheds light on relationships 
between parental effort and the independent variables, but what can be said about the 
three measures of effort? Looking at each equation, the Event equation is clearly 
influenced by a variety of household and school variables, but as a measure of parental 
effort it has problems, because the results suggest it needs to be adjusted for the 
frequency that the child participates in events and the availability of school events. In 
contrast, the other two measures of parental effort are not as influenced by school 
characteristics but respond to the constraints and attributes of the household.
Achievement Equations - The provision of parental effort is determined by the 
desire to consume achievement. As mentioned above, the chosen level of parental 
effort must be represented by the expected values of parental effort, x(Check), 
x(Discuss) and x(Event). As in the case of the production functions with exogenous 
parental effort, a separate household achievement production function is estimated for 
each measure of parental effort, x(Check), x(Discuss), x(Event). A fourth 
achievement equation, titled x(AU), is estimated; it includes all three measures of 
parental effort at once. As before, wages (M_Wage and F_Wage) are not included, 
although now they act as the identifiers of the achievement equations. The estimation 
of the fourth achievement equation includes the three expected values; therefore,
M  Wage and F_Wage are not enough for identification. As a result, the x(All)
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x(AU) equation relies on wages and the non-linearity of the expected values for its 
identification. The results of the achievement equations are Table 6, and a summary 
of the all achievement equations estimated in this dissertation is provided in Table 19.
As expected, parental effort contributes positively to a child's achievement. 
When entered separately, an increase in the expected value of effort raises a child's 
achievement. This supports the findings of Leibowitz (1977) and Stafford (1987).
One difference from the previous model (xx) is that checking on a child's homework 
now increases achievement. Previously, checking on a child's homework had no 
influence of achievement. However, when the three measures of effort are entered 
together in the All equation, only the expected value of Event remains statistically 
significant; it is still positive.
Surprisingly, adjusting for parental effort supply behavior takes away the 
influence of the mother's and father's education (M_Ed and F_Ed), in all four 
equations. So, other than their influence on parental effort, parents' educations do not 
affect achievement. This runs contrary to the findings of Leibowitz (1977), Murnane 
et al. and the exogenous effort and schooling (xx) model.
Other differences between the exogenous effort and endogenous effort models, 
the negative influence of the number of siblings (Sibs) no longer exists, as measured 
in all four achievement equations. Siblings no longer influence their sister or 
brother's achievement. They constrain effort, but they do not strain family resources 
in a direct fashion as is found in many of the previous studies of a child's 
achievement, including the exogenous effort and schooling model (xx).
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Even more surprising, across the four achievement equations, the level of 
family income (Family) now negatively influences a child's achievement, where it 
previously had a positive insignificant influence. Low income families are expected to 
have fewer resources (that are not accounted for) and thus produce less achievement, 
all else held constant. No intuition exists as to why families with higher income 
produce less achievement. This result contradicts the positive influence found by 
Stafford (1987).
Another interesting result, is that the negative influence of a problem child 
(BadChild) no longer exists. Recall the parents of problem children provided less 
effort. This suggests that a problem child's achievement is due to the reaction of the 
parents and not directly a result of the child's performance.
In achievement equations with Discuss and Event, female children achieve less 
than their male counterparts. Recall parents of girls are more likely to discuss school 
and go to events. This effort increases achievement. Adjusting for this behavior, the 
direct effect of being female is to reduce achievement; this result is not supported by 
other studies.
Many of the coefficients of the family variables in the achievement equation 
with exogenous effort (xx model) are supported in the literature. However, the results 
are not so complementary to previous studies when parental behavior is explicitly 
modeled. Notably, constraints on the family resources (more children, the lack of 
income, study aids and household physical capital) no longer bring down a child's 
achievement. Such constraints influence achievement through the provision of parental
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effort. In addition, parents' education, a  positive measure of family resources, no 
longer boosts achievement.
Looking at the schooling variables, Leibowitz (1977) and Stafford (1987) do 
not possess measures of schooling, while Hanushek (1992) and Murnane et al. (1981) 
use fixed effects for schools. In the exogenous effort model (xx), there are only two 
influential variables: (a) being in a non-urban area (an increase in schooling) reduces 
achievement and (b) an increase in the percentage of teachers with advanced degrees 
(an increase in schooling) raises achievement. These results hold in all four 
achievement equations.
However, in the model with endogenous effort (ex), the influence of schooling 
varies over the four achievement equations. Again, the percentage of teachers with 
advanced degrees (%Degree) positively influences the achievement of the child; 
however, it is only statistically significant in the Event and All equations. In addition, 
the strange result that a non-urban environment reduces the level of child achievement 
still holds in the first three achievement equations.
In the achievement equation with Event entered as the measure of parental 
effort, all of the schooling variables are influential. The influences of the student 
body variables (%NonLun and %NonMin) are mixed. The measures representing the 
teaching staff (LowSal, Tea/Stu and %Degree) show a positive relationship between 
schooling and achievement. These are the variables that policy-makers can influence. 
However, given the lack of support in the other achievement equations, it is difficult 
to draw sweeping conclusions about policy.
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Conclusions of the Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model 
The focus of this chapter is to explore the response of parental effort to 
changes in schooling under the assumption that schooling is exogenous. Along the 
way there is general support for many of the findings in the time allocation and 
household production function literatures. As for effort and schooling, the results are 
mixed. Some suggest complementarity, while others suggest substitutability. The 
effort of going to school events in which the child participates is influenced by school 
resources. From this measure of effort, it is shown that the quantity of school 
resources complements parental effort, while parents substitute for the quality of 
school resources. In order to boost achievement, policy-makers may consider 
providing more opportunities for families to participate rather than providing a 
substitute (better quality teachers). Regarding the other measures of parental effort, 
the signs of the coefficients are almost exactly the same, but these coefficients lack 
statistical significance.
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ENDOGENOUS EFFORT AND ENDOGENOUS SCHOOLING MODEL
Until now, the services a child receives at school are modeled as being out of 
the family's control; i.e., schooling is exogenous. Below, this assumption is dropped. 
Instead, schooling is assumed to be purchased by parents as an input into the 
production of achievement. The parents realize their preferences in purchasing 
schooling and supplying of effort. This is closer to Becker's (1965) model where the 
family may choose market goods (xj) and household time inputs (tj. The production 
function for achievement represents the mixture of schooling and parental effort.
When parents can choose the level of schooling received by their children, the 
substitutability or complementarity of parental effort and schooling is located within 
the cross price effects. Rather than providing families with resources directly, policy­
makers may try to boost achievement by making schooling cheaper and easier to 
obtain. Two theoretical models are presented below to explore endogenous parental 
effort and schooling. These models differ over how parents are able to purchase 
schooling.
Simple Model of Endogenous Effort and Schooling 
In this simple endogenous schooling model, the family is free to choose 
schooling. Specifically, parents simultaneously choose schooling, parental effort, and 
leisure in order to maximize utility. However, no explicit assumptions are made about
75
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how parents go about obtaining schooling, except that it is available at constant prices. 
The set up of the parents' problem is similar to the case of exogenous schooling. The 
parents' problem is
max*. ^ s U(J(E, S), wT + N -  wE -  wL -  p sS, I ) ,  (32)
with the first-order conditions:
U J t -  wUc = 0 , (33)
UL -  wUc - 0 , (34)
VJs - P %  =  0- <“ >
The second-order conditions are
|G,I = * V J a  * w2UCC < 0, (34)
|G2| = l U J t f z  * ULL * w2Ucc] * w2UccUu  > 0 , (37)
IGJ * I U M  * V Ja  * » 2UccUUl l  ♦ * %  ♦ p ' \ c ]
* W aJJc * U Jse * *PsVCcH*’2Vcc]lwp‘Ucc]
* W aJ J e * V J *  * wpsVCc ttw 2Ucc]lwp-Ucc)
W jufsfe  + UaFse * w p ^ c c w'2Gcc][C(M) ^  + ^jS ss + ^P ^^cc ]
-  W iJ J t * VJee * » 2U c J W J cc\[wp'Ucc] 
- I v X c t tv ’X c ttU jJsfs  VJss * P’^cc  1 <  o  imposed).
(38)
The parents maximize their utility by choosing parental effort, schooling and leisure:
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E  = £(w, T, N, p s) , O n
s  = S(w, r, w, ps), (W
L - L(w, r, « , p s). W!)
As before, the production function for desired achievement is residually found,
A =/(£Cw, r, AT, ps), S(w, r, AT, p1)). («)
The community and school may influence the family's decisions by influencing 
the price of schooling. A change in the price of schooling influences achievement by 
changing the amounts of schooling and parental effort used in the production of 
achievement. These two influences are
Aps = f sSps + f EEps. (43)
Recall, wage (w) represents a change in the opportunity cost of the time. The 
response of parental time to a change in this opportunity cost is
~ < W < F u \V jl * V J a l * IT-L-E1E„ > =< 0. <«)
As in the exogenous schooling model, there is a negative substitution because effort is 
more expensive with a rise in wage. There is also a positive income effect because 
the family has more income with a rise in wage.
Recall that when schooling is exogenous, the effect of a change in wage is
Ew = GUcUll + [T-L-E]En >=< 0.
The ability to substitute between effort and schooling in production is impossible.
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However, with schooling now endogenous, parents have the ability to switch to more 
schooling when faced with an increase in the opportunity cost of effort. This 
substitution toward more schooling is imbedded in the substitution effect with the 
additional term, U ^fs2 +  U ^ .  This term captures the productivity and utility 
generating capacity (via achievement) of schooling.
In the endogenous schooling model, whether achievement is a normal good 
depends on the relationship between effort and schooling in production:
a n  =/,["/* - P Sf s e \  + f s ^ P Sf e e  ~  w f s J -  (46)
In short, the effect of income depends on complementarity/substitutability and 
opportunity costs of effort and schooling. This in turn determines whether effort and 
schooling are normal or inferior goods (inputs). The signs of E*, and SN are 
ambiguous, and thus the sign of AN is ambiguous.
The response of schooling to a change in the price of schooling is
(47)
V = - V  * G U Jyv'U ccU J * GVJlVjJ / ^ U J ^ V c . * U J  < 0,
where SN is the response of schooling to a change in non-labor income (N), and G is 
negative and the reciprocal of the | G31. If the price of schooling decreases, then 
parents purchase more schooling, assuming that schooling is not an extremely inferior 
good. The first two terms of Spi are the income and substitution effects, respectively. 
The last term is another substitution effect that follows from the fact that the relative 
price of schooling and parental effort changes. Since both schooling and effort are
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assumed to positively effect achievement, parents can substitute schooling for parental 
effort in the production of achievement; i.e., with a decrease in its price, schooling 
becomes a more attractive input as compared to parental effort.
The response of parental effort to a change in the price of schooling is
Et ,  = - e„s  -  g u c\p swucculj  -  G t y i ^ / s/ £][W2i;cc ♦ v Lj
(48)
- GUclU J s 1)lw 2Ucc ♦ ULJ  
Together, the first two terms are the standard cross-price effect. The last two terms 
are similar to the achievement and productivity effects in Es of the exogenous 
schooling model (ex) in equation (28). In Ep«, these two effects follow from the fact 
that an increase in the price of schooling negatively influences the quantity of 
schooling demanded (S) thereby influencing the production relationship between 
schooling and parental effort. The positive achievement effect reflects the fact that an 
increase in the price of schooling (pst )  causes parents to purchase less schooling (Si) 
and increase their effort (Et), all the while maintaining the same level of 
achievement. In contrast, the negative productivity effect reflects the fact that an 
increase in the price of schooling (psT) reduces the amount of schooling purchased 
(S40 and lowers the marginal productivity of parental effort (fe), which causes an 
increase in the per unit opportunity cost of achievement. Effort is reduced (E i), 
because it is now less effective. Comparing Ep» and Es from the exogenous schooling 
model (ex), the achievement and productivity effects are now functions of the marginal 
utility of money (Uc). This difference follows from the fact that the achievement and 
productivity effects now filter through a change in the relative price between schooling
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and parental effort.
As in Becker and Tomes (1976), a policy-maker's attempt to increase 
achievement by subsidizing the family's purchase of schooling may be mitigated by a 
redistribution of household resources. The effect that a subsidy has on achievement 
may be dampened because the family purchases more schooling, but parents may 
reduce effort.
Realistic Model of Endogenous Schooling
In the simple model of endogenous schooling, no explicit assumption is made 
about how parents purchase their optimal level of schooling, except that it is available 
at a constant price. A more realistic model of endogenous schooling is presented 
below in order to more accurately represent the purchasing of schooling. In this more 
complex model, there are two ways parents can obtain their desired level of schooling. 
First, parents can leave their current school district and move to a public school 
district that provides a more appropriate level of schooling. This follows Tiebout's 
(1956) model of choosing publicly provided goods. Second, parents can forgo the 
local public school and send their child to a private school that offers a more 
appropriate level schooling.
Price of Schooling
Before modeling the parents' problem, certain assumptions about the price of 
schooling are made. The amount a person pays for a good is a function of the price 
of the good. In the exogenous schooling model (ex), the amount paid for schooling is 
relative to the exogenous level of schooling but is fixed. In the simple endogenous
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schooling model, the price of schooling is constant, and the amount paid for schooling 
is linearly related to the amount of schooling purchased. In this more complex model, 
the way a family chooses schooling is taken into consideration. Choosing schooling 
via Tiebout behavior implies that the family may also choose (to some degree) the 
amount they pay for schooling. However, there are other costs to obtaining school 
services that the family has no control over. As a result, the fee (F) a family pays for 
schooling is assumed to be a function of schooling (and is endogenous) but is 
influenced by exogenous choice set characteristics.
To begin, the school fee (F) that families pay is assumed to be a function (but 
not necessarily a linear function) of schooling (S). The marginal price of schooling is 
thus the change in this fee (F) due to a one unit change in schooling (5F/3S). The 
school fee for public schools (FB) is also a function of the composition of local 
taxpayers (DB).55 Public school families pay for schooling via taxes (and housing 
prices). From the vantage point of these families, public schooling is subsidized by 
taxpayers without school age children (such as firms and the elderly). For private 
schools, the school fee (FR) is determined by the characteristics of the school (DR).
For example, a religiously affiliated school may be subsidized by a congregation 
and/or by teachers who accept compensation from a "Higher" source. Such 
characteristics reduce the school fee (FR) paid by private school families. These 
school fees are summarized as
55 Variables for public schools are denoted with a superscript B, while variables 
for private schools are denotes with a superscript R.
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F b(Sb, D b), W9)
F*(S* D*). (5°)
These school fees are a matter of choice for parents. In part, the school fee 
follows residually from the family's choice of schooling. Of course, when choosing 
the level of schooling, parents also consider the availability of subsidies (D). If 
schooling is held constant, then parents choose the school with the most subsidies.
However, to some degree the fee parents pay for schooling is out of their 
control; it is determined by the characteristics of the family's choice set. To explain, 
Tiebout (1956) assumes no transactions costs or institutional irregularities to hinder 
choice of local jurisdiction. As for the purchase of schooling, these assumptions 
translate into the following scenario: parents choose a school from a choice set that 
costlessly sits in front of them and contains a continuous variety of schools. However, 
choosing a public or private school is not quite so simple. In reality, the choice set of
schools exists over a physical area and does not always contain all varieties, as a result
transactions costs are incurred. In addition, competition within a choice set may 
reduce the schooling fees of all the schools in the choice set. Parents looking to send 
their child to private schools face the same restrictions.
Families do not choose their choice set; it is exogenous. In order to capture 
these limits and transactions costs associated with a family's choice set, a proportional 
shift parameter is assumed to augment the family's school fee (F),
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kbF*(Sb, D b), <51>
k? F \S * , D*). <52>
In essence, the fee/schooling schedule proportionally shifts from choice set to choice 
set. (See Figure 2.) This proportional shifter (k) does not vary within a choice set 
but rather varies over choice sets and thus over families that reside in areas with 
different choice sets. Public school families face kb. Private school families face kr ,
because private schools exist over a physical area which does not always contain all
varieties.
With these definitions of the school fee and the proportional choice set shifter, 
the public school family's budget constraint is
wT  + N  = C + wE + wL + k?Fb(S b, Db). <53>
Given this specification, the marginal price of schooling is kbx 3F/3S. An increase in 
the proportional choice set shifter (henceforth the "price shifter") represents an 
increase in the opportunity cost of schooling. Certain characteristics of the family's 
choice set make it cheaper or costlier for the family to obtain schooling. In essence, 
the opportunity cost of the same level of schooling exogenously varies from choice set 
to choice set according to the price shifter. As before, a change in effort due to a 
change in the opportunity cost of schooling reveals information about the
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substitutability or complementarity of parental effort and schooling.56 
Parents' Problem
For the moment, the existence of private school alternatives is ignored. In the 
endogenous effort and schooling models (ee), parents satisfy their demand for 
achievement by demanding school services (S) and supplying effort (E). Given the 
reconfiguration of the family's full income constraint, the parents' problem is to 
maximize utility by choosing leisure (L), effort (E), schooling services (S) and school 
subsidization from the local community (D):
max U(J[E, S ), wT + N - wE -  wL -  kF(S, D), L), (54)
where U(*) is the utility function; f(*) is the household's achievement production 
function; w is the market wage; T is the maximum Time available to the parents, and 
N is non-labor income. The solution to the parents' problem is
E = E(T, N, w, k), (55)
S = S(T, N, w, k), (56)
D = D(T, N, w, k). (57)
L = U T, N, w, k). (58)
And the desired level of achievement demanded may be residually obtained by
56 Variation of choice set characteristics over families in my sample provides the 
variation to explore the substitutability or complementarity of parental effort and 
school service.
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plugging the effort and school inputs equations into the achievement production 
function:
A = f(E(T , N, w, K), S(r, AT, w, *)). (» )
The influence of a change in the price shifter ( k )  on the demand for schooling 
and supply of effort is similar to the influence of a change in the price of schooling in 
the simple model of endogenous schooling, equations (47) and (48).
Given the existence of private schools, parents have an additional way to adjust 
the inputs in the production of achievement. Parents choose between private and 
public schools according to which type of provider yields the greatest utility.
However, the private school family forgoes the services of its local public school (S8" 
0, yet must also pay the fee faced by public school families. The overall fee paid by 
a private school family is
F* = k*F*(Sr , D*) + kbF b(Sb'/, DB~f), WW
where KBFB(SB_f, D8"*) is the fee of the foregone local public school which depends on 
foregone local public schooling (SB'f) and local subsidies (DB'f). An important 
assumption is that private school parents do not receive utility from the foregone 
public school, but they must still pay for the foregone local public school through 
property taxes and housing prices.57
The budget constraint of the public school families is similar but simpler; they 
do not pay for the local private school they are forgoing. The fee paid by a public
57 Unfortunately, NELS does not have data on the foregone local public school.
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school family is
FB = kbFb(Sb, Db). <61>
When faced with private school alternatives and the ability to choose the school 
specific fee, the parents' problem in its most general form is
max U( /(£ , [ l - jq s 1* + RS*), wT+ N -wE - wL-[1~R]Fb -  RF* L).
R equals 1 if the parents send their child to private school or equals 0 if the parents 
send their child to public school.
Parents maximize utility by choosing whether to participate in private 
schooling. In order to formalize this choice between private and public schooling, the 
parents' indirect utility function is defined as
VCR, T, N, w, [I-*]*8, Rk* R k8). <63>
If the parents send their child to public school (R = 0), their indirect utility function is 
as follows:
FfO.r.W.w.K®) = U(fCE\ Sfl*), wT+N-wE* -w L ' - k?F b(S b\  Db*), I ) .  
Variables denoted with a superscript * are optimally chosen when the parents solve the 
problem,
maxE,s‘,D‘,L UC/CE, SB), wT+ N -wE - wL - k? F b(Sb, DB), I) . «»5)
Similarly, if the parents send their child to private school (R =  1), their indirect utility 
function is
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K(l, r ,  w, F 1**, F *8) = S8'*), wT + N  -  w£** -  wl** _
(60)
-  k*F*(Sr ' \  D8**) -  kbF b(Sb_/**, Db /*’), I**).
Variables denoted with ** are optimally chosen when the parents solve the following 
problem in equation 63,
U(.f(Et S B), wT + N  — wE -  wL
(67)
-  k?F r(Sr, D r ) -  1^ F B(SB~f, DB~f), L).
Note that E \ E** are not necessarily the same value, nor are any of the other 
optimally chosen values. Parents choose between private and public schools according 
to these indirect utilities. If the critical value,
R c = F(l, T, N, w, k8, o  -  V(Q, T,; N, w, k8), <«>
is greater than zero, then the parents send their child to one of the private schools in
their choice set of private schools; otherwise they send their child to one of the public 
schools in their choice set of public schools.
Given the definition of the critical value, if Rc is less than or equal to zero, 
then the solution to the parents' problem is
R = 0 (public school) (69)
E = E(T, N, w, k*) (70)
S = S B = S(T, N, w, ic8) <71)
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D = Db = Z)(r, N, w, k®) f72)
On the other hand, if Rc < 0, then the solution to the parents' problem is
R = 1 (private school) (73)
£  = E(T, N, w, k*,k®) <74>
S = S* = S*(r, w, k*, k®) <75>
D® = D*(T, N, w, k®, k®) (76>
SB'F = S b~f (T% N, w, k®, k®) (77)
d b - f  = d b - f ( j. Wt ^  kb ) (78)
L = L(r, V, w, k®, k®) <79>
Recall that private school parents choose the level of foregone public schooling and the 
local subsidies of public schools. Note that the endogenous school fee is residually 
found via the optimal choices of schooling and subsidies.38
Comparative static analysis is not possible because of the discrete nature of the 
private/public decision. However, comparative statics on the critical value (Rc)
58 Of course, if the private school parents do not receive any benefit from the 
foregone public schooling they would choose the lowest possible level of public 
schooling to minimize the public school fee they must pay via property taxes and 
housing costs. However, in reality, the quality of the foregone public school may 
provide them with some "public goods" type benefits or may be bundled with other 
desirable local amenities. This realistic perspective is supported by the findings in the 
literature.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
describe whether that family switches from private to public school or vice versa. 
Recall this critical value represents the net indirect utility parents derived from sending 
their child to private school rather than public school. An increase in the net indirect 
utility may cause a public school family to switch to a private school. A decrease in 
the net indirect utility may cause a private school family to switch to a public school. 
Expanding the expression of net indirect utility yields
An increase in the private school price shifter ( k r )  reduces the net indirect 
utility such that a private school family switches to public schools,
Rc = U (J(E "(T , N, w, k", N, tv, k8, k8)),
wT+N-v/E"(.T, S ,  tv, ic* K * )-w t" ( r ,  N, tv, K*, k>)
-K*F*(S*"(T, N, w, K* K * ) ,0 '" ( r , N, w, K* K®)) 
-r* F B(SB-F“ (T< N, w, K*, kb),D b-f--(T, N, w, k*, k8)), 
L "{T , N, w, k ", k *)) (80)
-U (A E-(.T , N, tv, tc*),S*-(r, N, w, *»)),
» T * N -w E '(T , N, w, tc * ) - tv f ( r ,  N, w, tc*) 
-xf>FB(.SB‘(T, N, tv, K8), Db'(T , N, tv, ic8)), 
L '(T , N, tv, tc8)).
UCFS + ULL f  < 0 (given assumptions).
(81)
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The utility derived from the bundle that includes private schools (VR) decreases 
(assuming effort and private schooling are not perfect substitutes and private schooling 
is not an extremely inferior good), while the utility derived from the bundle that 
includes public schools (VB) is not changed.
When considering an increase in the public school price shifter (kb), the 
comparative statics are not so simple because both utilities (VR and VB) decrease,
-  V J CE -J * UA/ Ss y  * Uc -U cw E f -  Uc w L -;
-  Uc KRF ‘ s y  -  Uck’ f £ d $ "  -  Uc r?F ‘ s y "
-  Uc r ? F ‘ Dy - V CF ‘  ♦ Vt L ?
'  -  V JsS‘J  -  Uc + Uc w E j * Vc w L j
* Uc * * F f s *  * Uc t?F%D‘;  * Vcf ‘  -  UlL 'J  >=< 0.
An increase in kb reduces the ability to purchase public and private schooling since the 
household must pay the increased cost of public schooling, whether or not they send 
their child to public school.59
A change in a particular variable may cause a change in the critical value, Rc, 
such that there is a switch from private school to public school or vice versa.
Assuming a change in a particular variable does not cause a family to change
59 Although one could imagine a "relative price" between private and public 
schools, such a relative price does not exist in this switching model, because parents 
ether send their child to public or private school. In other words, there is no smooth 
substitution of one for the other.
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institutions, the comparative statics for schooling demand and effort supply are similar 
to those of the simple endogenous schooling. A change in the choice set's 
proportional shift parameter ( k )  is similar to a change in the price of schooling and 
therefore affects the demand for schooling and supply of effort in a similar fashion to 
equations (47) and (48).
Looking over all of the theoretical models, the ability of the policy-maker to 
boost achievement depends on how parents adjust their behavior. In the exogenous 
schooling model, policy-makers boosted achievement by giving the family more 
schooling. In response, parents either help or hinder the actions of the policy-maker 
by increasing or decreasing parental effort, respectively. In the endogenous schooling 
models, the family may adjust parental effort and/or schooling in response to an 
exogenous increase in schooling. Suppose the policy-maker tries to boost achievement 
by helping parents to obtain more public schooling (a decrease in the kb). Parents 
may then demand more schooling but supply less effort, thereby keeping achievement 
the same. In addition, the parents may take their child out of private school and put 
him or her into the public school because of the change in the net indirect utility (R°). 
Again, the family can hinder or complement the efforts of the policy-makers to raise 
achievement, but now parents have more variables to adjust. In short, as the 
complexity of the parents’ problem increases in order to allow more control over 
inputs into the production of achievement, parents have more ways to adjust to the 
actions of policy-makers.
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Empirical Analysis
As before, the relationship between schooling and parental effort is an 
empirical issue. In order to estimate the endogenous schooling model with the 
availability of private school alternatives, a three step approach is used. The steps are 
outlined in Figure 3.
Using public and private school families, the first step is to estimate a private 
school participation equation,
Ri = b'X l + ult (*3)
where Rjc is, as in equation (68), the difference from indirect utility obtained from 
private school services and that obtained from public school services. X( is a vector 
containing the variables that influence the parents' choice of schooling and parental 
effort. These variables are basically family and choice set characteristics of private 
and public schools; i.e ., variables of the indirect utility functions.
At this point it is worth reiterating that families in the same choice set face the 
same choice set shift parameter. The exogenous variation in the price shifter occurs 
across choice sets. As a result, the effect of the price shifter is similar to a choice set 
fixed effect.
The second step is to estimate the reduced form equations for schooling 
demand and effort supply,60
- B  t /v B , E,B . ,  J  !v  ( 8 4 1= y Xt + e{ i f  -u ,,
60 The leisure (L), local characteristics (D) , and foregone schooling (SB'F) 
equations are omitted.
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S f  = P V  + t - 'B i f  1%  <: -u(,
E* = Y V  + *f'* i f  1%  > -u„
S *  = P * V  + e f ,Jl i /  &% >  - a (87)
(86)
(85)
The sample is split between private and public school families, and separate equations 
are estimated for the two groups. Equations (84) and (85) represent public school 
families, while equations (86) and (87) represent private school families. The vectors 
XjB and X R contain the variables in the X; of the private school participation equation. 
In accordance to the theoretical model above, X® contains k b , where X R contains k r  
and k b . Figure 4 contains an outline of the identifying restrictions that allow for the 
estimation of each step in the model; note, this figure refers to variables for the choice 
set variables that are described shortly.
The third step is to use the expected values from the second step to estimate 
the achievement production function;
The vector x; contains the elements of X; except for two things. Wages and the price 
shifter only influence household production via the supply of effort and purchase of 
schooling because they reflect the opportunity costs of the parents' choices.
Estimation Techniques and Issues
As in the previous chapter, the nature of the data and this multi-step empirical
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model necessitates the use of different econometric techniques and makes it difficult to 
interpret the estimated coefficients. Including the private school participation decision 
increases the complexity of the econometric techniques. Figure 6 provides an 
overview of the estimation techniques and statistical packages used in this three step 
process.
Of course, a major difference between the estimation of the exogenous 
schooling models (xx and ex) and the endogenous schooling model (ee) is the 
consideration of private schooling participation. Recall the critical value (R°) that 
determines whether a family participates in private schooling is the net indirect utility 
from attending private school. Of course, a numerical value for Rc is not available, 
but private school families reveal that their Rc 's are greater than zero by sending their 
children to private schools. Using this information, Rc is represented by a dummy 
variable (R) which is one for private school families and zero for private school 
families. In the first step of estimation, the private participation equation is estimated 
using this dummy variable and the probit model which is described on page 42.
The second step of the estimation process is to estimate the reduced form 
parental supply effort and schooling factor demand equations. Schooling is the level 
of services received at school. The factor demands for these services are represented 
by six reduced form factor demand equations based on the measures of schooling used 
in the exogenous schooling model (Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, NonUrb, %NonLun 
and %NonMin). Separate equations are estimated for public school families and 
private school families, because in accordance with the theoretical model these
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families face different price shifters, even when they are in the same physical area.
The results of the participation equation are used to adjust the schooling and 
effort equations for the decision to go to a public or private school. In short, each 
schooling and effort equation is adjusted for selectivity into the public or private 
school population. If the parental effort and schooling equations are not adjusted for a 
family's selection into public or private schools, then the estimated coefficients are 
inconsistent due to self-selection bias; the specification error of an omitted variable is 
committed according to Greene (1993).
Specifically, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated using the estimated 
coefficients of the participation equation. It captures the family's selection into the 
selection of the private school sector; and for reasons mentioned above, it must enter 
into the estimation of schooling and effort.61 The equations with continuous dependent 
variables (Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, %NonLun and %NonMin) are estimated via 
OLS. Entering the inverse Mills as an independent variable in these equations 
controls for the correlation between the private school participation decision and the 
schooling decisions; i.e., the correlation between ux and e;s. It should be noted that 
including the inverse Mills ratio introduces heteroskedasticity because the correlation 
between the effort/schooling decision and the private school decision varies from 
observation to observation and because the true coefficients are not being estimated. 
LIMDEP compensates for this heteroskedasticity.
61 For programming simplicity, when estimating the schooling and effort equations 
for public school families, a public school participation equation is estimated in order 
to provide the proper inverse Mills ratio.
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As in the previous chapter, the equations with the categorical dependent 
variables need to be estimated with qualitative-variable models: probit (Event and 
NonUrb) and order probit models (Check and Discuss). Simply entering the inverse 
Mills ratios into the probit or order probit model provides consistent estimates of the 
coefficients but does not allow for the correction of the introduction of 
heteroskedasticity. To rectify this problem, the participation equation and the effort 
(or schooling) equation are simultaneously estimated via full information maximum 
likelihood estimation (FIML). This technique provides the proper standard errors by 
estimating a log-likelihood function that capture the two decisions; it also provides 
more efficient coefficients.62
The inverse Mills ratio is included in the achievement equations in order to 
capture the influence of selecting into a particular sector. The private school 
participation decision is analogous to the schooling and effort decisions. In short, each 
equation is estimated to eliminate selectivity bias, thereby providing consistent 
estimates of the household production function. As in the previous chapter, including 
the expected values of parental effort causes the same difficulties with the standard 
errors of the achievement equations. As a result, the same bootstrapping procedure is 
used to calculate the correct standard errors in these equations. (See page 45 for a 
discussion of this procedure.)
Description of New Variables
62 For each of these full information maximum likelihood estimations new 
parameters are generated for the participation equation. These results are not 
reported.
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Another difference with previous estimations is the price shifter which enters 
into the participation, parental effort and schooling equations. Before describing the 
set of variables that represent the price shifter, the family's choice set must be 
defined. The borders of a family's choice set are likely to vary over families, for the 
borders are influenced by many different variables. For example, the choice set of 
schools may be within x miles of the parents' home towns. Or, it may be within x 
miles of all the labor market opportunities of the family's main wage earner. Thus, 
using a single definition of the choice set for every family in the sample is somewhat 
arbitrary; plus, "x mile" may differ according to transportation access.
Nevertheless, a single definition is needed. The choice sets borders must in 
some fashion hinder the family from choosing schools outside the borders. Drawing a 
circle around a family's home based on traveling distance would capture the ability of 
a family to choose a school by driving their child to a different school. Assuming 
Tiebout behavior, drawing a circle around a main wage earner's employer based on 
traveling distance to work would capture the ability of a family to choose a school by 
moving to a different town. However, the drawing of circles is somewhat arbitrary, 
because school y within the circle may not be feasible, while school z just outside the 
circle may be feasible. For example, school y may be on the other side of a 
mountain, while school z is just down the road but outside the circle. In addition, the 
National Center for Education Statistics does not provide zip codes. (They only 
provide very limited zip code level data but not the zip codes.)
Instead of defining the family's choice set via travel costs, in the empirical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
analysis below the family is assumed to be bound by state borders. While state 
borders are also somewhat arbitrary, they do limit the number, variety and 
competition among schools from which the family may choose. Transporting a child 
across state borders to another public school is prohibited in most states. State 
borders represent state policies, and these policies may provide disincentives to move 
across state borders by, for example, influencing a family's tax burden. In addition, 
the National Center for Education Statistics provides the family's state in the 
Restricted-Use NELS.
Recall the price shifter (k) reflects the ability or costliness of the family to 
obtain its desired level of schooling. The price shifter is represented by variables that 
make it harder or easier for a family to switch schools and provide the family with 
fewer or more choices; it also represents how competition may influence the school 
fee. They shift the family's total outlay schedule for schooling. Unfortunately, some 
of the choice set variables reflect a higher price shifter, while others reflect a lower 
price shifter. These variables are described below and briefly in Table 7, and the 
Data Appendix provides the source of these variables.
The process of choosing schooling is smoothed (less costly) when parents have 
more schools from which to choose. More schools represent more options and 
potentially more variability within a family's choice set.63 More schools may also
63 The number of schools may reflect the population of the state. Adjusting the 
number of schools by dividing by the school age population (schools per child) was 
considered but not accepted as a variable in the analysis, for it is essentially changing 
the definition of the choice set. For it is the borders that restrict the family, not the 
borders relative to the number of people, unless it is believed that population restricts
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reflect greater competition among schools. An increase in the number of schools in a 
state (Num t) represents a decrease in the price shifter (k^) and thus the fee (total 
outlays) for schooling. B_Num and R_Num represent the number of public and 
private schools, respectively.
The density of schools (per square mile of land) gives an idea of the travel 
costs when obtaining the services of a different school. It is costlier for a family in a 
large state with a small number of schools to adjust school quality as compared to a 
family in a small state with a large number of schools. In addition, if schools are 
closer together, then there may be more competition. An increase in the density of 
schools in a state (Dent) decreases the price shifter (ici). B Den and R Den 
represent the density of public and private schools, respectively.
The composition of the state's population in terms of urban and non-urban 
influences the similarities among public schools. For example, a state that is 100 
percent non-urban has more similar public schools than a state with half its population 
in urban locations and the other half in non-urban locations. The absolute value of 50 
minus the percentage urbanization (Alike) represents the lack o f variation or alikeness 
of the population and thus the alikeness of the public schools.64 Of course, this 
variable assumes that public schools in urban and non-urban areas are qualitatively 
different. This variable is a measure of the lack of variation among public schools in 
the state. An increase in variation (Alike T) represents an increase in the price shifter
a family's choices.
64 The percentage of schools in urban locations is not available on the state level.
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Similarly, the percentage of state and local revenue for primary and secondary 
schools raised obtained from local sources (Local) represents the variation in public 
schools. The more localities in a state depend on local revenue, then the more likely 
public schools are to vary across the state. An increase in this proxy of variation 
(Local f )  represents a decrease in the price shifter (k8!) .66 Federal aid to states is 
not included because it is not clear how much filters to the local level.
In addition, whether the state government supports or allows local school 
choice programs (Choice) is also used to represent the price shifter for public schools. 
In general, these choice programs allow parents to send their child to a public school 
other than the public school of the area in which they reside. In other words, parents 
can obtain a more appropriate level of public schooling without incurring costs. The 
ability of parents to choose more freely may also induce greater competition among 
schools. If Choice is one, then the price shifter is reduced (xBi ) .
Regarding the price shifter for private schools (kr), the percentage of private 
school enrollment in religiously affiliated schools represents the degree to which 
parents may choose from a subsidized school, assuming religiously affiliated schools
65 It is unfortunate that all of the choice set variables could not represent an 
increase in the price shifter. Such considerations were not in the forefront during the 
compilation of these variable.
66 However, if state revenue reflect attempts to mitigate variation across public 
schools (mitigate unequal educational opportunities), then the opposite relationship may 
hold.
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are subsidized by donations.67 This measure of potential subsidization enters into the 
effort and schooling equations of parents whose children are enrolled in private 
schools. An increase in the number of religious affiliation (Religious T ) represents a 
decrease in the price shifter (kH).
To summarize, for public schools, the price shifter is depicted with B_Num, 
B D en, Local, Choice and Alike. Except for Alike, an increase in these choice set 
variables leads to a decrease in the opportunity cost of schooling (the shifter). For 
private schools, the shifter is depicted with R_Num, R Den and Religious.
Private school participation is going to be influenced by the price shifter for 
both public and private schools. Like a relative price, families compare the relative 
opportunity costs of private and public schooling. As a result, the price shifters for 
both the private and public schools should enter into the private school participation 
equation. To represent this relative shifter, R Num, B_Num, R Den and B Den 
collapse into one variable, the ratio of private to public private schools (R to B). For 
example, an increase in the number or density of private schools (R to B t )  decreases 
the price shifter of private schools (kr) thereby decreasing the relative shifter.68 The 
other representations of the price shifter do not collapse so readily; thus, they are 
entered individually in the participation equation. Note, the influence of the public
67 The religious compositions of private schools by state is not available, thus 
enrollment figures are used. The average tuition for the private schools by state is not 
available.
68 R to B may also indicate the quality of public schools in a state. In states with 
low quality public schools, there may be more room for private schools to enter the 
market.
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shifter on private school participation is expected to be the opposite of the private 
shifter's influence.
Hypothesized Signs
Figure 7 maps out the expected relationships for public school families. In this 
model's estimation process, there are four basic dependent variables: private school 
participation (R), parental effort (E), schooling (S) and achievement (A). As in the 
exogenous schooling model (ex), Check, Discuss and Event depict parental effort, 
and Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, NonUrb, %NonLun and %NonM!n depict 
schooling. The independent variables are broken down into two basic groups: (a) 
opportunity costs - wages and the price shifter, and (b) household characteristics - the 
previously mentioned attributes of the parents (except wages), child and family. The 
means and standard deviations of the variables are presented in Table 8 for the 4159 
public school families, 809 private school families and 4968 total families.
Regarding the opportunity cost variables, parents' wages are assumed to be the 
opportunity costs of parental effort, while the influence of the price shifter is assumed 
to be the opportunity cost of schooling. As discussed above, an increase in wages 
ambiguously influences parental effort due to income and substitution effects.69 
However, assuming that achievement (and therefore effort) is not an extremely inferior 
good, wages are expected to negatively influence the supply of effort.
Likewise, the price shifter ambiguously influences the demand for schooling.
69 The substitution effect is more complex due to the achievement and productivity 
effects. The family now can substitute among inputs in the household production 
process and the productivity of schooling and effort change.
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Recall an increase in the shifter raises the price of schooling, KXdF/dS; i.e., it 
increases the opportunity cost of schooling. It follows that a change in the shifter 
influences schooling according to income productivity and achievement effects (see 
page 35). However, assuming that achievement (and therefore schooling) is not an 
extremely inferior good, the price shifter is expected to negatively impact the demand 
for schooling.
The cross price effects of wages and the price shifter are the major focal points 
of the endogenous schooling model. Theoretically, the influences of wages on 
schooling and the price shifter on parental effort are ambiguous because of the 
income, achievement and productivity effects (equation 46). In general, if the 
coefficients on wages in the schooling equations are positive, then families are 
substituting schooling for effort. In contrast, if these coefficients are negative, then 
they suggest that schooling and effort are complementary. The same interpretation 
holds for the relationship between the price shifter and parental effort; therefore, no 
expectations are held regarding the sign of these coefficients. It is an empirical 
matter.
As in the third chapter, the opportunity costs of parental choices enter the 
achievement equation only through their effect on effort and schooling. They act as 
identifiers of the achievement equation.
The expected influences of the other household characteristics are only briefly 
discussed, because much of the rationale is stated in the exogenous schooling model. 
The participation, schooling and effort equations are referred to as "R, S and E".
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Purchasing more school services or supplying more effort increases 
achievement. In addition, if households are rational, then private school participation 
is a boost in schooling; they wouldn't purchase (at an additional cost) a reduction in 
schooling. As a result, some household characteristics are expected to influence the 
supply of effort, the purchase of schooling and participation in private schooling in the 
same direction.
However, constraints on a family's household resources may restrict the 
family's ability to supply effort and cause them to purchase more schooling. The lack 
of household resources is reflected in the limited access to capital (LimCap) and the 
presence of more children (Siblings). The quality of "effort producing resources" is 
reflected in the parents' education (M_Ed, F_Ed and NonWhite) and the availability 
of study aids (Aid). Families with more or better household resources are expected to 
supply more effort and thus purchase less schooling and are less likely to participate in 
private school. In the achievement equation, the expected signs of these variables are 
the same as in the exogenous schooling model (ex).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Prior_A is prior achievement and it 
enters the achievement equation to control for endowed intelligence. It also enters into 
R, S and E equations. A child that has achieved well in the past may reflect past R, S 
and E; therefore, such a child may need less R, S and E in the current period, which 
suggests a negative relationship between prior achievement and R, S and E.
However, such a child's parents may be likely to provide the same high level of R, S 
and E as before, which suggests a positive relationship between prior achievement and
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current R, S and E. As a result, there is no firm expectation with respect to the 
influence of prior achievement on R, S or E.
A problem child (BadChild) may attract or repel R, S and E. Parents may be 
rectifying the problem with increased R, S and E. However, they may not wish to 
invest R, S and E in a problem child for they may be in squandered. In production, a 
problem child (BadChild) makes achievement harder to produce.
Similar to the lack of attention received from teachers, female children may 
receive fewer family resources such as R, S and E. However, parents may allocate 
more R, S and E to their daughters to compensate for the lack of teachers' attention. 
Thus, the influence of Girl on R, S and E is ambiguous. Likewise, in production of 
achievement, the influence of the child's gender is vague.
With the inclusion of wages, family income (Income) should to some degree 
represent non-labor income (N). Assuming achievement is a normal good, families 
with more non-labor income should expend more R, S and E aimed at raising 
achievement. With regard to production of achievement, an increase in family income 
may represent an increase in other household inputs that boost achievement.
Since many private schools are affiliated with Catholic churches, Catholic 
parents (Catholic) are expected to be more likely to send their children to private 
schools. After controlling for private school participation, no conjecture is made 
about the influence of the family's religious affiliation on schooling or effort.
No expectation is held regarding the influence of whether the father is the most 
involved parent (F_Invol). The same is true for the regional dummy variables




Estimating the endogenous effort and schooling model with private school 
opportunities leads to the estimation of 27 equations. However, summaries of all the 
results o f the endogenous schooling model (ee) are provided in tables 16, 17 and 18. 
For explicit results, table 9 contains the estimates of the participation which is 
estimated using information from all families (public and private school families). For 
public school families, table 10 contains the estimates of the parental effort equations 
(Check, Discuss and Events), and table 11 provides the estimates for the six measures 
of school services, and table 13 contains the estimates of the achievement equations. 
Results for private school families are in Tables 14, 15 and 16.
Opportunity Cost Variables - The coefficients on the choice set variables are 
interpreted first. These coefficients provide insight into the complementarity and 
substitutability of schooling and parental effort. Starting with the influence of the 
price shifter in the participation equation, an increase in the ratio of private schools to 
public schools in a state (R to B) represents a decrease in the relative price shifter of 
private schools. (R to B t -»• tcRi  and/or kbT) The positive coefficient on R to B 
suggests that parents are likely to send their child to a private school when the 
characteristics of their overall choice set makes it easier (less costly) for them to 
purchase private schooling as compared to public schooling. In other words, parents 
take advantage of lower opportunity costs.
The same hold story holds true for the positive coefficient on Alike, the
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alikeness of the state's public schools. (Aliket -» kbT) As it becomes more difficult 
to find their optimal level of schooling because all the public schools are alike, the 
family turns to private schools. Parents are reacting to the higher opportunity costs of 
public schooling and turning to private schools.
However, the opposite relationship is suggested by the positive coefficient of 
the state's support for choice programs (Choice). An increase in this measure implies 
a decrease in the price shifter of public schools (Choicet -»  k b >1) and thus an increase 
in relative price shifter of private school. The positive coefficients suggest that a rise 
in this relative price shifter increases likelihood of participating in private school. In 
other words, making it easier for families to choose public schools leads families to 
increase their demand for private schooling. This is contrary to expectations. Choice 
may be picking up other public choice explanations.
Notably, the percentage of religiously affiliated schools (Religious) is 
statistically insignificant. This variable represents the availability of subsidized private 
schools was expected to be statistically significant. In the end, the influence of the 
relative price shifter on private school participation suggests that parents are 
responding to the opportunity cost they face.
Regarding the other opportunity cost variables, the wages of the parents are 
statistically insignificant in the participation equation, thus no conclusions may be 
drawn.
Public School Families - To simplify matters, the effort supply and schooling 
factor demand equations for only public school families are interpreted in this section.
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As in the exogenous schooling model (ex), the parents' wages (M Wage and 
F Wage) reflect the opportunity cost of parental effort. Surprisingly, mother’s wage 
positively effects all of the measures of parental effort, which runs against 
expectations, since as wages increase effort becomes more costly. Even the most 
time-consuming measure of effort (going to events) is not deterred by the opportunity 
cost of the time as measured by wages. In the theoretical model, the influence of 
wage is a function of income and two substitution effects. This suggests that the 
income effect outweighs both of the substitution effects.
Theoretically, the relationship between schooling and the price shifter (kb) is 
also ambiguous but expected to be negatively related; therefore, positive signs are 
expected on the choice set variables, except for Alike.70 Looking at the all of the 
choice set variables, there are numerous statistically significant coefficients (24 of 30). 
Of these coefficients, some have the expected sign (14 of 24). These coefficients 
suggest that a rise in the price shifter decreases the family's demand for schooling. 
Parents reduced schooling in response to an increase in the opportunity cost of 
schooling. The remaining coefficients (10 of 24) run contrary to expectations, 
suggesting that parents increase schooling in response to an increase in the opportunity 
cost of schooling.
Looking for a pattern in these results, schooling as represented by the teacher 
characteristics (Tea/Stu, LowSal and %Degree) appears to be negatively related to
70 This interpretation is not backwards, because an increase in a choice set variable 
represents a decrease in the price shifter, except for Alike.
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the price shifter (9 of 12); i.e., the ability of the families to choose schooling increases 
demand for schooling. "Appears to be" is stated, because there are three coefficients 
that suggest the opposite relationship. As for the coefficients on the other school 
characteristics (NonUrb, %NonLun and %NonMin), their signs are even more 
mixed.
Table 12 reports F-tests (Tea/Stu, LowSal, % Degree, %NonLun and 
%NonMin) and a likelihood ratio test (NonUrb) for various groups of variables. For 
the choice set variables, these tests suggest that for public school families (and private 
school families) the opportunity cost of schooling influences the demand for schooling.
Going variable by variable, the number of public schools in the state (B_Num) 
positively influences the demand for quality teachers (as measured by LowSal) and the 
decision to move to a non-urban area. More choices (a decrease in the price shifter) 
lead the family to purchase more schooling. However, the number of schools 
(B_Num) is negatively related to schooling demand according to the coefficients on 
Tea/Stu, %NonLun and %NonMin. This suggests more choice leads to less 
schooling. In the end, the influence of the number of schools is mixed.
An increase in the density of schools (a decrease in the price shifter) leads to 
an increase in schooling demand as represented by Tea/Stu, LowSal, % Degree and 
NonUrb. This suggests that families demand more schooling when schools are more 
readily accessible. Only the coefficient on %NonMin refutes this relationship.
An increase in the state's schools dependence on local revenue (Local) (a 
decrease in the price shifter) leads families to demand more schooling as represented
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by Tea/Stu, LowSal, %Degree, %NonLun and %NonMin. In other words, families 
demand more schooling when there is increased variability in the choice set. This is 
the only representation of the price shifter to have a consistent influence across 
schooling measures.
Families in states that support or allow local choice programs (a decrease in the 
price shifter) demand more schooling (Tea/Stu and %NonLun) but also less schooling 
(%Degree, NonUrb and %NonMin). Their ability to switch schools has an influence 
on their demand for school services.
Similarly, the similarity of local population density (Alike) influences schooling 
demand in a mixed fashion. An increase in the similarity in the choice set's 
population (an increase in the price shifter) leads families to demand more and less 
schooling, depending on the service being demanded.
With respect to the complementarity and substitutability, the influence of the 
choice set variables on parental effort represent cross-price relationships. However, 
the results are sparse. Three of fifteen coefficients are statistically significant. How 
frequently parents discuss school with a child (Discuss) is positively influenced by the 
number of public schools in their choice set. In other words, with more public school 
opportunities (as the price shifter falls) parents provide more effort. This suggests a 
complementary relationship between schooling and effort. The same relationship is 
revealed in the Discuss equation; the negative coefficient on Alike suggests that as the 
price shifter decreases parents also reduce their own effort to produce achievement; 
schooling and effort are complements.
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However, the substitution of effort for schooling is suggested by the negative 
coefficient of Local in the Event effort equation. Nonetheless, according to likelihood 
ratio tests (Table 12), the opportunity costs of schooling do influence the supply of 
effort as measured by Discuss and Event, which in and of itself is an interesting 
result.
In the schooling equations, the complementarity or substitutability of schooling 
and effort is also revealed in the relationship between wages (M_Wage and F_Wage) 
and schooling. The statistically significant, positive coefficients on wages (3 of 12) 
suggest that as the opportunity cost of parental effort increases parents are switching to 
schooling in order to produce achievement. Roughly, parental effort increases when 
the price of schooling decreases. However, two of the twelve coefficients are 
statistically significant and negative; these suggest complementarity. Joint tests of 
significance in Table 12 suggest that wages influence the demand for teacher 
characteristics (Tea/Stu, LowSal and %Degree) and one of the student body variables 
(%NonLun).
With such conflicting results in both the effort and schooling equations, no hard 
conclusions are forthcoming. It is not surprising that with the plethora of school 
services and forms of parental effort that conflicting results are found. The family's 
menu of inputs that produce achievement is complex. Some may be complements, 
while others are substitutes. The problem is that there is no single measure of overall 
effort and overall schooling. Nonetheless, joint tests of significance do suggest that 
cross opportunity costs do influence the mix of inputs used in the production of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
achievement.
Private School Families - The effort and schooling equations of private school 
families shed very little light on the complementarity or substitutability of schooling 
and effort. The results for private school families are even more sparse. None of the 
coefficients on wages in the schooling equations are statistically significant. In the 
effort equations, only one coefficient on the price shifter of private schools (kr) is 
statistically significant. A decrease in the density of private schools (R_Den) (an 
increase in the price shifter) leads parents to "discuss things" more frequently. This 
suggests schooling and effort are substitutes. But this is only one of the nine 
coefficients. Thus, private school family behavior provides no conclusive answer to 
the question of the substitution of effort and schooling.
A surprising result from the schooling equations of private school families is 
the influence of the public school price shifter (<B). Recall this shifter represents the 
fact that private school families forgo the local public school and still pay for it. Since 
these estimates are adjusted for the decision to attend private schools, these results 
suggest a deeper relationship between public school opportunities and private schools. 
Once the parents have decided to send their child to private school the public school 
opportunities still influence the private school services the family chooses to purchase. 
Many of the statistically significant coefficients (10 of 16) suggest that an increase in 
the public school price shifter decreases the private school family's demand for private 
school services. In other words, after committing to a private school, the greater their 
opportunities to adjust public schooling the less private school services they demand.
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Of course there are statistically significant coefficients (6 of 16) that suggest an 
opposite relationship.
Nevertheless, the statistically significant influence of the public school price 
shifter variables is surprising. F-tests and likelihood ratio tests reveal that the public 
school price shifter influence all of the private school characteristics. This deeper 
relationship between public school opportunities and private school might reflect 
competition among private and public schools within a given state. This competition 
could be for students and/or resources. Another story could be that public school 
opportunities influence the entry of private schools into the market and composition of 
their services. The more public school opportunities, the better or more exceptional 
private schools must be to gain entry into the market.
The influence of the public school choice set variables on the parental effort of 
private school families is also surprising. Again the signs are mixed, but likelihood 
ratio tests reveal that Discuss and Event are influenced in a systematic way by these 
variables. Clearly, a deeper relationship exists between public school opportunities 
and the behavior of private school families. Access to data on the foregone local 
schools of the private school families is necessary to investigate these results and 
alternative stories further.
Household Variables - Opportunity costs aside, the composition of the family 
and its resources is expected to influence the demand for achievement and thus 
influence the demand for schooling and supply of effort. The interpretations below 
draw upon the participation, schooling and effort equations (R, S, and E) of both
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public and private school families. Some interesting patterns arise.
A mother's education (M_Ed) is one of the main focuses of the time allocation 
studies. In R, S and E, when statistically significant, the coefficient on mother's 
education is positive (except in one of the schooling equations) but is statistically 
insignificant in the achievement equations. These results suggest that public school 
families with better educated mothers demand/supply more of the inputs that increase 
achievement but do not effect achievement directly. (In addition, these results do not 
support the idea that better educated mothers specialize - supply more effort and 
employ less schooling because they are better at providing effort.) The many negative 
coefficients on NonWhite in R, S and E support this conclusion. Recall that the race 
of the parents may reflect the quality of their education (past discrimination).
The coefficient on the number of siblings, when statistically significant, is 
negative in R, S and E. This suggests that "more children in the household" 
constrains the provision of all the resources aimed at producing achievement, rather 
than directly influencing the mix of resources (a switching from effort to schooling).
For the most part, family income (Income) positively influences private school 
participation, schooling and effort. This suggests that achievement is a normal good.
For the most part, family income (Income) positively influences private school 
participation, schooling and effort. This suggests that achievement is a normal goods.
From a different vantage point, Hanushek (1992) estimates an equation 
representing "parental choice of teachers". An individual teacher's quality is 
measured by the average test score of students in his or her class. Hanushek's (1992)
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results are inconclusive because the coefficients of household characteristics are 
statistically insignificant. In the schooling equations, teacher characteristics (Tea/Stu, 
LowSal and %Degree) refers to a school's faculty not an individual teacher. With 
this in mind, the results suggest that various family characteristics are important in 
determining the attributes of a child's potential teachers. Although, as before, the 
results are contradictory. Focusing on public school families, according to the 
Tea/Stu equation parents with more years of schooling are choosing to send their 
child to a school with more teachers per child (more teacher attention). However, this 
is contradicted by the coefficient in the LowSal equation. Similarly, non-white 
parents send the children to schools with less teachers per child. This is contradicted 
in %Degree and LowSal equation. The results for family income are the same. 
Families with more income demand more attention from teachers. In the end, the 
results suggest that various family characteristics are important in determining teacher 
attributes but not in a cohesive manner.
Before moving on to the achievement equations, the differences between 
private and public school families are worth exploring. A striking difference is the 
role o f household constraints on the supply of parental effort. In public school 
families, parental effort is constrained by income, children (siblings) and the lack of 
household capital. For private school families, these variables are statistically 
insignificant (except one coefficient) in effort supply equations of the private school 
families. In addition, parental effort in public school families is positively related to 
the education of the parents, while there is no evidence of such an influence for
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private school families.
A noteworthy similarity between private and public school families is the 
influence of the child's gender on parental effort as measured by Discuss. In both 
groups, parents are more likely to discuss things learned in school with their daughters 
than their sons. Perhaps parents are compensating for the notion that girls are 
overlooked in the classroom. The cause of such a result is left to future research.
Adjusting for Selectivity - At this point it is also worth noting the effect of 
adjusting the effort, schooling and achievement equations for selectivity into public or 
private schooling. The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios (Lambda) are 
statistically significant in many of the schooling equations. This suggests that the way 
in which families select into public or private schools influence their decisions to 
demand school services. This makes sense because they are both similar decisions.
Selecting into a public school is associated with increases in the demand for 
teacher quality (LowSal and %Degree) and with a reduction in the demand for teacher 
(Tea/Stu). It is also associated with a decrease in the demand for the characteristics 
of the student body (%NonLun and %NonMin). If they decide to send their children 
to public schools, then they want good quality teachers but sacrifice the quality of the 
student body. Selecting into a private school also influences the demand for school 
services in a fairly similar fashion but in the opposite direction.
The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios' (Lambda) are statistically 
insignificant in the effort equations except the Discuss and Event equations for public 
school families. This suggests that the way in which families select into public
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schools influence their decisions to supply effort demand school services. Selecting 
into a public school is related to a decrease in the supply of parental effort (Discuss 
and Event).
Achievement Equations - Much of the interesting results lay in the schooling 
choice and effort supply, because the focus of this dissertation is on the "determinants 
o f the determinants" of achievement; for example, family income determines effort 
which determines achievement. However, to follow through with the theoretical 
framework the achievement equations are estimated in the third step. Specifically, the 
expected values of parental effort and schooling are entered into the achievement 
equations to represent the desired level of effort and school services. These expected 
values provide a measure of parental effort that is uncorrelated to the error terms of 
the achievement equations. Household variables are also included to represent 
household technology. The opportunity cost variables are excluded, because they are 
assumed to influence achievement only through the supply of inputs.
The results for both public and private school families (regardless of how 
parental effort is entered) are very sparse. Table 19 provides guidance. As expected 
the prior level of achievement raises current achievement, but recall it is included to 
transform the dependent variable from an absolute measure to a "value added" 
measure.
With the assumption and modeling of endogenous schooling, parental effort is 
no longer statistically significant. As a result, no conclusions may be drawn regarding 
the influence of parental effort on achievement.
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Likewise, the results of the expected values of school services are weak and 
contradictory when statistically significant. For private school families, purchasing 
better paid teachers raises the child's performance. A surprising result for public 
school families is that the teacher student ratio negatively influences a child's 
achievement in some of the specifications.
The statistical insignificance of the inverse Mills ratio in the effort equations of 
private school families suggests that selectivity is not related to their decision to supply 
effort. Similarly, Lambda's statistical insignificance in achievement equations of all 
families suggests the household's production of achievement is not related to the 
family's public/private school decisions. Overall, the action takes place in the choice 
of inputs, prior to the production of achievement.
As for the household characteristics, the strange result of family income 
negatively influencing achievement that is found in the exogenous schooling model 
(ex) still exists for public school families. No intuition is readily available to explain 
this result. However, the opposite relationship occurs for the private school families.
Other interesting results are that siblings appear to reduce the supply and 
demand of effort and schooling but not achievement directly. The results for mother's 
education suggest that public school families with better educated mothers 
demand/supply more of all the inputs of achievement. The statistical significance of 
the inverse Mills ratio in the schooling equations suggests that the way in which a 
family selects into a public or private school influences the family's decisions to 
demand school services.
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Comparing the All achievement equations of the exogenous and endogenous 
schooling models (ex and ee - Tables 6 and 13), the signs of the coefficients differ a 
great deal and no patterns are forthcoming. The complexity involved in modeling the 
family's choice of school services appears to wash out the ability to draw conclusions 
about the household production of achievement. The lack of statistical significance 
may result because the variables are not influential or the estimated coefficient is 
imprecise (standard errors being too large). Relying on the opportunity cost variables 
and non-linearities to identify the influence of so many endogenous variables severely 
reduces the ability to draw conclusions. This highlights the need to devise an 
alternative way to represent schooling and effort, perhaps with indices.
Comparing the achievement equations of the exogenous (ex) and endogenous 
(ee) schooling models reveals the magnitude of this problem. In particular, prior 
achievement (Prior_A) is statistically significant in all specifications of the 
achievement equation. However, the absolute values of the t-ratios for Prior_A are 
dramatically smaller in the endogenous schooling model (ee). This suggests an 
explosion of the standard errors due to multi-collinearity.71 In general, the degree of 
multi-collinearity among the independent variables in an econometric model can be 
measured by the condition index. A rule of thumb is that any condition index over 30 
signifies severe multi-collinearity. The condition index of the Discuss achievement
71 This comparison is not entirely tractable because ee's achievement equations are 
adjusted for selectivity which is another source of multi-collinearity. Removing the 
inverse Mills ratio from the achievement equations does not change the results in any 
appreciable manner.
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equation of the endogenous schooling model is 1,249 - very severe multi-collinearity. 
In comparison, the condition index of the Discuss achievement equation of the 
exogenous schooling model is 209 - less severe but still severe multi-collinearity.
Such problems are common with empirical models that push the data.
Conclusions of the Endogenous Schooling Model 
Given the endogeneity of schooling, the complementarity or substitutability of 
schooling and parental effort is revealed in the response of parents to changes in the 
relative opportunity costs of these inputs. The reduced form equations for schooling 
demand and effort supply yield conflicting results. The coefficients on wages in the 
schooling equations and the coefficients on the choice set variables in the effort 
equations represent cross-price relationships. Of the 48 cross price coefficients, 5 
suggest substitutability; 4 suggest complementarity; the remaining 39 are statistically 
insignificant. This "bean counting" method is inconclusive.72 However, F-tests and 
likelihood ratio tests reveal that in general parents are responding to changes in cross 
opportunity costs - wages influence schooling while the price shifter variables impact 
parental effort. These tests of joint significance also suggest that parents are 
responding to own opportunity costs - wages influence parental effort and the price 
shifter impacts schooling. Nevertheless, these scattered results highlight the need for 
overall measures of schooling and parental effort. Creating an index poses the 
problem of how to weight each measure of school service or parental effort.
72 The ability to perform cross equation hypothesis testing is hampered by the 
diversity of estimation procedures.
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With regard to the production of achievement, having to control for the supply 
of effort and demand for schooling creates estimation problems that are solved by 
instrumenting the parents' choice variables. However, by doing so, the ability to 
(empirically) draw conclusions is diminished due to multi-collinearity. In short, the 
lack of statistical significance in the achievement equations of the endogenous 
schooling model (ee) is to a large degree due to the imprecision of the estimated 
coefficients (large standard errors) rather than the lack of importance (small 
coefficients).73 This is not an entirely unexpected result given the use of so many 
expected values and controlling for sample selection.
Comparing the Results s f  the Exogenous and Endogenous Schooling Models 
Multi-collinearity aside, comparing the exogenous (ex) and endogenous (ee) 
schooling models provides insight into how parents may respond to the initiatives of a 
policy-maker. In the exogenous schooling model (ex), the level of schooling provided 
by the local public school influenced parental effort as measured by Event. A pattern 
emerged that parental effort substitutes for the quality of teachers but is complemented 
by the quantity of teachers. The policy-maker looking to boost achievement may 
consider providing more teachers per pupil to foster parental effort. Recall Event 
boosted achievement in this model. In the endogenous schooling model (ee), parental 
effort and schooling respond to changes in opportunity costs, thus it would be prudent 
for the policy-maker to take advantage of these responses.
73 The coefficients in the achievement equations in the two models are similar in 
size. This and the lack of significance in the ee achievement equations highlight the 
severity of the multi-collinearity in the ee achievement equations.
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But which model is the correct model? Are parents able to choose schooling? 
Is schooling endogenous or exogenous? In order to answer this question, a weak 
exogeneity test is performed for public school families. To facilitate this test, effort 
equations (similar to those in the exogenous schooling model) are estimated.74 The 
actual values of the schooling variables enter into these equations along with the 
residuals of the schooling equations of the endogenous schooling model. These 
residuals are measures of the error terms of the schooling equations (es). The 
coefficients on these residuals represent the correlation between the schooling and 
effort decisions, Cov(eE,es). If these residuals are jointly statistically insignificant 
(indistinguishable from zero), then schooling is exogenous; in other words, the 
hypothesis of no simultaneity between decision to supply effort and the decision to 
purchase schooling fa ils to be rejected.15 If these coefficients are jointly statistically 
significant, then effort and schooling are simultaneously chosen by parents; schooling 
is endogenous.
Likelihood ratio tests provide the test of joint significance. For Check,
Discuss and Event, the likelihood ratio statistics are 2.57, 22.99 and 7.69, 
respectively. According to these chi-squared statistics, the hypothesis of exogeneity 
fails to be rejected for the Check and Event equations, while it is rejected with a 
degree of confidence of 99 percent for the Discuss equation. The Check and Event
74 The inverse Mills ratio is included to adjust for sample selection.
75 According to Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988), this test 
is asymptotically equivalent to a Lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity.
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equations therefore suggest schooling is exogenous, but the Discuss equation suggests 
that schooling is endogenous. The Check measure of effort has been wrought with 
problems from the very start because of its nature.76 Discuss and Event are more 
straightforward measures of parental effort. Given these mixed results, no conclusions 
can be drawn regarding the exogeneity or endogeneity of schooling for public school 
families.
The ramifications of finding endogenous schooling in the Discuss equation 
extend to the researcher and the policy-maker. If schooling is truly exogenous, studies 
of parental effort and student achievement like the exogenous schooling model have 
efficient and consistent estimates. However, if schooling is truly endogenous, then 
such studies must control for the family's ability to choose schooling in order to obtain 
consistent estimates. Incorrectly treating schooling as endogenous yields consistent but 
inefficient estimates, while incorrectly assuming exogeneity yields biased and 
inconsistent estimates. Given this, a conservative researcher should treat schooling as 
endogenous.
For the policy-maker, endogenous schooling implies that changing the level of 
schooling or the opportunity cost of schooling may distort the behavior of the family - 
the effort they supply and the schooling they purchase. With endogenous schooling, 
the family has even more ways to hinder or help policy objectives. The key is to 
influence parental behavior in a complementary fashion such that parents purchase
76 For some families, "checking on" homework may indicate more effort and thus 
more achievement. While for other families, it may indicate the child needs help 
because they are not achieving.
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more schooling and/or supply more effort.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS
Returning to the beginning, the objective of this dissertation is to explore the 
"determinants of the determinants" of a child's achievement. It is assumed that 
schooling, parental effort and other household characteristics determine a child's 
achievement, where parental effort and schooling are chosen by parents. In turn, 
these choices are determined by the constraints, preferences, abilities and opportunity 
costs of the parents. Parents satisfy their demand for a child's achievement by 
supplying effort and purchasing schooling. Of particular interest is the interaction 
between parental effort and schooling. Are they substitutes or complements?
In modeling the constrained choices of parents, this dissertation develops three 
theoretical models. These models vary with respect to the ability of parents to choose 
schooling. However, no matter how parents choose schooling, if policy-makers 
attempt to boost achievement by providing or subsidizing schooling, then parents can 
either help or hinder this policy - parental decisions are distorted. Allowing parents to 
choose schooling simply allows them another way to react to policy and adjust the 
production of achievements accordingly.
Distortions in behavior due to government programs are not new. A 
commonly told story in public finance classes is that giving a family Food Stamps does 
not increase the family's expenditure on food by the full amount of the Food Stamps.
125
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This "leakage" results because some of the cash formally spent on food is now spent 
on non-food items.
However, as shown in the theoretical models, the inclusion of the household 
production function introduces a new twist in the distortion of parental choices.
Parents adjust the production of their desired level of achievement by adjusting the 
supply of effort and the purchasing of schooling. So, if the government influences the 
purchase of schooling then the supply of effort may be distorted. However, this is not 
the new twist. The new twist is that the distortion depends on the relationship 
between the inputs. In short, the public provision or subsidization of schooling may 
induce more parental effort because schooling and parental effort complement one 
another. Or, the opposite may hold true - giving or subsidizing schooling may reduce 
parental effort because schooling and parental effort are substitutes. In the end, the 
impact of government educational programs on parental effort is theoretically 
ambiguous and is thus an empirical issue.
Empirical Findings 
One way of looking at the methods of this dissertation is as an empirical 
merger of the household production and time supply literatures with a little help from 
public finance. One of Mincer's (1977) criticisms of Hill and Stafford's work is that 
it fails to show empirically a relationship between parental time inputs and a child's 
achievement. This dissertation fills this gap by borrowing from Hanushek (1992) and 
by following the methods of Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). Along the way, 
consistent estimates of the household production function are obtained and the
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exogeneity of schooling is tested.
Empirically exploring the decisions of parents and the potential influence of 
public programs leads to the estimation of two empirical models. These models differ 
with respect to the ability of the family to choose schooling. In the first model, 
schooling is assumed to be exogenously determined through the public provision of 
schooling. The reaction of parental effort to a change in the public provision of 
schooling is found by estimating the parents' reduced form effort supply equation. In 
this equation, the coefficients of various school services represent the overall 
substitutability and complementarity of schooling and parental effort.
In the endogenous schooling model, parents choose schooling among private 
and public schools within their choice set. In this case, parental behavior is revealed 
by estimating reduced form equations for effort supply and schooling demand. 
Potentially, government policy boosts achievement by making it easier for parents to 
purchase schooling (thereby reducing the price shifter). In this model, the 
substitutability and complementarity of schooling and parental effort is revealed by 
income and cross price effects.
The results of these two models suggest a mixed relationship between various 
forms of parental effort and school services. In the exogenous schooling model, the 
parental effort measure Event shows that parents withdraw effort as schooling increase 
but provide more effort when the relative number of teachers increases. No such 
conclusions can be drawn from the other measures of effort (Check and Discuss) or 
from the endogenous schooling model's schooling equations; the results are too
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conflicting. However, the opportunity costs of effort and schooling are still important. 
Nevertheless, whether schooling is actually a matter of choice is tested, and schooling 
is found to be exogenous and endogenous depending of the measure of effort used.
Policy Conclusions
An economist evaluating the effectiveness of government programs aimed at 
boosting achievement must consider the distortionary effect the programs have on 
household production and consumption. If parents withdraw effort in response to 
improved schooling, then the policy-maker who ignores this may over-estimate the 
influence that a school improvement program may have on student achievement. If 
parents supply more effort with improved schooling, the policy-maker who ignores the 
response of parents may under-estimate the influence that school improvement 
programs have on the level of student achievement.
According to Becker (1993, p.274), "[r]edistributions of expenditures within 
families induced by government subsidies can explain why many programs appear to 
have weak effects on participants." Empirically, Peltzman (1973) found some 
evidence that tuition subsidies to higher education reduce family expenditures on 
higher education. The findings of this dissertation suggest that the relationship 
between school inputs and parental effort is diverse and complex. Depending on the 
school input and measure of effort, the two can be either substitutes or complements. 
Any policy-maker wishing to compensate for the distortion of parental behavior needs 
to consider the specific elements of the policy. "Throwing money at schools" may be 
in part subsidizing alternative parental activities rather than boosting student
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achievement; however, it may also be providing incentives for parents to supply more 
effort. It depends on what the money is being "thrown at".
Concluding Remarks 
The ability of policy-makers to improve the level of student achievement 
depends not only on the efforts of students and teachers but also on the effort of 
parents. Understanding parental behavior is crucial to public policy, since the 
response of parents to public policies may hinder or help the effectiveness of these 
policies.
In the process of investigating parental effort, schooling, and achievement, the 
literature is advanced in four ways. First, the commodity demand/production function 
for child achievement is consistently estimated. Previous studies treated effort and 
schooling as exogenous to household production. Second, following the comments of 
Mincer (1977) and the work of Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983), the time-use and 
household production function literatures are merged with regard to student 
achievement. In general, the findings of these literatures are supported in this 
dissertation. Third, different assumptions regarding the provision of schooling are 
explored in the context of household production and time allocation; i.e., the existence 
of private schooling and the ability of families to choose public schooling are 
considered in the context of household production and time allocation. It is found that 
parents choose schooling. Thus, treating schooling as exogenous leads to 
inconsistently estimated results. Lastly, Becker and Tomes (1976) assertion that the 
distortions in household resource allocation run counter to the objectives of the policy-
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maker is empirically investigated for the first time with regard to primary and 
secondary education. It is found that the allocation of parental effort and the 
purchasing of schooling are influenced by the opportunity cost of schooling over which 
the policy-maker may control. The key is influence parental behavior in such a way 
that purchase more schooling and/or supply more effort.
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Figure 2 - Realistic Endogenous Schooling Model
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Figure 3 - Expected Relationships
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Figure 6 - Identifying Restrictions (ee)
Effort and Schooling Equations 
Private School Familea 
Non-linearity of Probit
Public School F am lies 
R_Num, R_Den, Religious and 
Non-linearity of Probit
Achievement Equationa 
Public School Familea 
M_Wages, F_Wages, B_Num, 
B_Den, Choice, Local, Alike 
and Non-lineaiitiea
Achievement. Equationa 
Public School Familea 
M_ Wages, F_Wages, R_Num, 
R_Den, Religious, B_Num, 
B_Den, Choice, Local, Alike 
and Non-linearities
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Appendix of Tables














0, if child report his/her parents NEVER checks on child's homework
1, if parents RARELY checks
2, if parents SOMETIMES checks
3, if parents OFTEN checks
0, if child report his/her parents NEVER discuss school with child
1, if parents SOMETIMES discuss
2, if parents OFTEN discuss
0, if child report his/her parents DO NOT GO to school events
1, if parents GO to school events
ratio of teachers to students in the child's school (times 0.00001)
lowest salary paid to a teacher at the school (times 0.01)
percentage of teachers with a Masters or Ph.D. degrees (times 0.01)
1, if child's school is not in a central city 
0, otherwise
percentage of students in the school's free or reduced price (times 0.01) 
percentage of students in the school that are non-minorities (times 0.01)
child's scores on standardized reading and mathematics questions from 
standardized examinations taken in 1990 (times 0.001)
child's scores on standardized reading and mathematics questions from 
standardized examinations taken in 1988 (times 0.001)
Continued
144
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1, if parent reports that child has behavior problems
0, otherwise
1, if child is female 
0, otherwise
number of years the mother spent in school (times 0.01) 
number of years the father spent in school (times 0.01)
1, if child is non-white
0, otherwise
1, if parent who answered the survey is Catholic
0, otherwise
1, if father is reported to be the most involved 
0, otherwise
wage of the mother, the opportunity cost of parental effort (times 
0.01)
wage of the father, the opportunity cost of parental effort (times 
0 .01)
number of siblings, including step-brothers and step-sisters (times 
0.01)
total family income from all sources in 1987 (times 0.000001)
1, if has encyclopedias, a computer, or study room 
0, otherwise
Continued
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1, if home does not have a dryer, washer, and dishwasher 
0, otherwise
1, if child's school is in a North Central states
0, otherwise
1, if child's school is in a Southern states
0, otherwise
1, if child's school is in a Western states 
0, otherwise
N ote: C ertain variab les needed  to  b e  rescaled  fo r estim ation.
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M_Wage___________ 8^ 10_______ 3.20
Continued
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Table 2 - Continued
Variable Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq



















^ D enotes d isc re te  v a riab les o f  w hich the  frequency 
and re la tive  freq u en cy  a re  provided
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Table 3 - Achievement Equation 
Exogenous Effort and Schooling Model 
Public School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)
Variable
Estimated Coefficients













































Tea/Stu 0.0041 0.0041 0.0022 0.0027
(0.43) (0.43) (0.23) (0.29)
LowSal -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.002
(0.63) (0.53) (0.44) (0.39)
% Degree 0.0115* 0.0112* 0.0128 * 0.0125
(1-74) (1.70) (1.93) 0 .8 8 )
NonUrb -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0013
(3.08) (3.15) (3.36) (3.35)
%NonLun 0.001 0.001 0.0011 0.0011
(1.14) (1.14) (1-22) (1.25)
%NonMin -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.86) (0.78) (0.94) (0.84)
Continued
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Table 3 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variables Check Discuss Event All
Child
Prior_A 0.9978 *** 0.9961 *** 0.9932 *** 0.9928 ***
(103.68) (103.77) (102.91) (102.76)
BadChild -0.0014 ** -0.0013 ** -0.0013 ** -0.0013 **
(2.28) (2.25) O-20) a .  12)
Girl -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(1.18) (1.52) (1-33) (134)
Parent
M_Ed 0.0192 *** 0.0174 *** 0.0183 *** 0.0167 ***
(3.28) 0 .9 7 ) (3.14) (2.86)
F_Ed 0.013 *** 0.0126 *** 0.0128 *** 0.0124 ***
(3.26) (3.16) (3.21) (3.10)
NonWhite -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.49) (0.36) (0.33) (0.30)
Catholic 0 0 0 0
(0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10)
F_Invol -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.95) (1.06) (0.83) (0.93)
Familv
Sibs -0.0247 *** -0.024 *** -0.0241 *** -0.0231 ***
(4.00) (3.91) (3.92) (3.76)
Income -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0063 -0.0064
(1.18) 0 .2 2 ) (1.35) (138)
Aid 0.0006** 0.0006 ** 0.0006 ** 0.0006 **
(2.24) O-20) (2-24) 0 .2 2 )
LimCap -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
( l . 10) (0.97) (0.86) (0.75)
Demozranhic
NorthCen -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005
(104) (0.95) (1.26) (1.15)
South -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.38) (0.36) (0.47) (0.44)
Continued
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• * *  S tatistically  significant to the  1 -p ercen t level.
**  S tatistically  significant to th e  5 -p e rc e n t level.
*  Statistically  significant to th e  10 -percen t level.
Im portan t: T h e  reported coefficients w e re  estim ated  w ith rescaled  dependent variab les. L o o k  to 
T ab le  1 fo r the rescaling  fac to rs .
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Table 4 - Effort Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model 
Public School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)
Estimated Coefficients
Variables Check Discuss Event
Constant 1.0718 *** 0.2222 -0.9988 ***
(4.59) (0.92) (3.53)
School
Tea/Stu -0.7267 -1.61 4.3105***
(0.62) (1.26) (2.87)
LowSal 0.0796 -0.734 -2.2947 ***
(0.13) (1.09) (2-95)
% Degree 0.2204 -0.0107 -3.4174 ***
(0.26) (0.01) (3.35)
NonUrb -0.0564 0.0412 0.2312 ***
(1.14) (0.78) (3.91)
%NonLun -0.1905* -0.0858 -0.3099 **
(1.68) (0.72) (2.30)
%NonMin -0.0584 -0.1011 0.1057
(0.68) (1.12) (1-04)
LR Test* 7.31 5.33 72.62 ***
Child
PriorA -3.1102*** 1.5521 9.9707 ***
(2.64) (1.20) (6.77)
BadChild -0.2169 *** -0.1219 -0.2345 ***
(2-99) (1.58) (2.64)
Girl -0.0423 0.2097 *** 0.0679 *
(1.25) (5.77) (1.65)
Parent
M_Ed 1.2294 3.9893 *** 2.0922 **
(1.49) (4.28) (2.09)
F_Ed 1.0147 1.1773 * 0.6485
(1.62) (1.79) (0.87)
NonWhite 0.1053 ** -0.0541 -0.0698
(2-17) (1.03) (1.20)
Continued
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Table 4 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variables Check Discuss Event
Parent - Continued 
Catholic 0.0241 0.0045 0.1037**
(0.63) (0.11) (2-24)
F_Invol -0.0137 0.062 -0.1124**
(0.32) (134) (2-16)
MWage 1.0899* 1.3438 ** 1.2776*
(1.72) (1.98) (1.67)
FWage 0.691 0.6963 0.6635
(1.41) (132) ( i n )
Family
Sibs -2.6258 *** -2.0101 *** -2.7695 ***
(3.70) (2.68) (2.98)
Income 0.8118 0.4628 2.5141 ***
(1-37) (0.70) (3.29)
Aid 0.0403 0.0565 0.0016
(1-10) (1.47) (0.04)
LimCap -0.06 -0.0746 * -0.2019 ***
(1.52) (1.80) (4.27)
Demographic
NorthCen 0.0258 -0.0754 0.2344***
(0.49) (1.36) (3.70)
South 0.05 0.0138 0.1178*
(0.88) (0.23) (1.72)











*** S ta tistically  sign ifican t to the 1-percent level. 
** S tatistically  significant to the 5 -percen t level. 
* Statistically  sign ifican t to  the 10-percent level.
* T h e  nu ll hypothesis is that the schooling coeffic ien ts a re  jo in tly  zero. 
Im portan t: T h e  rep o rted  coefficients w e re  estim ated  w ith  rescaled
dependent variab les. Look to  T ab le  1 fo r th e  resca ling  factors.
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Table 5 - Influence of Various Variables in Effort Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model 
Public School Families
Influence of a Change in a Continuous Variable bv One Standard 
Deviation on Probabilities
Variable p(Check Often)* p(Discuss Often)b p(Go to Event)'
Tea/Stu -0.0038 -0.0074 0.0266 ***
LowSal 0.0008 -0.0061 -0.0261 ***
% Degree 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0288 ***
%NonLun -0.0105 * -0.0042 -0.0207 **
%NonMin -0.0048 -0.0072 0.0103
M_Ed 0.0106 0.0315 *** 0.0212 **
F_Ed 0.0131 0.0135 * 0.0098
MWage 0.0113* 0.0124 ** 0.0155 *
FWage 0.0104 0.0093 0.0118
Sibs -0.0183 *** -0.0124 *** -0.0237 ***
Income 0.0089 0.0045 0.0322 ***
Change in the Probabilities Due to Dummv Variables
Variable p(Check Often) p(Discuss Often) p(Go to Event)
NonUrb -0.0183 0.0115 0.0900 ***
BadChild -0.0648 *** -0.0329 -0.0917 ***
Girl -0.0136 0.0591 *** 0.0260 *
NonWhite 0.0344 ** -0.0151 -0.0268
Catholic 0.4113 0.4930 0.3349 **
F_InvoI -0.0044 0.0178 -0.0434 **
Aid 0.0129 0.0159 0.0006
LimCap -0.0191 -0.0209 * -0.0777 ***
*** S tatistically  significant to th e  1 -p ercen t level. 
**  S tatistically  significant to th e  5 -p e rc e n t level.
* S tatistically  significant to  the  1 0 -percen t level.
* A t sam ple  m eans p(C heck O ften) is 0 .2 5 .
b A t sam ple  m eans p(D iscuss O ften) is 0 .6 2 . 
c A t sam ple  m eans p(G o to E vents) is 0 .2 1 .
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Table 6 - Achievements Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Exogenous Schooling Model 
Public School Families
(B oo tstrapped  S t. E rro rs , 1000 iterations)
(th e  ab so lu te  v a lu e  o f  t-ratios a re  in  p a ren theses)
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Check Discuss Event All
Constant -0.0075 -0.0007 0.0038 • -0.0079















Tea/Stu 0.01 0.0115 -0.0232 * -0.0349
(1.06) (1.10) (1.76) (1.09)
LowSal -0.0036 0.0015 0.0129 * 0.0022
(0.70) (0.28) (1.69) (0.09)
% Degree 0.0092 0.009 0.0348 *** 0.032 *
(1.30) (1.29) (3.40) (1.91)
NonUrb -0.0008* -0.0014 *** -0.0029 *** -0.0015
(1.90) (4.04) (4.10) (0.51)
%NonLun 0.0023 ** 0.0012 0.003 *** 0.0048
(2-03) (1.17) (2-58) (1.27)
% NonMin -0.0001 0.0015 * -0.0013 * -0.0018
(0.09) (1.90) (1.77) (1.22)
Child
Prior_A 1.0205 *** 0.9847 *** 0.9259 *** 0.9922 ***
(71.72) (92.14) (34.31) (6.84)
(1.44) * (1.48) ' (2-75) * (0.05) ‘
BadChild 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0003 0.002
(0.27) (0.79) (0.33) (0.56)
Girl 0.0001 -0.0017 *** -0.0008 ** 0.0027
(0.01) (2.69) (2-53) (0.38)
Continued
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Estimated Coefficients 
Variable Check Discuss Event All
Parent
M_Ed 0.0051 -0.0115 -0.0005 0.0352
(0.55) (0.76) (0.05) (0.48)
F_Ed 0.0015 0.0023 0.0053 0.0047
(0.23) (0-36) (1.07) (0.68)
NonWhite -0.0009* 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0018
(1-75) (0.51) (1.15) (0.39)
Catholic -0.0002 0 -0.0007* -0.0011
(0.58) (0.15) (1.79) (1-33)
FJnvol -0.0002 -0.0007* 0.0005 0.0016
(0.59) (1.95) (1.06) (0.69)
Family
Sibs -0.0043 -0.012 -0.0047 0.009
(0.37) (1.31) (0.47) (0.31)
Income -0.012 ** -0.0097 ** -0.0215 *** -0.0281
(2.24) (2-01) (2.9 3) (1.84)
Aid 0.0003 0.0002 0.0006 ** 0.0008
(0.94) (0.71) (2.19) (1 6 0 )
LimCap 0.0002 0.0002 0.0012 * 0.0011
Demographic
(0.40) (0.52) (1.87) (1.63)
NorthCen -0.0006 0.0001 -0.002 *** -0.0035
(1.46) (0.24) (2-82) (1.12)
South -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.001* -0.0016
(1.17) (0.49) (1.89) (1 1 9 )
West -0.0006 0.0009* 0.0004 -0.0025
(0.63) (1.93) (0.62) (0.43)
** Statistically  s ign ifican t to  th e  1-percent level.
** Statistically  s ig n ifican t to  th e  5 -p erccn t level.
* S tatistically  s ign ifican t to th e  10-percent level.
1 D enotes th e  ab so lu te  v a lu e  o f  th e  t-ratio  u n d e r th e  null hypothesis that the  
population  co effic ien t is equal to  1.
Im portant: T h e  rep o rted  coefficien ts w e re  estim ated w ith resca led  dependent 
va riab les . L o o k  to  T ab le  1 fo r  th e  resca lin g  factors.
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Choice Set (State Level) Variables
B_Num number of public schools in a state that have grades 10, 11, 12
(times 0.01)
R_Num number of private schools in a state that have grades 10, 11, 12
(times 0.01)
BJDen number of public schools divided by the state's land area
R_Den number of private schools divided by the state's land area
R to B ratio of private schools to public schools (R_Num/B_Num)
Local percentage of state and local school district revenue in the state
from local sources (times 0.01)
Alike absolute value of the difference between 50 percent and percentage
of the state's population in urban areas (times 0.01)
Choice 1, if state allows children to switch districts without changing
residency 
0, otherwise
Religious percentage of private enrollment in religious schools (times 0.01)
N ote : C erta in  variab les needed to b e  resca led  fo r estim ation.
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Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Public (n = 4159) Private (n = 809) All (n == 4968)
Variable Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq
Parental Effort 
Check 
Never1 678 0.163 135 0.167 813 0.164
Rarely1 1118 0.269 219 0.271 1337 0.269
Somed 1294 0.311 243 0.300 1537 0.309
Oftend 1069 0.257 212 0.262 1281 0.258
Discuss
Never1 751 0.181 80 0.099 831 0.167
Somed 2530 0.608 481 0.595 3011 0.606
Oftend 878 0.211 248 0.307 1126 0.227
Event
God 2527 0.608 635 0.785 3162 0.636
$?hpgl
Tea/Stu 0.068 0.016 0.083 0.028 0.070 0.020
LowSal 20000 2900 17600 3700 19600 3200
% Degree 5.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 2.00
NonUrbd 3504 0.843 313 0.387 3817 0.768
%NonLun 82.00 17.40 97.30 11.70 84.50 17.50
%NonMin 79.50 25.60 84.20 18.20 80.20 24.60
Choice Set ("State Level-)
R to B 0.273 0.135 0.324 0.124 0.281 0.134
R_Num 197 164 232 189 203 169
BNum 742 503 755 538 744 509
R_Den 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.008
B_Den 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.015 0.016
Religious 84.80 12.50 82.60 14.00 84.50 12.80
Choiced 565 0.136 251 0.310 816 0.164
Local 50.30 13.80 49.00 14.40 50.10 13.90
Alike 26.90 12.90 31.60 13.00 27.60 13.00
Child
Achieve 105 18 116 15 107 18
PriorA 95 15 105 14 97 15
BadChildd 226 0.054 29 0.036 255 0.051
Continued
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Public (n = 4159) Private (n = 809) All (n == 4968)
Variable Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq Mean/Freq Sdv/R.Freq
Child Continued
Girl'1 2160 0.519 401 0.496 2561 0.515
Parent
M_Ed 13.20 2.70 15.10 2.90 13.50 2.80
F_Ed 13.50 4.00 16.50 4.20 14.00 4.20
NonWhited 803 0.193 109 0.135 910 0.183
Catholic*1 1237 0.297 330 0.408 1567 0.315
F_Invold 841 0.202 186 0.230 1027 0.207
M_Wage 8.10 3.20 9.60 3.30 8.30 3.30
F_Wage 11.20 4.70 13.50 4.90 11.60 4.80
Family
Sibs 2.40 2.20 1.90 1.50 2.40 2.10
Income 44000 34000 93000 68000 52000 45000
Aidd 2632 0.633 647 0.800 3279 0.660
LimCapd 1501 0.361 126 0.156 1627 0.327
DemoeraDhic
NorthCend 1362 0.327 261 0.323 1623 0.327
South*1 1240 0.298 282 0.349 1522 0.306
West- 754 0.181 121 0.150 875 0.176
D enotes d isc re te  variab les o f  w hich th e  frequency  a n d  re la tive  frequency a rc  p rovided.
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Table 9 - Private School Participation Equation 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model




Choice Set (State Level)
R to B 2.1759***
(7.38)
Religious -0.3858
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Table 9 - Continued



























* * *  Statistically  significant to  the  1 -percen t level.
**  Statistically  significant to  the  5 -p erccn t level.
* S tatistically  sign ifican t to th e  10-percen t level.
Im portan t: T h e  reported  coefficien ts w e re  estim ated w ith rescaled
d ep en d en t variables. L ook  to T ab les  1 and 7  fo r the  
resca lin g  factors.
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Table 10 - Effort Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model 
Public School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Check Discuss Events
Constant 0.5861 *** 0.344* -1.0667***
(2-85) (1.75) (4.52)
Choice Set (State Level')
BNum 0.0007 0.0865 * 0.0352
(0.01) (1.83) (0.61)
B_Den 0.1703 -1.3526 -1.2541
(0.07) (0.98) (0.49)
Choice 0.0306 -0.0479 -0.0061
(0-46) (0.70) (0.08)
Local 0.1181 0.1656 -0.5002 ***
(0.68) (0.93) (2-47)
Alike 0.0028 -0.7179 *** -0.3189
(0.01) (3.02) (1 0 6 )
Child
Prior_A -2.5698 ** -0.464 11.197 ***
(2.01) (0.35) (7 6 8 )
BadChild -0.2179 *** -0.1055 -0.2419 ***
(3.00) (1.37) (2.84)
Girl -0.043 0.2075 *** 0.0516
0-2 7 ) (5.80) (1 2 8 )
Parent
M_Ed 1.4575* 3.1121 *** 2.6228 ***
(1-71) (3.32) (2.68)
F_Ed 1.1922* 0.6772 1.0354
(1 8 7 ) (1.03) (1-43)
NonWhite 0.1235 *** -0.0137 -0.1512***
(2.65) (0.28) (2.86)
Catholic 0.0569 -0.0654 0.1556***
0-3 3 ) (1.58) (3.12)
F_Invol -0.0086 0.0491 -0.1065**
(0.20) (1.08) (2-09)
Continued
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Table 10 - Continued
Parent - Continued
MWage 1.1407* 1.2142 * 1.4556**
(1.80) (1 8 1 ) (1.96)
FWage 0.5914 0.8801 * 0.2199
(1.21) (1.71) (0.38)
Familv
Sibs -2.6339 *** -1.6989 ** -2.7317 ***
(3.74) (2-23) (3.04)
Income 1.4796* -1.5336 ** 3.4649 *•*
(1.90) a .  i4) (3.96)
Aid 0.0453 0.0421 -0.0137
(1.24) ( l . i i ) (0-32)
LimCap -0.0388 -0.0719 * -0.1918***
(0.99) (1.78) (4.11)
DemoeraDhic
NorthCen 0.0407 -0.2292 *** 0.2343 ***
(0.61) (3.53) (3.04)
South 0.1244* -0.1439 ** 0.0323
(1.67) (2.03) (0.36)









Lambda 0.2263 -0.5288 *** -0.5613 ***
(1.46) (5.13) (2-47)
*** S ta tistically  significant to the 1-percent level.
** S tatistica lly  sign ifican t to the 5 -p ercen t level.
* S ta tistica lly  sign ifican t to the 10-percent level.
Im portan t: T h e  rep o rted  coefficients w e re  estim ated  w ith rescaled
d ep enden t variables. L ook to  T ab les 1 a n d  7  fo r th e  rescaling  
factors.
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Table 11 - Schooling Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model 
Public School Families
((he absolute value of t-ratku are in parentheses)
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Tea/Stu LowSal % Degree NonUrb %NonLun %NonMin
Constant 0.0635 *** 0.2027 *** 0.0049 *** 2.5512 *** 0.4658 *** 0.8457 •**
(21.77) (34.85) (11.79) (9 JO) (14.85) (20 J 0 )
Choice Set (State Level)
BNum -0.0043 0.0073 *** 0 0.3813 *** -0.0245 *** -0.0495 ***
a .o 8 ) (6.19) (0.06) (6.36) (3.56) (5.34)
B_Den 0.042 *** 0.0962 *** 0.0119*** 2.9886 *** 0.1456 -0.8423 ***
a -7 4 ) (3.21) (5.08) (4.65) (0.79) (3.33)
Choice 0.0085 *** 0.0019 -0.0005 *** -0.1956** 0.0169 * -0.0471 ***
(9.13) (1.03) (3.69) (2.05) (1.66) (3.49)
Local 0.0109 *** 0.0165 *** 0.0007 ** -0.052 0.1443 *** -0.0412
(4.53) (3.44) (1.99) (0.22) (5.60) (1.22)
Alike -0.0123 *** 0.0351 *** 0.0006 -2.0871 *** 0.2897 *** 0.078 *
(3.97) (5.68) (1.34) a  is) (8.40) (1.70)
Child
PriorA 0.0979 *** -0.1443*** -0.0041 -1.9239 0.9799 *** 0.7616 ***
(5.23) (3.85) (1.53) 0.00) (4.88) (2.89)
BadChild -0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0268 -0.0005 -0.001
(0.26) (0.25) (0.77) (0.26) (0.05) (0.06)
Girl -0.0004 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0066 -0.0033 -0.0048
(0.78) (1.58) (1.46) (0.14) (0.64) (0.71)
Parent
M_Ed 0.0245 ** -0.0407* 0.0006 -0.6831 0.3428 *** 0.241
a .o 2 ) (1.68) (0.35) (0.53) (2.64) (141)
F_Ed 0.0283 •** -0.0265 -0.0024 * -1.1403 0.0386 0.1129
(3.17) (1-48) (1.88) (1.28) (0.40) (0.90)
NonWhite -0.0015 ** 0.0062 *** 0.0003 *** -0.4617 *** -0.0326 *** -0.1939 ***
(2-26) (4.68) (2.84) (7.17) (4.60) 0 0 .87 )
Catholic 0.0023 *** -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0802 0.0083 -0.0013
(3.77) (0.88) (1.00) (1.24) (1.25) (0.15)
FInvol -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0918 0.0058 -0.0012
(0.23) (0.01) (1.16) 0 .54) (0.88) (0.14)
Continued
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Table 11 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Tea/Stu LowSal % Degree NonUrb %NonLun %NonMin
Parent - Continued 
M_Wage 0.0097 -0.0331 * •0.0006 0.6687 -0.0207 -0.1765
(1.08) (183) (0.44) (0.76) (0.22) (1-40)
F_Wage -0.0301 *** 0.0258 * 0.0035 *** 0.3613 0.2758 *** -0.1106
(4.35) (1 8 5 ) (3-56) (0-53) (3.71) (113)
Familv
Sibs -0.0082 -0.0074 -0.0016 -1.0697 -0.3099 *** -0.1155
(0.73) (0.33) (0.97) (0.94) (2.60) (0.74)
Income 0.0761 *** -0.0505 ** 0.0023 -3.154*** 0.9707 *** 0.5488 ***
(6-96) (2.28) (1.41) (2.97) (7.96) (3.37)
Aid -0.0011 *• 0.0018 * 0.0001 -0.1009* 0.0227 *** -0.0003
(2.20) (1.74) (1.51) (1.90) (4.11) (0.04)
LimCap 0.0012 •* -0.0017 0 -0.1928 *** -0.0491 *** -0.0413 ***
(2-08) (1-55) (0.15) (3.29) (8.25) (531)
Demographic
NorthCen -0.0081 *** -0.0188 *** -0.0007 •** -0.5052 *** 0.0539 *** 0.0669 ***
(8.95) (10.43) (5.32) (5.44) (5.49) (S.16)
South -0.0113*** -0.0181 *** -0.0008 *** -0.8745 *** 0.0375 *** -0.1079 ***
(11.18) (8.97) (5.43) (9.35) (3.41) (7-42)
West -0.0228 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0012 *** -0.4955 *** 0.0596 *** -0.1631 ***
(23.58) (3.81) (8.32) (5.11) (5.72) (11.90)
Miscellaneous 
Lambda -0.0159 *** 0.0359 *** 0.0018 *** 0.3367 * -0.1031 *** -0.0697 **
(7-36) (8.25) (5.56) (1.64) (4.16) (2.09)
*** S tatistica lly  significant to th e  1-p e rcen t level. 
**  S ta tistica lly  significant to the  5 -percen t level.
* S ta tistically  sign ifican t to the  10-percent level.
Im portan t: T h e  reported  coefficients w e re  estim ated  w ith rescaled dependent v a riab le s . L o o k  to  T ab les 1 and 7
fo r  th e  rescaling  factors.
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Table 12 - Test of Joint Significance 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model
Equations
Public Private
Wages Public Fees Wages Private Fees Public Fees
ParsntaLEffod
Check* 5.26* 0.73 1.52 1.46 2.32
Discuss* 7.11 •* 13.39 ** 4.97* 8.49 ** 10.61 *
Events* 0.13 12.72 ** 1.92 13.01 ** 14.13 ***
School ins
T to S 11.66 *** 44.84 *** 0.42 9.71 *** 15.49 ***
LowSal 4.44 ** 69.31 *** 1.24 5.17 *** 5.99 ***
% Degrees 7.06 *** 11.79 *** 0.36 3.86 *** 3.57 ***
NonUrb* 0.63 52.01 *** 1.48 6.55* 72.25 ***
%NonLun 7.33 *** 36.58 *** 1.32 3.31 ** 4.37 ***
%NonMin 1.83 15.26 *** 0.52 9.37 *** 21.15 ***
*** S tatistically  s ign ifican t to th e  1 -p e rcen t level. 
** Statistically sign ifican t to th e  5  -p e rcen t level.
* Statistically sign ifican t to  th e  10-percent level. 
k D enotes likelihood ra tio  tests ; a ll o thers a re  F-test.
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Table 13 - Achievements Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling 
Public School Families
(B ootstrapped S t. E r ro rs ,  1000 iterations) 
(the  absolute va lue  o f  t-ra tio s  a re  in parentheses)
Variables
Estimated Coefficients
Check Discuss Event All
Constant 0.0301 0.0324 0.0498 -0.0298
(0.44) (0.95) (0.79) (054)
Parental Effort (Exoected Values)
x(Check) 0.0051 -0.0106
(0.44) (0.73)
x (Discuss) 0.0087 0.0176 *
(1.32) (1-77)
x(Event) 0.0019 0.0242
(0.13) (1 5 3 )
School fExoected Values)
x(Tea/Stu) -0.1324 -0.1041 -0.1614 0.089
(1.05) (1.12) (1.10) (0.44)
x(LowSaL) -0.0848 -0.0569 -0.1434 0.1047
(0.46) (0.54) (0.97) (0.45)
x(%Degree) -0.1123 0.3316 -0.2196 1.2907
(0.10) (0.28) (0.20) (0.89)
x(NonUrb) -0.0058 -0.0121 -0.0044 -0.0128
(0.85) (1-51) (0.63) (158)
x(%NonLun) 0.0121 0.0072 0.0244 * 0.0089
(0.37) (0 5 7 ) 0 .64 ) (0.27)
x(%NonMin) -0.0052 -0.0075 -0.0132 0.0125
(0.20) (0-56) (0.57) (0 5 8 )
Child
PriorA 1.0022 0.9978 *** 0.9711 *«* 0.8652 ***
(17.77) (39.92) (14.85) (7-95)
BadChild -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0012 -0.0006
(0.17) (1 5 1 ) (0.83) (0.24)
Girl 0 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0034 *
(0.07) (1 5 8 ) (0.36) (1.76)
Continued
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Estimated Coefficients
Variables Check Discuss Event All
Pjcsots
M_Ed 0.0061 -0.0002 0.0086 -0.0284
(0.45) (0.02) (0.47) (109)
F_Ed 0.0029 0.0043 0.0073 0.0021
(0.24) (0.76) (0.98) (0.16)
NonWhite -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0013 0.0032
(0.44) (0.83) (0.26) (0.59)
Catholic -0.0001 0.0003 0 -0.0006
(0.18) (0.67) (0.01) (0.55)
FInvol -0.0005 -0.0008 ** -0.0005 -0.0001
(1.02) (2-08) (0.65) (0.13)
Family
Sibs -0.0137 -0.0206 ** -0.022 -0.007
(0.53) (2-22) (1.04) (0.23)
Income -0.0146 -0.002 -0.0167 -0.0321
(1.16) (0.14) (0.57) (1.12)
Aid 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001
(0.25) (0.03) (0.42) (0.35)
LimCap 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0023
(0.06) (0.32) (0.13) (1.00)
Demographic
NorthCen -0.0037 -0.0019 -0.005* 0.0013
(0.89) (0.55) (1-71) (0.24)
South -0.0054 -0.0044 -0.0073 0.005
(0.73) (0.91) (0.92) (0.46)
West -0.006 -0.0043 -0.0078 0.0087
(0.73) (0.71) (0.79) (0.64)
Miscellaneous
Lambda 0.0015 0.0003 0.0042 0.0026
(0.21) (0.07) (1.13) (0.36)
*** S ta tistica lly  sign ifican t to the 1-pcrcent leve l.
** S ta tistically  sign ifican t to the 5-perccnt lev e l.
* S tatistically  s ign ifican t to  the  10-percent lev e l.
Im portan t: T h e  rep o rted  coefficients w ere  estim a ted  w ith  rescaled  dependent variab les. 
L o o k  to T ab les 1 and 7 fo r the  re sca lin g  facto rs.
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Table 14 - Effort Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model 
Private School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)
■ r ■ -  r sagBSBF 'ti :a - r t- i - -in j a a e g g"BT -Maacggggag
Estimated Coefficients 
Variable Check Discuss Event
Constant 0.2283
(0.15)
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Table 14 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Check Discuss Event
Parent (continued}
NonWhite -0.0556 -0.1653 -0.3062 *
(0.47) (1.19) (1.70)
Catholic 0.1035 -0.1933 -0.1759
(0-71) (1.22) (0.77)
F_InvoI 0.116 0.0002 0.0307
(1.23) (0.00) (0.22)
MWage 0.8932 -3.3925 ** 2.7948
(0-59) (2-07) (1.34)
FWage 0.9759 0.1819 -0.3773
(0.94) (0.16) (0.25)
Family
Sibs -4.8727 ** -0.2753 2.1911
(1.97) (0-09) (0.64)
Income 1.6132 -1.5331 -0.6077
(0.97) (0.79) (0.22)
Aid 0.1169 0.271 ** -0.2399
(1.14) (2-24) (1.60)
LimCap -0.0105 -0.1956 -0.1715
(0.08) (1.57) ( i . n )
Demographic
NorthCen 0.5767 * -0.3639 -0.1971
(1.91) (0.94) (0.37)
South 0.3952 -0.1007 -0.2312
(1.60) (0.29) (0.51)
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Table 14 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Check Discuss Event
Miscellaneous - Continued
Lambda -0.3262 0.2399 -0.1684
(1.01) (0.60) (0.31)
** *  S ta tistically  significant to  th e  1 -perccnt level. 
**  S tatistically  significant to th e  5 -percen t level. 
*  S tatistically  significant to th e  10-percen t level.
Im portan t: T h e  reported  coefficients w ere  estim ated  w ith  resca led  dependent 
variab les. Look to T ables 1 and 7 fo r th e  resca lin g  factors.
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Table 15 - Schooling Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model 
Private School Families
(the absolute value of t-ratios are in parentheses)
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Tea/Stu LowSal % Degree NonUrb %NonLun %NonMin
Constant 0.0291 0.3331 *** 0.0022 -3.7703 — 1.1061 *** 0.0701
(0.86) (5 J6 ) (0.51) (6.14) (6.28) C0.29)
CHqice.SeJ IStat§_UYd)
R_Num -0.0695 *** 0.0486 * 0.0077 *** 1.3531 -0.0902 0.5211 ***
(4.15) (191) (3.46) (1.00) (1.05) (4.60)
R_Den -0.6471 -2.4169 * -0.1433 -27.161 5.8101 -27.668 ***
(0.64) (1.65) (1.05) (0.55) (1-12) (4.09)
Religious 0.0377 *** 0.0387 * 0 0.6029 0.1326** -0.0052
(3.67) (1.83) (0.01) (1.53) (2.44) (0.07)
B_Num 0.0108 * -0.0094 -0.0008 -0.8367 0.0226 -0.2538 ***
(1.79) (1.08) (1.03) (1.56) (0.73) (6 J 0 )
B_Den 0.1518 0.0455 0.0992 ** 28.687 -2.3971 12.153***
(0.41) (0.09) (1.98) (1.38) (1.26) (4.90)
Choice 0.001 -0.0143 ** -0.0007 0.3714 ** -0.0333 * 0.201 ***
(0.26) (199) (1.38) (2.46) (1.69) a. 27)
Local 0.0608 *** 0.0239 -0.0014 -1.5131 *** 0.1294*** 0.3128 ***
(7.09) (1.38) (1.28) (3.25) (2.87) (4.87)
Alike 0.0365 *** 0.0098 -0.0036 ** 2.3507 *** -0.1253 ** -0.0992
(3.24) (0.46) (2-42) (4.03) (2-12) (1-20)
Child
PriorA 0.2291 ** -0.1287 0.0238 * 3.0281 -0.4608 1.124
(2.24) (0.66) (1.78) (0.92) (0.86) (1.49)
BadChild 0.0127 *** 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0657 -0.0278 0.0071
(2-97) (0.30) (0.60) (0.29) (1.24) (0.23)
Girl 0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0004* -0.0071 0.0035 -0.0193
(1.14) (0.86) (1.82) (0.09) (0.40) (1.57)
Parent
M_Ed 0.0314 -0.1704* 0.0015 4.0502 ** -0.3762 0.391
(0.68) (1.82) (0.25) (2-29) (1.54) (1.12)
F_Ed -0.0961 *** -0.0641 0.0097 ** 1.1874 -0.1874 0.4047
0 .8 3 ) (0.93) a  i9) (0.97) (1.04) (1-58)
Continued
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Table 15 - Continued
Estimated Coefficients
Variable Tea/Stu LowSal %Degree NonUrb %NonLun %NonMin
Parent- Continued 
NonWhite 0.0048 * 0.0123 ** -0.0003 -0.2387 ** -0.001 -0.1664 ***
(1.77) (2-31) (0.73) (2.02) (0.07) (*•28)
Catholic -0.0133 •** -0.026 *** 0.0002 -0.131 -0.0169 0.078 ***
(3.97) (4.01) (038) (1.10) (0.96) (3.13)
F_Invol 0.0026 -0.0067* -0.0001 0.1455 -0.0034 0.0098
(1.34) (1.67) (032) (1.61) (033) (Q.66)
M_Wage -0.0126 -0.0526 0.0027 1.2775 -0.2471 -0.154
(0.42) (0.85) (0.69) (0.91) (1.56) (0.68)
F_Wage 0.0188 0.0243 -0.0018 0.6724 0.0126 0.1173
(0.86) (0.54) (0.63) (0.66) (0.11) (0.71)
Familv
Sibs -0.1947 *** 0.0695 -0.0027 0.0722 0.2796 -0.6476
(3.61) (0.67) (039) (0.03) (0.99) (1.63)
Income 0.0523 -0.2541 *** 0.0021 3.783 *** -0.4412 ** 0.792 ***
(1.30) (3-32) (0.39) (4.41) (2-09) (2.66)
Aid 0.0032 0.0074 * 0.0003 -0.0826 0.0075 -0.0205
(149) (1.78) (1.20) (0.86) (0.66) (130)
LimCap 0.0058 ** 0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0187 -0.0326 *** -0.0322 *
(2-47) (0.63) (0.52) (0.19) (2.67) (1.90)
Demographic
NorthCen -0.0345 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0015 0.3056 0.0245 0.1401 ***
(4.81) (4.40) (1.60) (1.12) (0.66) (2.75)
South -0.0073 -0.0614 *** -0.0017 ** 0.7153 *** 0.039 0.2699 ***
(1.25) (5.41) (2-06) (3.88) (1.20) (5.98)
West 0.0001 -0.019 ** -0.0039 *** 0.4387 * 0.1274*** 0.0824 **
(0.03) (2-21) (6.06) (1.80) (5.05) (239)
Miscellaneous 
Lambda -0.0111 -0.0638 *** 0.0004 0.8876 *** -0.0787 * 0.1666 ***
(1.38) (4.40) (0.42) (11.60) (1.88) (2.* 7)
*** S ta tistica lly  significant to  the 1-percent level. 
** S ta tistica lly  significant to the 5 -percen t leve l. 
*  S ta tistically  significant to the 10-percent leve l.
Im portan t: T h e  rep o rted  coefficients w ere  estim ated  w ith rescaled  dependent v a riab les. L ook  to  T ab les 1 and 7 
fo r  th e  resca ling  factors.
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Table 16 - Achievements Equations 
Endogenous Effort and Schooling Model 
Private School Families
(B ootstrapped  St. E rro rs , 1000 iterations)
(th e  ab so lu te  v a lu e  o f  t-ratios a re  in  p a ren theses)
Variables
Estimated Coefficients
Check Discuss Event All
Constant 0.0072 -0.0055 0.0144 -0.0047




x(Discuss) --------- -0.002 ------- -0.0026
(t.20) (1.08)
x(Event) ------- 0.0002 0.0002
(0.31) (0.32)
School
x(Tea/Stu) -0.0345 -0.0555 0.0061 -0.0339
(039) (0.80) (0.12) (039)
x(LowSaL) 0.071 • 0.0895 •* 0.0725 * 0.0966 **
(1.86) (2.18) (1.84) (2.16)
x(% Degree) -0.0778 -0.1636 0.2391 0.0317
(0.10) (0.27) (0.48) (0.04)
x(NonUrb) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.71) (0.63) (0.65) (0.65)
x(%NonLun) 0.0011 0.0075 -0.003 0.0067
(0.06) (0.37) (0.16) (033)
x(%NonMin) 0.0022 0.006 0.0006 0.0061
(0-34) (0.86) (0.10) (0.90)
Child
PriorA 0.8428 *** 0.8534 *** 0.8082 *** 0.8323 ***
(10.55) (14.49) (18.14) (10.46)
BadChild -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0011
(0.38) (0.31) (0.52) (037)
Girl 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.27) (0.40) (0.20) (037)
Continued
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.




Check Discuss Event All
Parent
M_Ed 0.0203 0.0312 0.0144 0.0307
( i n ) (1.52) (0.97) (1.54)
F_Ed 0.0024 0.004 0.002 0.0043
(0.23) (0.37) (0.20) (0.41)
NonWhite -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0008
(0.49) (0.45) (0.75) (0.53)
Catholic -0.0004 -0.0001 0 0.0002
(0.26) (0.09) (0.03) (0.14)
F_Invol -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.56) (0.22) (0.53) (0.10)
Family
Sibs -0.0013 -0.0133 0.0043 -0.0133
(0.05) (0.45) (0.17) (0.44)
Income 0.0081 0.0185 0.0028 0.0183
(0.54) (1.10) (0.24) (1.09)
Aid 0.0005 0.001 0.0004 0.001
(0.59) (0.95) (0.44) (1.03)
LimCap 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.20) (0.32) (0.05) (0.14)
Demographic
NorthCen 0.0012 0.0016 0.003 0.003
(0.26) (0.49) (1-10) (0.61)
South 0.002 0.0025 0.0034 0.0036
(0.52) (0.79) (1.15) (0.85)
West -0.001 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0012
(0.20) (0-15) (0.35) (0.20)
Miscellaneous
Lambda 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0001 0.0023
(0.19) (0-77) (0.06) (0.84)
*** S tatistically  s ign ifican t to  th e  1 -percen t level.
** Statistically s ign ifican t to th e  5 -p ercen t level.
* Statistically sign ifican t to  the  10-percen t level.
Im portant: T h e  rep o rted  coeffic ien ts w e re  estim ated w ith rescaled  d ep en d en t variab les. L ook to  T ab les 1 and 
7  fo r th e  resca lin g  facto rs.
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Table 17 - Summary of Effort Tables
(4) (10) (14)
ex-Public ee-Public ee-Private
Variable C D E C D E C D E
Schooling
Tea/Stu -  - 0
LowSal + - ©
Degrees + - ©
NonUrb -  + ©
%NonLun © - ©
%NonMin -  - +
Child
PriorA © + 0 © - 0 - - +
BadChild © - © © - © + - +
Girl -  0 0 - 0 + - 0 +
Parents
MJEd + 0 0 © 0  0 + + +
F_Ed + 0 + © + + - + +
NonWhite 0  - - © - © - - ©
Catholic + + 0 + - 0 + - -
F_Invol -  + © - - © + + +
M_Wage 0  0 0 0 0  0 + © +
F_Wage + 4* + + 0 + + + -
Familv
Sibs © © © © © © © - +
Income + + 0 0 © © + - -
Aid + + + + + - + 0 -
LimCap -  © © - © © - - -
Choice Set
R_Num + + -
RDen + © +
Religious - - -
BNum + © + - © +
BDen + - - - © -
Choice + - - + - 0
Local + + © + + 0
Alike + © - - + -
Misc.
Lambda + ©  © - + -
N ote: C ircled  signs a re  sta tistica lly  sign ifican t.
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Variable T L D U L M P T L D U L M
Constant 0 © 0 0 © 0 © + 0 + © 0 +
Child
Prior_A © © - - 0 0 © © - 0 + - +
BadChild - + + - - - - 0 + - + - +
Girl - + + - - - - + - © + -
Parents
M_Ed 0 © + - 0 + 0 + © + 0 - +
F_Ed 0 - © - + + 0 © - 0 + - +
NonWhite © © 0 © © © © 0 0 - © - ©
Catholic 0 - + - + - 0 © © + - - 0
F_InvoI - - - - + - + + © - + - +
M_Wage + © - + - - + - - + + - -
FWage © 0 0 + © - - + + - ■f + +
Family
Sibs - - - - © - © © + - + + -
Income 0 © + © 0 0 0 + © + 0 © 0
Aid © 0 + © 0 - 0 + 0 - -
LimCap 0 - - © © © - 0 + - - © ©
ChQi?? Set
R to B 0
RNum © © 0 + - 0
R_Den - © - - + ©
Religious - 0 0 + + 0 -
B_Num © 0 - © © © 0 - - - + ©
BDen © 0 0 0 + © + + 0 + - 0
Choice © + © © 0 © 0 + © - 0 © ©
Local 0 0 0 - 0 - - 0 + - © 0 ©
Alike © 0 + © © © 0 0 + © 0 © -
Misc.
Lambda © 0 0 0 © © - © + © © 0
N ote: C ircled signs a re  sta tistica lly  significant.
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Table 19 -  Summary of Achievement Tables
(3) (6) (13) (16)
xx-Public ex-Public ee-Public ee-Private
Variables C D E A C D E A C D E A C D E A
Constant © © © 0 - - © - + +• + - + - + -
Effort
Check + + © + + - + -
Discuss © © © - + © - -
Events © © © © + + + +
Schooling
Tea/Stu + + + + + + © + -
LowSal + © + - - - + 0  0  0  0
% Degrees © © © © + + © © -  + - + - - + +
NonUrb © © © © © © ©
%NonLun + + + + © + © + + + © + + + - +
%NonMin - - - - © © - -  - - + + + + +
Child
PriorA © © © © © © © © © © © © 0  0  0  0
BadChild © © © © + - + +
Girl - - - - + 0 © + - - - © + + + +
Parents
M_Ed © © © © + - - + + - + - + + + 4*
F_Ed © © © © + + + + + + + + + + +
NonWhite - - - - © + +
Catholic + + - - - - © - -  + - - - - + +
FInvol - © + + - ©
Familv
Sibs © © © © - - - + -  © - - - - + -
Income © © © © -  - - - + + +
Aid © © © © + + 0 + + + + + + + + +
LimCap - - - - + + 0 + + - + + + + - +
Miscellaneous
Lambda + + + + + + - +
N ote: C irc led  signs a re  sta tistica lly  significant.
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Total Differential of E and L
w2Utcc
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U u ' M c c
dE
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” UCC ^ V cc UaJ S s - vJ e s- ”P ! Vcc U ^ lT -E -D w U ^  -SwU(CC
wUcc w 2Ucc -w p sU.cc Uc +[T-E-L]wUcc -SwU,
Comparative Statics on Parental Effort 
Non-labor Income
En = G
* u cc w2Ucc
wUcc VLL + w2Ucc









= G[wUccUL[)  > 0




~UaaFJs ~ UjJ es ~ 'wP sUcc * 2uc
-wpsUtcc Vll * * 2Vcc
-  ♦ V jB * " P sUa$ V LL+ v1Vcc] ^ V c c M ^ U ^ ]  <«
- - c ttW ,t ♦ v j j i v ll + w % c] H yvsuccvLj
-  - p % - C [ l W s][l/t l * ^ U cci - G W J eeKVll* *>2VCJ  >=< 0
Price of Public Schooling
Eps = G
-SwUcc w2Ucc
-Sw2Ucc ULL * w2Ucc
= -G[[SwUcc][Ull * w 2Ucc] -  [w2Ucc][SwUcc]] (7)
= -G[SwUccUl J
=  <  0
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Wags
Uc + [T -  E -  L]wU.cc w 2U,cc
Uc + [T -  E -  L]wUcc ULL + w 2Ucc
= G{[UC * HwUcc][Ull + w 2Ucc]'cc*
(8)
= G[UC «■ HwUcc\Ull
= GUCUU + HEn >=< 0
Total Time Available
ET = G
w 2Ucc w 2Ucc
* 2VCC VLL +
= G[[w2^ cc][^I£ + w 2Ucc] -  [W2UCC][W2UCC])'cc*1- v cc* (9)
= G[w 2UccUl J
= wEn > 0
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Endogenous Schooling Model 
Second-Order Conditions
|C?i| -  UjuJ e + ^jSee + w2Ucc < ® (10)
* V J u  * w*u cc v 'V c c
w 2U.cc Uu  <• w 2Vcc
■ W j !  ♦ V J u  <■ w 2Ucc][Uu  * w 2Ucc] -  [w2t/cc][w 2Vccl 
m WaJ I  * U J eJ lU u  * W2UCC] * w2UccULL > 0
(11)
Ua/ e 'U J se^ U ,cc w 2C/cc UJuf/s*UjifEs*wPSUtCC
w U,cc Ull+w 2Ucc wpsU.cc
t v / f + UJes +WPS ^ cc WP SVCC UaJ s +UJx +p 'U cc
W j l + % £ +” 2UCC] [ U j *  * %  +plucc] [Ull + w 2Ucc] 
^A /SSe + fsE + WPs^cc] +
^A /SSe + UjSse + WPsUCc] [W2(^ccl 
W /JJs  + U/SeS + WPs^ CC  ^Wa/SeSs + ^/t^ES + WPs^ CC^  
[U/jSe + U/SeE + w2^ c J  W W  ['VPs^Cci 
+ ^/Sss + Psu ccttw2uccttw2ucc\ K 0 (w»/xw«0
(12)
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Comparative Statics on Parental Effort
Non-labor Income
wUcc w2Ucc V jJ J s  + VJk  + vp'U cc
IIt*f wUcc UlL * w2Ucc *psu cc
P su cc w su cc VjJ ?  ♦ % + P*Vcc
* GllwUccK U jJ? * VJa  * P ^ U U u  * W2UCC] 
* [wC/cc][t-Vs/i- + uJes * wPSUCcll*VSUCC1 
* \PsUcc][» 2Ucc\ \» p sUcc\
-  [“'t'ccl lWPSUcd  lVPSVcd
-  fw^cel W fjj}  * U J a  ♦ P ^ V c c U w ^ J
-  t fU c J I U j J S ,  *  V J B  ♦ * p sUccUULL ♦  w 2Ucc}}
‘  G U w U c J lV ^  * V Ja  + p*U cc\{ULL]
-  W c J V J M  * V Jb  * *PSVCC][VLL)
-  G l W a M U j t  ♦ V J ^ I V ^
-  lP*Ua2lv u f / s  * V M W u )
= G Uc c Ul M U Mf i  * U Jssl -  P ' W j i  * i v y  ]
“ GUccUl l [UJJ l ^ s -  p sf^  + UA[wfss -  p sf 5EI]
■ W a J U u V tM x  -  p % EI > - < 0
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Wage
E  = GW
Uc ♦ [T-E-L]wUcc 





+ Uj/ eS +WP 5^CC
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- GWJC * [T -E -Q w U ^ iu J Z  <-
-  [ i r - M j . ' y u g ' / j  * H/oHiW
= G V ^ l V ^  ♦ £ //„ ]
* o[r-B -i]w o,ectfIj i ^  * u jB)
- G[r-£-z.]pIucct/tt[t)A/ 1/s ♦ ty y
= G U J U u lV j ;  * t y y
♦ [T-E-i] <3 G celU w tt^/? * % ]  -P jttW A  ♦ % D
= g v cvll\v j I  * u jss\
* [T-E-L]GUccULL[UAA[wfs -  p% ] * UAM a  ~ P % bI]
= guculliu^  * ig y
+  I T - E - L l G U c c U ^ U J w f x  -
= GUcUll[ U ^  * (//„]
+ [T-E-L]En >=< 0
(16)
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Comparative Statics on Schooling
Non-labor Income
U j l  ♦ UJa  *
w2U,cc
cc v'U cc *Ucc
Ull * w2Ucc * V CC
UaJSs + u J es  + wPSucc uccwPS P %cc
-  CUUaA  * U J a U U u K p ’U a l
- [H'VanU uU U ^/s * % ] )
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Price of Schooling
Spt = G
UaJ e * V J m  * >»2l/cc w l Va  -SwU,
w 2U,cc
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Wage
U j t * V J u + * 'V c c  "*UCc UcHT-E-LlwUcc
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DATA APPENDIX
This appendix contains descriptions of the variables used in the econometric 
models. Whenever possible the actual survey question that a variable is based upon is 
provided. In addition, descriptions from the NELS code book are provided when 
possible.
Parental Effort
Check - How often do your parents check on whether you have done your
homework? [OFTEN, SOMETIMES, RARELY, NEVER] Source: 
the 1990 student survey, F1S100A.
Discuss - In the first half of this school year, how often have you discussed things 
you've studied in class with either or both of your parents or 
guardians? [NEVER, SOMETIMES, OFTEN] Source: the 1990 
student survey, F1S105C.
Event - In the first half of the school year, how often did either of your parents
or guardians attend a school event in which you participated?







- classifies the type of school into public, Catholic, other religious and
nonsectarian private schools, as reported by the school. . Source: the 
1990 school survey, G10CTRL1.
- How many full-time regular teachers work in your school? As of
October 1, 1989 (or the most recent date for which data are available), 
what was the total student enrollment in your school? Source: the 
1990 school survey, F1C35 & F1C2.
- What are the lowest... annual salaries currently paid to full-time teachers
on your school's payroll? Source: the 1990 school survey, F1C42A.
- How many members of your full-time regular teaching staff have
[Masters] ? How many members of your full-time regular teaching 
staff have [Ed.D. or Ph.D] ? Source: the 1990 school survey,
191
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F1C44C & F1C44D.
NonUrb - is derived from a variable that trichotomizes the urbanicity of the area in
which the sample member's second follow-up school is located. This 
metropolitan status is defined by QED for public school districts, for 
Catholic dioceses, or in some cases for the county in which the school 
is located. These classifications are based on the U.S. Census. 
[URBAN, SUBURBAN, RURAL] Source: the 1990 school survey, 
G10URBAN.
%NonLun - What percentage of the total student body in your school receives [free or 
reduced-price school lunch program]? (Please provide your best 
estimate.) Source: the 1990 school survey, F1C30A.
%NonMin - What percentage of your current tenth grade students are [white, not of 
hispanic origin]? (If none, enter '000'. Percentages should sum to 
100%.) Source: the 1990 school survey, F1C27F.
Child
Achieve - IRT Theta: t-score According to the NELS Second Follow-Up: Student
Prior A - Component Data File User's Manual, "... this score is standardized to a
mean of SO and standard deviation of 10. ... First, it is a 
transformation of the IRT-estimated ability scale (theta) rather than of 
a count of estimated correct answers on test items. Second, the 
standardization is done across years, rather than within year. Each 
test taker in the panel sample had three thetas: the measurements of 
ability at the base year, first follow-up, and second follow-up. The 
scores are standardized so that the mean score within each subject area 
is SO, and the standard deviation is equal to 10 when scores are 
aggregated over all students and all three observations for each 
student. The parameters for standardizing were computed for the 
panel sample, using panel weights, and then applied to all test scores. 
Thus, the mean of these scores for the base year test takers alone 
would be less than SO, for the first follow-up around SO, and for the 
second follow-up, more than 50. ... Since all three waves are used in 
standardizing, the resulting scores are normally distributed across 
years, and the distributions within year, particularly for the earliest 
and the latest observations, would be somewhat skewed. Thus, this 
score is most useful for analysis of longitudinal gains rather than
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cross-sectional comparisons. Gains in this metric can be computed by 
subtracting earlier scores from later ones.” Source: the 1992 student 
survey.
BadChild - Has your eighth grader ever been considered to have a behavior problem 
at school? [YES, NO] Source: the 1988 parent survey, BYP50.
Girl - was taken first from the "Your Background" section of the student 
questionnaire. If this source was missing or not available, then the 
value of the variable SEX assigned on the school roster was used. If 
SEX was still missing, it was imputed from the respondent's name. On 
any records for which this could not be done unambiguously, this 
variable had a value of Male or Female randomly assigned. Source: 
the 1990 student survey, SEX.
Parent
2 Parents - Which of the following people live in the same household with you?
[FATHER, STEPFATHER, OTHER ADULT MALE, MOTHER, 
STEPMOTHER, OTHER ADULT FEMALE] Source: the 1990 
student survey, F1S92A, F1S92B, F1S92C, F1S92D, F1S92E & 
F1S92F.
Ed - What is the HIGHEST LEVEL of education you have completed? What
is the HIGHEST level of education your spouse/partner has 
completed? [EIGHTH GRADE OR LESS, NOT H.S 
GRADUATION, GED, H.S GRADUATION, VOC,TRADE,BUS <
1 YR, VOC,TRADE,BUS 1-2YRS, VOC,TRADE 2YRS OR > ,
LESS THAN 2 YRS COLL, OR MORE YRS COLL, FINISHED 
2YR PROGRAM, FINISHED 4-5YR PROG, MASTER'S DEGREE, 
PH.D./M.D./OTHR PRO] Source: the 1988 parent survey, BYP30 & 
BYP31. M_Ed and F_Ed were derived from these categories.
Non White - race of the student, the categories of RACE are ASIAN/PACIFIC
ISLANDER, HISPANIC, BLACK NOT HISPANIC, WHITE NOT 
HISPANIC, AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE. Source: the 
1988 student survey, RACE.
Catholic - What is your religious background? [BAPTIST, METHODIST, 
LUTHERAN, PRESBYTERIAN, EPISCOPALIAN, OTHER 
PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, EASTERN ORTHODOX, OTHER 
CHRISTIAN, JEWISH, MOSLEM, BUDDHIST, HINDU, TAO,
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OTHER, NONE] Source: the 1988 parent survey, BYP29.
F_Invol - What is your relationship and that of your spouse/partner to the student
named on the front cover? [PARTNER'S RELATIONSHIP TO 8TH 
GRADER MOTHER, FATHER, STEPMOTHER, STEPFATHER, 
GRANDMOTHER, GRANDFATHER, OTHER FEM. RELATIVE, 
OTHER MALE RELATIVE, OTHER FEM. GUARDIAN, OTHER 
MALE GUARDIAN, NO OTH PARENT/GUARDN] It is asked that 
the most involved parent respond to the survey. Source: the 1988 
parent survey, BYP1A1 & BYP1A2.
Wage - Which of the categories below comes closest to describing this [your]
job? Which of the categories below comes closest to describing this 
[your spouse's] job? [CLERICAL, CRAFTSPERSON, 
FARMER/FARM MANAGER, HOMEMAKER, LABORER, 
MANAGER, MILITARY, OPERATIVE,
ACCNTNT/ARTIST/NURSE, DENTIST/LAWYER, PROPRIETOR, 
PROTECTIVE SERVICE, SALES, SCHOOL TEACHER, SERVICE, 
TECHNICAL, NEVER WORKED, DON'T KNOW] The wages 
were created by using these occupation question and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics median weekly earnings by occupation, by gender for 
1990. Home-makers received the wage for his or her gender's overall 
market wage as a measure of their foregone market wage. Sources: 
the 1988 parent survey, BYP34B & BYP37B and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1990.
Family
Sibs - How many older brothers do you have (including adopted, step-, or
half-)? How many older sisters do you have (including adopted, step-, 
or half-)? How many younger brothers do you have (including 
adopted, step-, or half-)? How many younger sisters do you have 
(including adopted, step-, or half)? [NONE, ONE, TWO, THREE, 
FOUR, FIVE, SIX OR MORE] Source: the 1990 student survey, 
F1S90A, F1S90B, F1S90C and F1S90D.
Income - What was your total family income from all sources in 1987? (If you are
not sure about the amount, please estimate.) Source: the 1988 student 
survey, BYP80.
Aids - Does your family have in your home a specific place for study? Does
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your family have in your home an encyclopedia? Does your family 
have in your home computer? Source: the 1988 student survey, 
BYS35A, BYS35D & BYS35H.
- Does your family have in your home an electric dishwasher? Does your
family have in your home clothes dryer? Does your family have in 
your home washing machine? Source: the 1988 student survey, 
BYS35I, BYS35K & BYS35J.
Demographic
- indicates in which of the four U.S. Census regions the school is
located. It was created by recoding the state of the tenth grade 
school the four Census Bureau regions: Northeast (New England and 
Middle Atlantic states); North Central (East North Central and West 
North Central states); South (South Atlantic, East South Central and 
West South Central states); West (Mountain and Pacific states). 
Source: the 1990 school survey, GIOREGON.
Choice Set (State LeveD Variables
- indicates the student's last attended school state. Source: the 1990
student survey, G10STATE. 
the number of private secondary schools plus schools with secondary 
grades in a state in the Fall 1990. Source: Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, Table 40. 
the number of private secondary schools plus schools with secondary 
grades in a state in the Fall 1980. Source: Digest of Education 
Statistics 1985-86, Table 40. Note: 1980 data is the most trustworthy 
data available; it is derived from a survey of all private schools in 
1980-81. More recent figures are base on samples that are not 
sufficiently large in all states.
B_Num divided by the land area (sq. mi.) of the state. Source: 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1991, table 347.
R_Num divided by the land area (sq. mi.) of the state. Source: 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1991, table 347.
R_Num divided by B_Num.
state and local revenue for public primary and elementary state general
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revenue from state sources. Source: Digest of Education Statistics, 
1991, table 152.
Alike - absolute value of the difference between 50 percent and percentage of the
state's population in urban areas in 1990. Source: Statistical Abstracts 
of the United States, 1992, table 33.
Choice - whether a state supports local public school choice programs. Source:
"Public School Choice: National Trends and Initiatives," New Jersey 
State Department of Education, 1988.
Religious - total enrollment in private primary and secondary schools divided by the 
total enrollment in Church-related, for the Fall of 1980. Source: 
Digest of Education Statistics 1982, table 40.
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